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Dawn Rothe, Ph.D.
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On April 28, 2004, pictures o f abuse and torture o f Iraqi detainees at Abu
Ghraib prison by U.S. military personnel shocked many Americans. In the wake of
the images, it became clear that several military personnel were involved in the acts
of torture and abuse. This dissertation explores the interconnections o f larger
structural factors, state policies, and individual actors in an attempt to understand how
and why torture and abuse occurred at Abu Ghraib. It builds upon an integrated
theoretical model o f state and corporate crime. The dissertation revises this model so
that it can better address the complexities o f state crime within the international arena.
The findings suggest that despite unequivocal individual responsibility, this was not
simply a case o f a few individual acts committed by rogue soldiers. Rather, a
thorough investigation and criminological analysis o f the reasons and forces behind
the torture at Abu Ghraib suggest that the Executive Branch, the Pentagon, CIA, and
Military Commanders bear culpability for the way in which their policies and
demands for intelligence altered the traditional handling o f prisoners.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What is past is not dead, it is not even past.
We cut ourselves o ff from it, we pretend to be strangers.
— Christa Wolf

On April 28, 2004, pictures of abuse and torture o f Iraqi detainees at Abu
Ghraib prison by U.S. military personnel shocked many Americans. The photographs,
first released by CBS network and The New Yorker, showed a hooded man—naked
on a box, arms spread, with wires dangling from his fingers; pyramids of naked
bodies; a line of naked men posed as if masturbating; and a man on a dog leash. These
images instantaneously spread around the world as the collective representation of
Abu Ghraib. U.S. citizens were confronted with the reality of their government’s
involvement in the use of state sanctioned torture. While President Bush declared it
“does not represent the America I know,” the nation was faced with the stark
contradiction between its stated principles and its practices. However, the dissonance
created by these images was quickly reduced as the blame for the torture was placed
on a “few bad apples.” And it soon became clear that many Americans simply did not
“want to see or hear the obvious. Frightened and searching for personal safety, the
public chose to avert its eyes” (Harbury 2005: 1). Criminologists, however, should
not avert their eyes from evidence of serious criminality. The torture that took place

1
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at Abu Ghraib prison was a flagrant violation o f international and domestic law and a
state crime. The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and explain this crime.
To understand the illegal events that occurred at Abu Ghraib, we have to
place them in the context of the Bush administration’s general “war on terror” and the
invasion and occupation of Iraq. The images from Abu Ghraib provide “a window
into the larger picture” o f U.S. policies since the current war on terror began (Brody
2004: 1). The state crimes committed at Abu Ghraib cannot be explained without
placing them in this broader historical and structural framework.1 Analyzing this
historical background also demonstrates that the events in question were not just the
unfortunate actions of a “sick few” but also a set o f systemic practices endorsed by
the chain of command at the highest levels in clear violation o f international law.
I begin by providing a literature review that examines the central issues
surrounding a criminological case study of state crime. This includes a review of
theories of the state and the contributions of state and state-corporate crime scholars.
Chapter II presents the theoretical frame that guides my analysis. Included in this
section is a review of an integrated model addressing state crime along with
contextualized proposed revisions to the original framework. I conclude Chapter II
with a section discussing the methodological issues involved in this analysis.

1 While the use of torture and violations of international law by the U.S. in the
war on terror needs to be systematically and theoretically analyzed, it should be noted
that far greater uses of torture and abuse happens worldwide on a systematic basis
that are ignored (e.g., Sudan, Darfur, China, North Korea, Russia, Israel, Democratic
o f Congo, Egypt, Jordon, etc.).
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Chapter III starts with a brief introduction to international law. This is
followed by a more extensive look at the international laws relevant to the cases of
Abu Ghraib torture. Specific legal issues concerning war crimes, torture, the status of
detainees during times o f conflict, and federal laws and military codes applicable to
this case study will be considered.
Chapter IV describes the historical background leading up to the events at
Abu Ghraib. I begin by charting the rise of the Neo-conservative agenda in American
politics and then go on to discuss the invasion of Afghanistan, the installation of
detention camps at Guantanamo, and the onset of the war on Iraq as a framework for
understanding Abu Ghraib.
Chapter V is dedicated solely to the events at Abu Ghraib. I begin by
providing a description o f the events that occurred leading up to the cases of torture
and/or cruel and inhumane punishment. Then I examine the subsequent charges and
punitive measures taken (or not taken) thus far against those involved.
Chapter VI begins the theoretical analysis. Specifically, the analysis is
organized according to the catalysts of motivation and opportunity. The chapter is
divided between general and specific motivations and opportunity. Chapter VII
continues the theoretical analysis focusing on the catalysts o f constraints followed by
controls at all four. I conclude each section with a brief summary of the analysis.
Chapter VIII offers some potential policies to address these types of state
crimes at both the international and domestic levels. I then review the limitations of
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my research followed by suggested future research o f the torture and abuses at Abu
Ghraib.

Literature Review

The growing inter-relationships between the state, international organizations,
transnational corporations, the mass media, and globalization generates a situation
where the interplay and reinforcement of these processes in multiple institutions
create profound implications for defining states. Moreover, as the state has been
reified to the point o f it being a seemingly “natural” institution, social scientists in
general, and criminologists more specifically often analyze the state without ever
providing a clear definition of the concept. Likewise, social scientists attempt to
create a theory of state, describing its functions and or roles, while simultaneously
failing to provide a working definition of the apparatus they are discussing. Therefore,
I wish to fill this gap and to allow the implicit to become explicit. I begin by briefly
exploring the complexities of state theory which have led to multiple and often
contradictory models. This is followed by a brief examination o f the political
construct of the term, state, by the U.S., international law, and the United Nations. I
conclude by offering my own working definition o f the state, which is subsequently
used in framing this analysis.
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State Theories

Attempts to develop a theory of the state have occurred for centuries.
Philosophers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all attempted to
explore the political components of society and civil governance. Classical theorists,
such as Marx (1906), Weber (1947), and Durkheim (1933) also developed theories of
the state and its function. By mid 20th century, contemporary theorists continued to
explore theories o f states. These works come from several scholars including
Miliband (1970), Poulantzas (1969, 1976), Habermas (1975), O’Conner (1973), and
Gramsci (1971). The modernity and dependency schools also explored state theory in
terms of globalization (see Smelser 1964; So 1990; Santos 1971; and Wallerstein
1986).
Nonetheless, during the 1980’s state theory waned considerably so much so
that the last decade was “notable for the impoverishment o f state theory” (Barrow
2005: 1). There were negligible theoretical advances and many radical scholars,
including critical criminologists, drifted away from state models. This was in part due
to the complexities o f the topic itself and a stalemate between “proponents o f various
theories.”
There was also a broad abandonment of grand theory and grand scale meta
narratives. The move from a Neomarxist model to post structuralist and post modem
theory shifted analysis from the macro to the micro forms of power and to
“technologies ofpower” (Foucault 1972; Henri-Levi 1977; and Mitchell 1991). As
such, there could be no “grand theory of the state-political. . . or of the economy”
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(Poulantzas 1978: 19). Instead, merely “general propositions can be made”
concerning the state unless specific to one nation state. The recognition that a Meta
theory of the state was unrealistic resulted in a shift in focus o f the state in general to
the capitalistic state in particular. “What is perfectly legitimate is a theory of a
capitalist state . . . made possible by the separation of the space of the state and that
of the economy” (20). This change also led to a neglect o f state definitions once
present in Classical models.
There was also an emerging trend towards theories of globalization and states.
The new interest in globalization sparked a renewal o f political economy models.
These began to take on an a priori assumption that state interests based on the
political economy were “considered eternal and self-evident” (Creveld 1999: 415).
Capital accumulation is seen as directly dictating the rhythm of state activity and is
articulated to and inserted into state global policy (Poulantza 1978; Wallerstein 1977,
1979, and 1986). Moreover, the concept of one grand economy, the global economy,
took center stage and was reified. Simply stated, the development o f a capitalistic
world economy was seen as “self-perpetuating.”
At the same time, recognition of the state as a more complex political
apparatus surfaced wherein the state was recognized as a pecuhar political entity
composed of an assemblage of impersonal and anonymous functions distinct from
economic power (Poulantzas 1978: 54). The state “is a specific and highly complex
phenomenon, and it can by no means be reduced to, or treated as a simple variant of,
the capitalist state” (Poulantzas 1978: 24). This included recognition of the relative
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separation o f the political from the economic. Nonetheless, the political, as conceived,
still failed to take into account agency or the forces of individuals’ ideological,
religious, and moral interests framed as state interests. As Seabrooke noted, the state
was effectively a faceless rational actor.
The globalization literature tended to analyze the state as potentially irrelevant
in international relations (Whyte 2003). State theories waned due to assumptions that
the nation state, as a meaningful unit of analysis, in the global economy, was ending
(Ohmae 1995). Griffen (1995) concurred with the deterministic view of globalization
as inevitable as well as the growing diminution o f the nation state. Simply stated, the
notion of sovereignty erosion was becoming popular leading to a further decline in
state theories that focus more broadly on state functions domestically and
internationally (Krasner 1995). Models accepting this premise focused on the
undermining of state sovereignty by the globalization of markets beyond the
institutional boundaries of states. Moreover, as such, states were not only seen as
declining in relevance, the actors within the political process were completely omitted.
Furthermore, these assertions rested upon a highly idealized and reified account of
globalization (Whyte 2003). State policies were viewed as inevitably market driven.
As such, state theories focused on the dynamics of a global and capitalistic economy,
most notably, U.S. centered. For example, Aglietta (1990) focused on Imperialism as
the emerging theme of globalization. This inevitably led to a state analysis that was
“incomplete” as it was “restricted to the structure and dynamics of wage relations in
the U.S.” (Aglietta 2000; Barrow 2005). On the other hand, other scholars (Domhofif
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1998) noted that theories of imperialism could not be constructed on the basis of
economics alone.
In general, political scientists examined international relations and foreign
policy using two approaches: (1) the structure of the international system (based on
economics and rational choice models), and (2) decision making analyses that attempt
to explain political processes from within states (Spiegel and Wheeling 2005). Both of
these orientations failed to address the dialectic process between states and the
international arena. Concerning this point, Seeley (1986: 133) stated, “Never be
content with looking at states purely from within; always remember that they have
another aspect which is wholly different, their relation to foreign states.” These
interstate relations need not be limited to or solely based on political-economic
relationships, but could incorporate tradition, religion, or ideological interests.
The focus for other scholars shifted to an elite centered model wherein (in
Milibandian and Domhoffian terms) states were seen as captured by a “mere fraction
of capital that is pursuing a myopic definition o f national interest rather than the larger
neoimperial interests o f globalizing capital” (Barrow 2005: 20). This attention
coincided with a renewed interest in class conflict now seen as intrastate contradicting
interstate class interests. Simply stated, the state took on the personification or
representation o f class interests within a global conflict. As stated by Wallerstein
1977: xi), “we shift from seeing classes (and status groups) as groups within a worldeconomy.”
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Interest also began to shift towards state models that could explain the
significance of interstate relations more broadly. This shift inevitably led back to the
ongoing debate over the significance o f state theory within a global order. For
example, Cox (1987; 1992: 31) challenged the idea the state was in retreat and
proposed an internationalization of the state wherein the state was being transformed
“into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to a perceived
global economy.” Others claimed the state was growing stronger in its role within the
international arena because state specific resources remain core to economic activity.
For example, transnational organizations “utilize the most advanced states for foreign
investment and remain tied to specific dominant states” suggesting state economies
may supersede a “global economy” (Hirst and Thompson 1996).
In general, models of the state either; focus on domestic affairs or on
international relations and/or globalization. There are few accounts o f state theory
that are capable o f addressing both without reducing one or the other to a point of
irrelevance. Moreover, the few theories that do address both usually focus on the
western capitalist state to do so (Barrow 2005; Cox 1987; Whyte 2003). With the
reemergence of interest in political economy models, variables at the level of agency
are often ignored. There are exceptions. For example, in exploring international
relations and prohibitions on state behavior, Passas (2004: 1) states:
it is also true— despite the inattentions o f most international relations
scholars—that moral and emotional factors related to neither political nor
economic advantage but instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian
sentiments, faith in universalism, compassion, conscience, paternalism, fear,
prejudice, and the compulsion to proselytize can and do play important roles
in the creation and the evolution of international relations.
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Intrasocietal interactions as well as interstate relations entail highly complex
processes in which not only “economic and security interests but also moral interests
play a prominent role, in which the actions of states must be understood as the
culmination of both external pressures and domestic political struggles” (Nadelman
2004: 2). This is not an argument suggesting states have moral views; rather, “the
capacity of particular moral arguments to influence government policies, particularly
foreign policies, stems from the political influence of domestic moral entrepreneurs as
well as that of powerful individual advocates within the government.” Others, such as
Charles Beitz (1979) and James Mayall (1982), also focused their research on
morality in international politics, centered on individuals with agency, as opposed to a
focus on the state.
In essence, these premises bring back the agentic forces that compose the
state political apparatus and allow for an understanding o f state actors beyond capital
accumulation and domestic legitimation. It allows for the interactional level within the
structural and international levels to be explored. This view, coupled with
international critical legal theory (Carty 1991) that recognizes the diversity of states
and state functions within international relations moves beyond the limitations of state
theories that are focused on the economic relations wherein capitalism lies at the heart
o f the analysis.
From this brief review o f state theories, a general lack o f operationalizing of
states is evident. As previously stated, there are relatively few contemporary state
theories that provide a working definition of the state within their research.
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Exceptions to this include Giddens (1985), who suggested the state can be defined as
an apparatus of government o f a definite type within a society. Neuman (2005)
recently defined the state as “all the government, or the public sector, plus much of
the what immediately surrounds it, connects it to society, and holds it together” (17).
Yet, in general most political sociologists and critical criminologists, while putting the
state at the center o f their field, fail to provide a definition o f the state at the core of
their analysis. In part, this omission is simply because “defining the state is a
notoriously difficult task” (Faulks 2000: 20). As such, it is often omitted. I wish to fill
this gap by providing a working definition of the state. In doing so, I briefly review
how the state has been defined by political entities.

Political Entities

The preceding brief overview demonstrates the multiple ways the state has
been analyzed and its subsequent role within sociology. Yet, defining a state is also
done within the political arena, both internationally and domestically. For example,
The Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (S 201) and the 1933 Montevido Convention
on Rights and Duties of State used a more simplistic model for defining a state
wherein the state has (1) a defined territory and population, (2) said territory and
population are under the control of its own governmental apparatus, and (3) the entity
engages in or has the capacity to engage in formal relations with other states. Another
working definition used by the United States’ State Department when dealing with
international legalistic matters and its foreign policy relating to other states includes
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these characteristics: (1) the entity has effective control over a clearly defined
territory and population, (2) possesses an organized governmental administration,
(3) has the capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and fulfill
international obligations, and (4) has been recognized as a legitimate entity by the
“international community.”
The defining o f a state can often be done ad hoc and for self-serving interests
of the state such as that offered on November 16, 2001, by President Bush. He
defined the state as “any State, district, territory, or possession o f the United States”
(Federal Registrar, Vol. 66, p. 57835). While this definition is much more expansive
than those offered by sociologists, the 18 USC goes further and defines the state as
“all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including . . . all places and
waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction o f the United States” (18
USC Section 5 and 49 USC 46501 (2)).
International Governmental Organizations also define states. For example,
Article 4(1) of the UN Charter explicitly mentions the ability and willingness “in the
judgment of the Organization” to carry out international obligations as a criterion for
admission of new members to the United Nations, thus, as recognition o f statehood.
This stipulates what constitutes statehood in accordance with international law, i.e.,
the essentiality inherent to the state as a subject o f international law. All other
requirements for statehood according to international law, in particular the existence
of effective power of control over a territory and its inhabitants, are derived from this
one criterion: the necessary ability and readiness to act in accordance with
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international law. Moreover, admission of new states as members o f the United
Nations takes place by an act of collective recognition by existing states.
Thus, statehood becomes defined by more abstract concepts such as
recognition, self-determination (UN Charter 1: 2) and willingness to fulfill
international obhgations and relations. Simply stated, statehood becomes defined
internationally using the constitutive approach: recognition by other states and/or by
the declarative approach: states have a legal personality de facto regardless of
international recognition or UN membership.
While international and state definitions are based on political interests,
legalistic criterion and/or legal obhgations, they demonstrate the ambiguities of
defining a state. Consequently, it seems, as social scientists we must be aware of the
socially constructed nature of and implicit assumptions o f the term “state.” As such, it
is essential that we operationalize such an ambiguous term, perhaps even more so
when we claim criminal liability on the part of a state. Therefore, I suggest that the
state be defined as:
the institutions, organizations, and/or agencies composed of actors
representing and entrusted with the functions of the political apparatus
governing the corresponding population via the legitimate and symbolic use of
power, contained within a historically and culturally defined milieu and bound
territory.
This definition allows us to conceptualize the state as composed of individuals
and also as an entity that has been reified as the institution of political power within
the existing territory and culture. Moreover, by recognizing the agentic forces that
compose the administrative machinery, we are not limited to political-economic or
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capitalistic models of the state, but can consider the political, ideological, and
religious views o f the actors that often frame the socially constructed “state
interests.” After all, ideology always has roots “which go beyond the state apparatus
and which always consist in relations o f power” (Poulantzas 1978: 37). Once
operationalized, we can analyze state actions as crimes. According to state and statecorporate criminological research, states can commit crime. While definitional issues
plagued the concept of state criminality for nearly a decade, it is now recognized as a
legitimate area of research within the field of criminology.

State Crime Literature Review

Only recently have criminologists studied state crime. Yet, state crime has
been approached in a number o f fashions by a number of disciplines (i.e., criminology,
history, political science, sociology). For example, at the end of the nineteenth
century, a French judge, Louis Proall (1898), in his book Political Crime, focused on
the crimes of statesmen and politicians. Becker and Murray (1971) analyzed how
state governments break the law as did Lieber in 1972. Sociologists, such as Giddens
(1985) and Tilly (1985), explored the use of organized violence used by nation-states.
Keelman and Hamilton (1989) analyzed crimes committed in accordance to obedience
to state authorities.
State crime was also conceptualized as political crime. Austin Turk (1982),
however, viewed this as crimes against the state not by the state. Instead, Turk (1982:
35) stated, “No matter how heinous such crimes may be, calling them political crimes
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confuses political criminality with political policing or with conventional politics, and
therefore obscures the structured relationship between political authorities and
subjects.” Hagan (1997), on the other hand, argued that political crimes were crimes
committed by the state. Ross (2000, 2003) combined the earlier work o f Turk and
Hagan and defines political crime as both, crimes against the state and crimes by the
state. Other criminologists began exploring state crime from a political economy
model. For example, Michalowski (1985) utilized a political economy model to
explore crimes of capital committed by organizations. To date, the strongest body of
work on state crime has been done in critical criminology.
The intellectual history behind White-Collar Crime (WCC) research on state
crime can be traced back to Edwin Sutherland (1939) who called attention to a thenneglected form of crime, namely the crimes of respectable people in the context of a
legitimate occupation, and of corporations. Although the significance of such crime—
white-collar crime—was conceded by some criminologists in response to Sutherland,
only a few began to focus on white collar crime until several decades after his 1939
speech, and the publication of his landmark book, White Collar Crime (1949).
Since the 1970’s, however, a fairly rich literature and substantial interest in
white-collar crime has developed within criminology (e.g., Friedrichs 2004). Yet,
Sutherland himself was not at all interested in crimes of states. For him “war crime”
referred to black market activity of businessmen, and he disregarded the massive
crimes of the Nazis, which were taking place during the decade that he was working
on his White Collar Crime book. But his extension of the concept of crime beyond its
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conventional parameters did provide an important foundation, built upon by several
later scholars, for the establishment o f a criminology o f crimes of the state (Clinard
1946; Geis 1967; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970; Kramer 1982; Vaughn
1982; Turk 1982; and Michalowski and Kramer 1987). Nonetheless, for most of the
twentieth century criminologists largely disregarded the topic of crimes of the state.
For example, in 1988, Martin stated that criminologists neglected the study of large
scale economically motivated international criminal networks. At about the same time
Manual Lopez-Rey complained “about the neglect o f criminology of nonconventional crime” including state sponsored terrorism (Martin et al. 1988 in Barak
1991: 7).
While the concept of state crime had been addressed by a few criminology
scholars one can argue that Chambliss’ (1989) American Society of Criminology
Presidential address provided the more direct and immediate inspiration for more
systematic attention to crimes of the state on the part of a number o f criminologists
(Barak 1990; Friedrichs 1992; Kramer 1992, 1995; Ross 1995; and Tunnell 1993).
These early works (though often plagued by definitional issues) examined the crimes
o f the state as well as potential controls of such crime. The two issues that generated
much debate in these early works were (1) whether the individual or the state
(organization) was culpable for acts deemed a state crime and (2) what standards
should be used to define state criminality.
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Definitional Issues I: Individual Versus State Entity

Dating back to Sutherland, the notion o f an organization being criminally
liable has consistently been met with resistance by criminologists until the late 1970’s
through the mid 1980’s. It was then some criminologists began to incorporate ideas
from organizational sociologists’ research (Ermann and Lundman 1981; Schrager and
Short 1978; Gross 1978; and Vaughn 1982, 1983). In the 1970’s the organizational
sociologists emphasis argued that social scientists needed to move beyond focusing
on the individuals who make up an organization and to recognize that the aggregate
whole “iunctions as an entity” (Hall 1987, quoted in Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998: 7).
Moreover, they are capable o f actions that affect a community (Perrucci and Potter
1989). As such, it can be argued that organizations, as social actors, “can and should
be the primary focus of analysis in state and corporate crime” (Kauzlarich and Kramer
1998: 9). Others strongly objected to the notion of a state, as a social actor, in an
analysis of state or corporate crime (Cressey 1989). Nonetheless, research on state
and corporate crime that defined the state as a social actor continued. However,
within the international legal arena, the notion of a state actor was already well
underway.
The concept o f a state as an entity possessing individual rights and subject to
criminal liability emerged back in the mid 1900’s. As Henkin (1995: 111) points out:
At Nuremberg, sitting in judgment on the recent past, the Allied victors
declared waging aggressive war to be a state crime (under both treaty and
customary law) as well as an individual crime by those who represented and
acted for the aggressor state.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

18

In 1976 the International Law Commission again discussed the notion of state
criminal responsibility (Jorgensen 2000: 28). Moreover, several legal scholars have
observed, there is a connection between individual criminal responsibility and state
criminal responsibility under international law (Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe
2005). Cassesse (2003: 19) suggests that most o f the offenses proscribed under
international law “for the perpetration of which it endeavours to punish the individuals
that allegedly committed them,” are considered by international law “as particularly
serious violations by States” ; consequently, when a crime is committed by an
individual “not acting in a private capacity, a dual responsibility may follow: criminal
liability of the individual, falling under international criminal law, and State
responsibility, regulated by international rules on this matter.”
Furthermore, during the process of negotiations o f the Rome Statute in 1998,
the French delegate introduced a proposal for the inclusion o f organizations including
states. Of the two drafts proposed, one Draft Statue contained an Article that would
subject legal entities to the Court’s jurisdiction if the crimes were committed on behalf
of such legal persons or their agencies or representatives. In the end this was
dismissed as contradictory to the principle of a complimentary system (Sadat and
Carden 2000). Jorgensen (2000) also has called for the use of state criminal
responsibility. I agree with her claim that there is a link between state and individual
criminal responsibility. As social actors, an organization is nonetheless composed of
specific agentic individuals.
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The inclusion of states as criminally responsible actors would eliminate a
major obstacle o f non-babibty currently evidenced in state criminological analysis. By
including a state as criminally liable it would follow that, as acting Head o f State, the
individuals) at the top of a political apparatus be held responsible. Thus, state
officials cannot avoid responsibility through claims of ignorance, non-participation,
hegemonic propagandized counter-claims, and plausible deniability to protect both
their inner circle and military leaders by limiting prosecutions to the lowest levels of
involvement (Schmitt 2005a). Such additional prosecutorial possibilities will place a
level of responsibility upon state leaders that should undercut existing criminogenic
tendencies in the modem nation states. It will also heighten the energies funneled into
the due diligence governments practice in the oversight of their sub-units.
Moreover, a state as an organization will not necessarily be deterred from
criminal action if it can merely sacrifice individual agents to the court as it can
sacrifice individual soldiers and units on a battlefield (Mullins et al. 2004). With the
precedent set at the Nuremberg Trials, acting Heads of States would be held liable
Furthermore, Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) work emphasizes that the loci of state
criminality is the state, not the individual. Structural and organizational conditions
combine with individual predilections and positions to generate these offenses;
punishment of individuals will not be able to deter the polities themselves from
offending. One can sanction numerous bureaucrats, soldiers and spies without
eliminating a state’s ability or motivation to engage in criminal behaviors. The most
powerful motivational elements arise within the state itself, not within the state’s
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agents (Mullins et al. 2004). Moreover, states as criminal actors would further ensure
victim(s) compensation and a sense of justice for those victimized. It also would allow
for sanctions to be set against the state versus utilizing the underpowered ICJ or
trying to get the Security Council to grant such a sanction with existing veto votes.
Obviously, one cannot incarcerate a state. However, the ability to levy trade
and other sanctions upon criminal states may act as further controls. Restriction of
trade, imposition o f tariffs, denial of loans from foreign powers or the International
Monetary Fund, or insistence upon collection of outstanding debts are all tools which
the ICC could use to exert social control. This requires that there exist political and
economic bodies capable o f and willing to engage in such sanctioning behaviors.
While sanctions are often criticized as ineffective, these claims are often made
disingenuously as part of broader political rhetoric or the specificities o f a case are
inappropriately generalized (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
If we accept that a state is indeed an actor that may be held liable for its
actions, we must then discuss what standards we should use to judge a states’ action
as criminal. This was the other issue of the contentious debate engulfing earlier works
of state crime research.

Definitional Issues II: Standards to Be Used

Within criminology, the idea of a state being criminally liable was met with
significant resistance. There were those that denied state criminality was possible. The
common argument against state criminality was that “governments and their agencies
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do not commit crimes, but only because the criminal law does not take cognizance of
them as criminal actors.” Instead, states can only commit “noncriminal deviance”
(Cohen 1990: 104). On the other hand, scholars who supported the idea of state
criminality were divided upon the standards to be used between a legalistic frame and
a broader frame including social harms to human rights.
Several criminologists argued that the standard for defining a crime by the
state needed to be expanded to include social definitions. The earliest proponents of
this view were the Schwendingers (1970) who proposed crime could be socially
defined based on the notion of human rights. While some criminologists followed the
idea of human rights (Galliher 1989) broader definitions were also put forth. For
example, Michalowski (1985) suggested that socially analogous harm could be used
to define state or corporate crimes (see also Barak 1990). Nonetheless, from its
inception, the growth and development of state crime studies have been faced with a
key conceptual problem: how can the state be a criminal actor when legally it is the
state itself that defines criminal behavior? Barak (1991: 8) points out that:
the study o f state criminality is problematic because the concept itself is
controversial, in part because of a debate over whether one should define
crime in terms other than law codes of individual nations. Some argue that if a
state obeys its own laws, it should be judged by no higher criterion.
Sharkansky (1995) presents such a critique, arguing that while states may
commit many undesirable behaviors one can not call them criminal unless they
expressly violate their own laws. Labeling a state criminal on other grounds violates
key precepts o f national sovereignty and a nation’s right to regulate itself. However,
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this critique sees even well recognized instances o f state criminality, like the
Holocaust, as “nasty” behaviors but not criminal.
In Chambliss’ 1989 presidential speech he suggested that state crimes are
those that are “acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials in
pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the state” (184). Kramer and Michalowski
(1990) quickly followed with the definition of state-facilitated crime, those activities
of the state which fail to constrain criminal and dangerous behaviors. Chambliss
(1995: 9) subsequently again called for resolving the key question at the foundation of
the discipline, the definition of crime, so that the discipline could remain viable and
vital. He stated:
State organized crimes, environmental crimes, crimes against humanity,
human rights crimes, and the violations of international treaties increasingly
must take center state in criminology.. .Criminologists must define crime as
behavior that violates international agreements and principles established in
the courts and treaties o f international bodies. (Chambliss 1995: 9)
Green and Ward (2000) have critiqued definitions of state crime that are based
on a highly legalistic use of international law. They define state crime as the area of
overlap between two phenomena: (1) violations of human rights and (2) state
organizational deviance. They suggest that human rights are “the elements of freedom
and well-being that human beings need to exert and develop their capacities for
purposive action” and that state organizational deviance
is conduct by persons working for state agencies, in pursuit o f organizational
goals, that if it were to become known to some social audience would expose
the individuals or agencies concerned to a sufficiently serious risk of formal or
informal censure and sanctions to affect their conduct significantly. (Green and
Ward 2000: 110)
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They have opted for a deviance-based definition that draws upon the work of Howard
Becker (1963) and other labeling theorists. Green and Ward assert that state crimes
are only offenses when the action is labeled as such by a social audience. Other
definitions, they claim, lack legitimacy. Moreover, their latest work (2004) examined
state crime in relation to corruption, state-corporate crime, natural disaster, police
crime, organize crime, state terror and terrorism, torture, war crimes, and genocide all
under the rubric of International Human Rights Law (IHL) and the labeling of such by
some social audience. This approach is far too vague concerning what constitutes a
social audience and which audiences may legitimately label behavior a crime.
Moreover, IHL draws from existing customary law and is incorporated in many
Treaties. Others, such as Kramer and Michalowski (2005), have responded to the call
of Green and Ward for using international human rights by claiming that human rights
and/or more vague frames can indeed be incorporated within the body o f an
international legalistic frame.
In general, the critical critique of using legal codes as the base definition of
crime is well discussed. Alternative formulations have been advanced, ranging from
international legal codes to basic human rights precepts to the perceptions of the
state’s citizens (Barak 1991, Chambliss and Zatz 1993, Tunnell 1993, Ross 1995,
Friedrichs 1996a, Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998, Ross et al. 1999, Green and Ward
2000).

The controversy over the appropriate definition of crimes of the state is sure
to continue, as standards used for defining state crime remain problematic and have
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not been fully resolved (see Ward and Green 2004). However, I contend that in
general, most critical criminologists studying state crime agree that using international
law (Customary, Treaties, Charters, and the newly emerged criminal law) constitute a
basic foundation for defining state crime as this framework includes standards such as
human rights, social and economic harms, as well as providing a legalistic foundation
(Rothe and Friedrichs 2005). Furthermore, international criminal law covers
individuals as well as states, thus resolving any ongoing reservations o f state as actors
versus individuals. As Jorgensen suggests, “all acts which constitute international
crimes may in principle entail individual or state responsibility, or both, depending on
the nature and circumstances of the breach, and that the two notions can complement
each other” (Jorgensen 2000: 139). In sum, the emergent principle o f criminal law is
that states themselves can commit crimes, and they can and should be held criminally
responsible for them (Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe 2005). Consequently, I follow
a more legalistic approach by drawing upon existing international law in the definition
of an act as criminal similar to the recent definition proposed by Kramer,
Michalowski, and Rothe (2005: 56) wherein state crime is defined as any action
violating
public international law, international criminal law, or domestic law when
these actions are committed by individuals acting in official or covert capacity
as agents of the state pursuant to expressed or implied orders o f the state, or
resulting from state failure to exercise due diligence over the actions of its
agents.
Their definition recognizes that offenders “under international or domestic law
can be states qua states and/or officials using state power in pursuit of state goals”
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which is also supportive o f earlier claims that a state is indeed a social actor as well as
the individuals within the agency (2005: 9). The complexities of this definition,
however, can be simplified wherein state crime can be defined as:
Any action that violates international public law, and/or a states’ own
domestic law when these actions are committed by individual actors acting on
behalf of, or in the name of the state even when such acts are motivated by
their personal economical, political, and ideological interests. (Rothe and
Mullins 2006)

State-Corporate Crimes

Scholars o f state crime have also explored how crimes can occur wherein
states and corporations are often intermingled. Consequently, an act can be attributed
to the actions (or lack thereof) o f both, a state and a corporation(s). Building upon
the growing interests in political and state crimes several presentations and/or articles
brought the concept of state/corporate crime to the attention o f criminologists.
Kramer and Michalowski (1990: 4) provided the most widely cited definition of statecorporate crime: “State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that
occur when one or more institutions or political governance pursue a goal in direct
cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution.”
State-corporate crime increasingly came to be seen as taking two forms,
although these forms often interacted with each other. Accordingly, a distinction
emerged between state-facilitated and state-initiated crimes (Kramer 1992; and
Kauzlarich and Kramer 1993). These earlier works proposed and explored a
“framework for examining how corporations and governments intersect to produce
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social harm” (Kramer et al. 2000: 263). Such intersections can work in a myriad
fashions. States can create laws which facilitate corporate wrong doing and crimes
(e.g., the infamous Savings and Loan debacle within the United States). Regulatory
and advisement agencies can simply fail to do their appointed tasks (see Aulette and
Michalowski 1993; and Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000). States and state actors can
also directly collude and conspire with private corporations to violate laws (Rothe,
2006).
On the surface, these cases and types of crime would seem to have little to do
with the cases o f torture at Abu Ghraib, as they are domestically-based violations.
Yet, with the increasingly international nature of corporate operation, capital
accumulation and dispersement, these types of crimes take on an increasingly
international flavor and situation (Friedrichs and Friedrichs, 2002; Rothe, Muzzatti,
and Mullins, 2006). Moreover, as states continue to privatize war efforts, utilize
mercenaries and corporate warriors, the notion of state/corporate crime brings the
role of transnational organizations within the context of crimes committed at Abu
Ghraib.
The notion of a State as an actor did indeed raise scrutiny within academe
while the notion of corporations as criminally liable has been generally accepted.
However, within the courts domestically and internationally, liability o f corporations
has often been viewed as a civil case at best (Singer 2003). Nonetheless, international
legal precedence has also been set for criminal liability of corporations and
transnational organizations.
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Transnational Organizations

The idea of criminal liability of organizations is not new. Within the scope of
criminological research, such claims have been made for several decades. Moreover,
during the Rome Statute Prepatory Committee meetings the concept of organizations
and states were added into one of the existing Drafts (see Chapter III). Recently,
agreements have been framed by the UN that compel transnational corporations to
obey Human Rights Laws. For example the 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human
Rights agreement expressly bring the behavior of corporations operating in multiple
nations under the rubric o f human rights laws. Drawing heavily upon the UN Charter,
especially Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56, this agreement acknowledges that globally-active
for profit corporations are major players in the international arena.
Traditionally, it has been the internationally held expectation that nation-states
are the key players responsible for the maintenance and enforcement o f human rights
standards. Yet, due to the increasing power and influence o f these corporate entities,
it is their obligation as the core of a key social institution—e.g., the international
society’s economy, to abide by existing human rights law. If they are either active or
complicit in such actions, then they are prosecutable by the ICC. Corporate actors,
state agents, and even private citizens unconnected to a transnational or national
entity are currently under the court’s jurisdiction as long as the action in question
occurs within a signatory state that has ratified the Rome Statute or they are nationals
of signatory states. This means that representatives of transnationals who operate
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within signatory states must abide by international human rights law or face
prosecution (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
Furthermore, the recent Agreement by the Economic and Social Council
(2003), to which the U.S. is a signatory, specifically addresses the criminal liability of
transnational organizations and that these organizations (actors within the
organization) fall under the purview of international law and the ICC. Article 18 also
of this Agreement sets up criminal liability to which even the ICC could potentially
have jurisdiction. It states: in connection with determining damages, in regard to
criminal sanctions, and in all other respects, these Norms shall be applied by national
courts and/or international tribunals, pursuant to national and international law
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2). As several of the actors directly involved in the
events at Abu Ghraib were privatized corporate actors, it is pertinent that we consider
the ramifications of their involvement within the context o f corporate liability as well.
Previously, individual and organizational criminal liability was avoided through
“transnational loopholes” (Michalowski and Kramer 1987). Thus, the notion of
transnational criminal liability is relevant to the ongoing sub field of state-corporate
crime as well as the case at hand (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
Consequently, this brief overview of criminological inquiry o f crimes of the
state illustrates that by the late 1990’s and early years of the twenty-first century, a
significant literature on crimes of the state has developed (Friedrichs 1996b, 1998;
Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998; Kauzlarich et al. 2001, 2005; Mullins et al. 2004; Rothe
and Mullins 2006; Ross 1995, 2000; Ross et al. 1999; and Simon 2002). However, at
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the present stage, one would still have to concede that a criminology o f crimes of the
state is still very much in its infancy. Moreover, a general neglect o f research on
controls for state crime is increasingly apparent.
More specifically, relatively little attention has been given to international
institutions of social control within the context of state crime (Rothe and Mullins
2005; Rothe 2004a; Mullins, Kauzlarich, and Rothe 2004). Additionally, there
continues to be limited applications of a systematic theoretical model addressing and
analyzing such crimes (see Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998; Kramer and Michalowski
2005; Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe 2005). Instead additional typologies are
created and/or abstract analysis is used in place of a rigorous theoretical frame
(Friedrichs 1996a; Friedrichs and Friedrichs 2002; Ross 2000, 2002; Green and Ward
2000, 2004). This thesis aims to add to the limited literature utilizing a criminological
model for analysis of state crime. Moreover, I attempt to add to the literature by
expanding and revising the only integrated model for state or state/corporate crime to
date. Therefore, the following section outlines the integrated model created by
Kramer and Michalowski and later revised by Kauzlarich and Kramer followed by
suggested expansions and revisions.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY
Traditional criminological theories generally address one specific level of
analysis. While some scholars have attempted to integrate traditional theories
(Braithwaite 1989a; and Tittle 1995) they have done so by integrating theories
addressing the same level of analysis. While this may be an acceptable form of
integration for some I believe that an analysis of phenomena that is time and space
specific1, and inevitably involving history, culture, politics, ideology, and economics,
must include an integrated model that addresses all levels of analysis: the structural to
the individuals) involved in crime or crime control.

The Dialectic o f Structure and Agency

While this thesis is not the place to fully lay out or resolve one o f the key
theoretical issues within social science since its inception, I cannot enter into a
theoretical examination without acknowledging the tensions between social forces on
the macro level guiding the behavior o f states and individual level agency. For
generations, scholars have wrestled with the contradictions inherent in attempts to

1 The concept of time-space refers to the specific era of a phenomenon, the
location, and the exact actors involved. Simply stated, a snapshot o f time involving
specific actors, culture, ideology, and politics, making the phenomenon unique to its
own time-space.
30
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uncover the nature of the influence of social structure on individual human action and
vice versa (Rothe and Mullins 2006). Moreover, the review of state theories, classical
and contemporary, revealed the difficulty of attempting to bridge structure and
agency. However, as the state crime literature has revealed, the complexities, multiple
levels of catalysts, and actors with agency, make it necessary to integrate these
historically divided levels of analysis.
Structure clearly frames action and thought, channeling human behavior
toward certain outcomes and away from others; it defines possibilities and molds goal
structures. Social actors respond to stimuli within their environments, yet, exercise
individual choice in decision-making processes based on any number o f variables.
Consequently, I define agency as bounded volunteerism or bounded free-will. I see a
clear dialectic where individuals respond to structural parameters that can influence
what those parameters are by reinforcing, challenging or constructing them. Further,
given the intent of this thesis, we must also consider the structure/agency interactions
as they apply within and to complex organizations (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
As criminologists studying international law and social control mechanisms,
we clearly place a strong emphasis on macro-level behavioral influences. Culture and
structure form the cognitive landscape on which individual decisions are made. Global
and historical forces come to bear upon organizations and establish environments in
which decisions are made and that organizations must respond to. Any given incident
of state crime is a product of a myriad of social forces that come together in the
production of the event in question. Thus, attention must be given to specific time-
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space. Global political and economic conditions make state crimes more or less likely,
provide tensions and contradictions for nation-states to navigate and present problems
for state actors to resolve— either criminally or legally. Contextualization of such acts
is essential to understand both the idiosyncrasies of an individual event as well as the
patterns that emerge in the phenomena as a whole (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
Yet, in our focus on the broadest of socio-historical forces, we do not ignore
the influence of individual decision makers within these events. O f course all acts
require that a singular social actor make a decision and produce an act. In any state
crime, orders to carry out the activities must be reached, agreed upon and enacted.
Within a structure as complex as a state, this involves not one, but a multitude of
social actors in a number of organizational positions. While individual agency is
indeed modified or even extremely constrained by the social conditions present within
any complex organization, no bureaucratic actor is a mere automaton. Individuals
carry with them pre-established cultural and ideological visions (Rothe and Mullins
2006). Such lens influence how they evaluate information, create policy objectives
and direct organizational activities toward the realization o f those policies. More
essentially, at the top levels of power, agency can often be fully revealed and active.
While indeed processes like groupthink can come into play, original decisions,
directives and directions must be established through some form o f agentic individual
decision making process. These decision making processes, however, do not exist in a
vacuum. Indeed, they are time and space specific.
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To understand this point better, I turn to several hypothetical questions. For
example, would the U.S. have invaded Iraq were George W. Bush not President at
the time? If Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz did not control the Pentagon,
would the same forces have been brought to bear on intelligence analysis? Would
cabinet and Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings have come to different operational
directives without the influences of Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld? Would the torture
of detainees have occurred if the actors within Abu Ghraib where different (e.g.,
personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company and the 800th MP Brigade)? Of course,
all of these questions are hypothetical and unanswerable, but they do illustrate the
influence o f a single person or small group of decision makers on the behavior of a
nation-state. Moreover, these questions demonstrate the weaknesses o f pure linear
analysis and call for sensitivity and attention to specific time-space within any
theoretical analysis. It is with this broad framework in mind that I turn to an
integrated theoretical model of state crime that will not only help us explain the
criminal behavior of states, but will also allow us to examine the events at Abu
Ghraib, not as an atomistic event, but rather as a microcosm of a much larger set of
historical and structural conditions involving the U.S.

An Integrated Model of State Crime

While many mainstream and critically-orientated theories of crime and
criminality have relevance to the explanation of state crime, standing alone each
contains serious shortcomings. Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), building upon earlier

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

34
work by Kramer and Michalowski (1990), present an integrated model of state
offending. This model is designed to indicate the fundamental variables that contribute
to crimes of the state: motivation, opportunities and controls. Additionally, they
suggest these variables are interdependent factors and as such can lead to difficulty
addressing them as separate phenomenon without minimizing their significance. For
example, most crimes involve motivation and opportunity, yet, all the motivation in
the “world to act in a particular way means little if the opportunity to carry out that
action is not available” (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998: 150). Likewise, their integrated
frame presents three levels for analysis: the cultural-structural, organizational, and the
interactional. As noted with the catalysts of action, these levels are also
interdependent and omitting one of them minimizes the significance o f either actors or
the larger environment within which they operate.
Moreover, their model integrates components of several criminological
theories that fall short by themselves in addressing state crime. For example,
Kauzlarich and Kramer utilize anomie and strain, rational choice, differential
association, routine activities, political economy, and organizational models.
At the structural or institutional level of analysis, the major social institutions
and social structure are included, particularly; the political and economic institutions
and their interrelationship merit special attention in any effort to explain
organizational crime. They suggest the primary assumption o f that perspective is that
the very structure of corporate capitalism provides the impetus toward organizational
crime; thus, becoming crimes of capital (Michalowski 1985). They further propose
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that the political economy perspective stresses the shaping and/or constraining
influences of the broader historical structure of a society as a factor on organizational
behavior. This includes factors such as the culture of competition, economic pressure,
and performance emphasis under the catalyst of motivation. Also needed is the
availability o f legal and illegal means, blocked goals, and access to resources that are
included under opportunities (See Appendix A). Controls at the structural level are
said to include international reactions, political pressure, legal sanctions, media
scrutiny, and public opinion.
At the organizational level, Kauzlarich and Kramer draw heavily from
organizational theorists who argue that “there is built into the very structure of
organizations an inherent inducement for the organization itself to engage in crime”
(Gross quoted in Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998: 145). They, along with organizational
theorists, argue that organizations are strongly goal oriented and concerned with
performance while governing norms may be weak or absent (anomie). Moreover,
these goals may be blocked internally or externally causing strain (e.g., standard
operating procedures or codes of conduct). As Kauzlarich and Kramer argue,
organizational crime depends on two other factors . . . availability o f illegal means and
the social control environment that fosters organizational crime (146). Organizational
opportunities are said to include instrumental rationality, role specialization, and task

■y

These include operative goals, subunit goals, and managerial goals.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

36

segregation while controls include a culture of compliance, reward structure, safety
and quality control procedures, and effective communication processes.
At the social-psychological level of analysis, Kauzlarich and Kramer recognize
the utility of differential association wherein a person in a particular environment may
engage in a criminal act if the weight o f the favorable definition o f an act exceeds the
unfavorable definition. They also incorporate sociological models of socialization (see
Appendix A under motivation). At the social-psychological or interactional level,
Kauzlarich and Kramer discuss how motivation is affected by one’s socialization
within that environment, the social meaning given to their behavior, an individual’s
goals, and issues of personality such as personal morality and obedience to authority.
Borrowing from Sykes and Matza, they include techniques of neutralization as a
variable of control.
While this model has proven useful in examining numerous cases of state
crime including U.S. nuclear crime (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998), U.S. crimes of
colonialism (Mullins and Kauzlarich, 2000), and the recent war on Iraq (Kramer,
Michalowski, and Rothe 2005; and Kramer and Michalowski 2005), I believe it fails
to recognize an additional and equally significant level of analysis: the international
level. Moreover, the concepts of opportunity and controls are often intermingled,
where controls that are assumed to be non-existent or non-functional are
conceptualized under the rubric of opportunity. Consequently, constraints and
controls are intertwined while they potentially represent two separate fundamental
catalysts.
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Division o f Controls an d Constraints

Phenomenologically, a constraint differs from a control in that it is an inhibitor
or barrier that occurs at the onset o f an illegal action. This constraint can act as a
complete blockage to the act, or it can act as a restraint, thereby inhibiting or causing
the actor(s) to find alternative means to crime enactment. For the purposes of state
crime, this could take the form of a propaganda campaign, a reduction in the scope of
the act itself, more intense development of neutralizations, to name a few outcomes. I
view a control as a complete blockage to an act or a criminal sanction that is ideally
inevitable after the fact. This means that conceived criminal action will not occur and
if it does there will be legal repercussions. This could lead to additional organizational
strain, and the seeking out of other illegitimate means. A control is a perceived
blockage due to existing and/or after the fact controls such as laws, regulations, and
belief in sanctions or punitive measures, an imbalance o f costs to benefits. Controls
and constraints are separate conditions that do more than affect opportunity. They
work independently of opportunity and can thus be conceptualized separately. It is for
this reason that I believe the operationalizing of controls within Kauzlarich and
Kramer’s model needs to be drawn out and specified as constraints and controls.
Moreover, the lack of one or the other is implicit that it would either foster
motivation or provide opportunity. However, the control or constraint remains as
such, whether functioning, non-functioning, present, or absent.
Broadly, state crime scholars identify both external and internal controls on
the behavior of states (see Ross 1995, 2000). External controls are those that He
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outside of the specific state apparatus and are imposed on the state itself. Internal
controls are those that arise within the state and are directed against itself such as
previously discussed domestic laws and self-regulation. These controls can be tangible
(i.e., the firing of an agent) or symbolic (i.e., an official statement o f denial or a
promise to investigate).
Internal controls are broadly conceived of as restrictions placed on state
agencies by themselves or other state agencies. For example, the United Kingdom’s
establishment of a Royal Commission on Police Procedure and a Police Complaints
Board in response to police brutality (Ross 2000), the passing o f the Parliament of
Canada Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Corrado and Davis
2000), the Zorea, Blatman and Karp Commissions in Israel (Miller 2000), and
campaign finance reform laws in Japan (Potter 2000) are all examples o f such internal
controls. All of these internal control mechanisms were established in the wake of
publicity generated by various criminal state practices—most of which involved the
abuse of power by state-run intelligence agencies against their own citizens (Rothe
and Mullins 2006).
Internal controls are those created by the state to govern itself. Generally, they
are attempts to assuage public criticism of state actions. While the above examples all
produced results, they are often limited to specific types of offenses that have already
occurred (i.e., the Israel and U.K. investigative commissions) or often get quickly
circumvented by new procedures or new depths of secrecy (i.e., the FOI acts in the
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U.S. and Japan’s campaign finance laws), or are left under-funded or understaffed
(i.e., OSHA and the EPA).
External controls lie outside the apparatus o f the state itself. To be effective,
such controls actually have to exert some form of pressure after the fact (political,
economic, legal or military) on the state. External controls can be localized either
within states’ own domestic territory or external to it. Suggested external controls
within the state have included (1) media organizations, (2) interest groups, and (3)
domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). I view these external agencies as
constraints versus controls. Such pressures raise inherent contradictions within
modem democracies that are supposedly citizen-driven, but operate in a more eliteorientated fashion. When media or other agencies specifically address these
contradictions in a public sphere, the state has to respond. Responses are typically
symbolic, and often involve the erection of new veils of secrecy. Moreover, they do
not block or attempt to block a preceding act; at best they act to constrain a state’s
actions once such knowledge is made public (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
External controls located outside of the state’s boundaries would include the
United Nations (UN), the World Court (WC), the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and, potentially, other nation-states. As international governmental bodies, these
organizations hold the power to apply sanctions to states that violate either
international law or are overly abusive of their own citizens. However, save for other
nation-states, the ability to back up sanctions with coercive force is limited to
members who are willing to volunteer the necessary force to act in the organization’s
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name. It is for this reason that U.S. violations of international law regarding nuclear
weapons have gone unsanctioned (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Also, economic
organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) represent potential controls on criminal
states through the manipulation of financial assets, trade agreements, and trade
sanctions. While the former set of organizations would be more broadly seen as
having legitimacy to sanction and control criminal states, it is most likely the latter
that hold real coercive power over the behavior of sovereign states. It is also more
likely that such organizations would not use this coercive financial authority against
some of the industrial democracies that need it.
At the international level, existing relations based on specific conditions create
broad social forces that can act as constraints against a state’s intended policy. This
can include NGO’s, other nation-states, and inter-governmental organizations such as
the UN. Moreover, there are the broader global economic forces that can produce or
constrain competition and goal attainment. The larger international culture or ethos
can also produce an environment wherein a set of objectives can be replaced with
covert or overt activities by a state. Presently, controls at the international level can
occur by means of economic or political sanctions or through the threat of military
actions. However, these mechanisms often fail to act as controls for other nation
states due to lack of consistent application. For example the UN Security Council can
(and has) sanctioned states endlessly, but without formal mechanisms to enforce those
sanctions, there is nothing to compel compliance. Alternatively, international criminal

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

41

law may hold more power. As street crime research has shown, social location and
position strongly influences deterrence. (Paternoster and Piquero 1995; Paternoster
and Simpson 1992; Piquero and Paternoster 1998; Sherman and Berk 1984; Stafford
and Warr 1993). Those actors most likely to be involved in state crime would seem to
be those who are most susceptible to legal sanctions. However, for the most
egregious of crimes, such controls have historically done little to deter; typically, they
come into play long after the criminal actions are over and the viability and integrity
of the state which has committed them has been compromised (Rothe and Mullins
2006).
At the macro, or institutional level, broad social forces of competition and
goal attainment intersect with the lack of effective controls to produce an
environment where states are, once the micro and meso level elements align, able to
ignore domestic legal codes as they see fit in the process o f enacting their policy
objectives. Moreover, any constraints, such as media, general population opinion,
and/or internal state obstacles, can often be ignored or manipulated via hegemonic
discourse, symbolic political gestures, or altering policy to immediately appease while
continuing in a covert direction.
Control at the macro level emerges from a number of locations. Clearly law
can serve to control actions, but due to the unique position of a state vis-a-vis its own
domestic law and the problematic ways in which it is enforced, law may not hold the
same deterrent power over a political body as it does over citizen actors. Moreover,
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public forces embodied in the media, public opinion and social movement activism can
potentially operate as constraints on state criminality at this level.
Controls at the meso level (organizational) also emerge from several factors.
Codes of conduct and other internal controls and checks all serve to block
organizational criminal activity. These controls can also be reinforced by some
punitive measure when broken, thus serving as a form o f deterrence. Constraints, on
the other hand, include a general culture of compliance and reward structures. As
previously noted, constraints generally act as temporary barriers and do not generally
hold some sort of deterrence in the form of potential legal reactions or penalties. At
the interactional level, controls include psychological factors such as obedience to
authority and beliefs in the legitimacy of law, wherein constraints include such things
as personal morality. Morality is a constraining factor due to the pressures of the
organizational culture. Moreover, personal morality can be psychologically divided.
This can be done through techniques o f neutralization wherein acts at work that
contradict one’s moral code are justified. This allows the actor to leave work and
enter other roles to which the moral code is intact, avoiding cognitive dissonance
(Rothe and Mullins 2006).
The divisions of controls and constraints can be justified by these few
examples (see also Appendices B and C). However, the levels of analysis also need to
be addressed. The following section draws the distinctions between these levels, most
significantly, the need to separate the institutional level from the surrounding
geopolitical environment in which it exists.
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Fourth Level o f Analysis

Traditionally, the nation-state has been the preferred unit of analysis within
sociology (see Mills 1956). Macro-level sociological theory developed in opposition
to other social sciences (e.g., psychological models over-emphasizing the individual
out of social context, economics and political science models which removed social
institutions from their structural context). In that context, a focus on a single society’s
social structure arose, rightly so, to provide a holistic perspective which would allow
scholars to understand institutional interrelationships and social forces at work.
However, it is clear that singular societies are not atomistically separated from each
other. Institutional arrangements and forces do not cease their influence at the
arbitrary political boundaries currently drawn upon our maps. I do not propose an
invalidation of this level of analysis; historical contingencies have created unique
social arrangements that approximate geo-political units. However, there are social
forces, arrangements and interactions that operate outside of this arena: a separate
culture and separate rules governing actions.
As criminologists expand to areas of specialization which include the
international level such as state crime, crimes of globalization, and international
controls, the given macro level or cultural structural level is not sufficient to address
the culture, economic, political, and historical environment of both the international
realm and the nation-state. It can be argued that the current levels o f analysis are fluid
enough to address the surrounding environment regardless of whether it is at the state
or international level. However, I argue that this cannot be the case. The
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conceptualization o f different levels o f analysis should be consistent and objective.
The macro level must be separated into two distinct realms of analysis. The culture of
a state: it’s economic, political, cultural, and historical environment is distinct from
and often in contradiction to the international level. This, in and o f itself, illustrates an
essential need to examine a new level o f analysis. Beyond this, as the process of
globalization continues to expand, imperialistic agendas resurface, and transnational
corporations become the norm in global economic relations, examining the macro at
both the state and international level is essential. The two distinct environments
proffer divergent information, culture, laws, history, relations, and ethos. Moreover,
the catalysts of motivation, opportunity, controls, and constraints vary between the
international and structural-cultural level. Thus, it becomes necessary to speak of the
organization (multi-national corporation or governmental agency) as the meso level,
the state as the domestic environment of that organization (the structure and culture
in which it exists), and then the level examining the transnational formation of the
international ethos, culture, history, politics, law, and economics.
The process o f integration also includes utilizing different theoretical
perspectives or frames within the overall model. Not only do I recognize four levels
of analysis, each with specific catalysts such as motivation, opportunity, constraints,
and controls, I recognize the varying theories within the integrated model, for
example, Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) model utilizes anomie, rational choice,
differential association, routine activities, political economy, and organizational
models (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
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Drawing upon strain theory (e.g., Merton 1938), I argue that broader forces
of cultural goals of success and competition when met with blocked goal attainment
processes push political organizations— and actors within them—toward the violation
of law in the accomplishment of their objectives. Being a nation-state strongly
enhances the ability to create and capitalize upon criminal opportunity. Even the
poorest states have tremendous amounts o f human and financial capital to draw upon
for crime commission. Illegal means are often available; the desirability of drawing
upon these means will be even more tempting when legal means o f accomplishing the
goals are absent, blocked, or constrained. While this is not to say that legitimate
means may also be present, due to the concept o f instrumental rationality, it is often
the “by any means necessary” and the least costly in terms of consequences, thus
resulting in the choice o f illegitimate over legitimate means (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
At the meso, or organizational level, elements of organizational culture and
goals structure decision-making environments that can lead either toward or away
from criminal activity within a polity. Drawing upon broader theories of
organizational behavior and corporate offending, it is argued that certain states may
develop a bureaucratic environment where goal attainment is pushed to an “any
means necessary” degree. Certain organizations further reinforce instrumental
rationality within decision making processes (see Perrow 1986; Weber 1947) that can
enhance the perceived value of criminal behaviors and reduce the perceived harm of
the same act. Cultures can develop within organizations or subunits that can motivate
criminal endeavors; further, managerial influences can push for illegal solutions to
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goal accomplishment. Another factor within complex organizations is the ability of
those in charge o f staffing positions to fill those roles with individuals who tend to
think and act like the managers themselves.
The very nature of complex organizations provides a host o f opportunity
producing elements. Any given governmental agency (or corporate unit) will have
resources (human and otherwise) that can be directed toward a criminal action.
Bureaucracies can maintain levels o f secrecy on how their resources are utilized;
external actors need not know what was done within the organization or by whom.
Information may also be hidden from other organizational actors, including those who
are actually carrying out elements of the criminal activity. Due to internal
organizational structures o f information control, the inability o f external agencies (be
they public media or law enforcement) to obtain information on the nature and
dynamics of these decision-making events heighten criminal tendencies within some
states. The ability to avoid detection is a strong motivator and facilitator (Rothe and
Mullins 2006).
At the micro, or interactional level, this model combines aspects of
associational and social learning theories (e.g., Akers 1977; Sutherland 1939). These
factors are relevant in understanding state crimes at all levels of power within the
polity—from the decision makers, to those who organize the act’s implementation, to
those who actually carry out the actions. Individual level motivations can be personal,
but these individualized outlooks and motivations are highly malleable within the
organizational culture and context that encapsulates the social actors. Again, cultural
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elements discussed above come to bear—both in the broader socio-cultural sense
(singular actors motivated for personal success and advancement) but also
organizational cultures which the individual has been socialized into. Certain
organizations may inculcate employees into broader ideological beliefs that facilitate
violating laws for the sake of the institution; day-to-day interactions with coworkers
provide ample opportunity for the transmission not only of criminogenic value
systems but also o f neutralizations to excuse such behaviors (Rothe and Mullins
2006).
Admittedly, this model for criminological analysis is complex. However, as
previously stated, by ignoring the specific time-space, or the dialectic of structure and
agency, we cannot address the complexities involved in state crime. Likewise, the
application of this theory to the events in Abu Ghraib allows us to have a more
detailed explanation o f the torture that occurred. For example, addressing catalysts at
all four levels (from structures to agents) helps us answer questions such as: (1) why
the state decision making process occurred as it did; (2) why the individuals at Abu
Ghraib were motivated to commit torture; (3) what opportunities were present at all
levels that allowed such acts to take place; (4) what constraints occurred or failed to
occur; and (5) what controls were present to block such acts o f torture and cruel and
inhumane treatment. Without such a complex model, any analysis would lead to
reductionism.
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Method

To address such complexities involved in the abuse and torture of detainees at
Abu Ghraib, the case study method provides the most suitable methods of inquiry.
Therefore, the following section addresses the methods utilized for the analysis of the
events leading up to, during, and after the torture at Abu Ghraib.
The quintessential characteristic of case studies is that they strive towards a
holistic understanding of cultural systems of action: interrelated acts engaged in by the
actors in a specific social time and space (Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991). A case
study method is not a style of data gathering or an analytical technique: it is a
methodological approach to research. Case studies emphasize detailed contextual
analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships. This
method incorporates a systematic gathering of information about specific phenomena
to allow for an effective understanding o f how or why the event(s) occurred. Robert
K. Yin has defined the case study method as an empirical inquiry “that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of
evidence are used” (Yin 1984: 23).
This research design utilized the spatiotemporal chronology strategy for
organizing the data (Hill, 1993). This included separating and recording the records
according to dates that documented events surrounding the war on terrorism, invasion
of Iraq, and subsequent abuses at Abu Ghraib. As new data were encountered, they
were also included in the spatiotemporal chronology. This, in effect, allowed a
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research design that would incorporate both primary and secondary data for analysis
(to be discussed further in the data section). Furthermore, a key strength of this
method involves using multiple sources and techniques in the data gathering process.
After all, the method is known as a triangulated research strategy. For example, Snow
and Anderson (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg 1991) state that triangulation occurs with
data, theories, and methodologies. The need for triangulation in research stems from
the ethical call to confirm the validity of specific research. In case studies, this could
be done by using multiple sources of data (Yin 1984).
Using the case study method, data analysis typically relies upon inductive
models of reasoning common to qualitative analysis. Traditional deductive reasoning
begins with broader understandings and theory o f a subject matter that is translated
into casual predictions that are tested with relevant data. Qualitative data do allow for
traditional theory-testing approaches that predominate quantitative inquiry, but such
rigid approaches often do not allow the discovery o f the unexpected. One of the
strong values o f rich, descriptive data is the ability to explore major trends within the
data and find the unexpected by way of commentaries within unclassified memos,
Congressional hearings, and legal documents such as Executive Orders, military
manuals, and laws.
Inductive analysis begins with specific observations and then attempts to build
generalized understandings from observations. Purely inductive work is rare; “data
analysis is always guided to some degree by the existing theoretical and empirical
literature” (Mullins 2005: 45). A researcher must determine in advance what evidence
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to gather and what type of analysis to use with the data to answer the research
questions. Simply, one cannot observe and collect data on everything relevant to a
specific case. Similarly, one cannot look for any and all potential categories and
themes. The data analysis, specific to this case, is guided by a frame or model of
criminological state crime. This included examining the data in terms of the presence
or lack thereof o f the catalysts motivation, opportunity, constraints, and controls.
However, this does not presuppose theoretical testing as the overall goal, but rather
to understand and explain contingencies and processes at work before, during, and
after the events at Abu Ghraib.
This case study includes several data sources and a multi-faceted in-depth
investigation into the social phenomenon of torture at Abu Ghraib. Moreover, the
case study is intrinsic in nature: meaning the events at Abu Ghraib are of interest to
the existing social order (Adler and Clark 2003). Nevertheless, the central nature of
the case study is not to test abstract theories, or to illustrate a general statement, but
rather to understand the crucial aspects of the events at leading up to and including
Abu Ghraib.

Data Sources
The data sources used for this research include primary and secondary data.
The primary data are drawn from five main categories: (1) international legal
documents generated from Treaties, Charters, Statutes, and customary laws; (2)
intergovernmental reports generated by the United Nations and the International Red
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Cross and Red Crescent such as the ICRC reports and the Secretary General of the
United Nations Reports; (3) domestic legal documents generated from domestic laws,
military codes, trial transcripts; (4) domestic reports generated by investigations
including the Taguba Report, Fay-Jones Report, Schlesinger Report; and the
Mikolashek Report; and (5) de-classified documents and memos generated by top
officials within the DOD, DOJ, and other top military and legal offices as well as
letters written to the Administration by the American Bar Association.
The bulk of this primary data was accessed from the following sources: the
United Nations Library o f Documents, the Yale Library o f Law (Avalon ProjectOnline), International Red Cross (Online), Congressional Records at Western
Michigan Waldo Library, White House records Online (Executive Orders), and the
purchase of several books containing the reprints of de-classified memos and reports.
Secondary data were drawn from multiple sources. The strategy for obtaining
these data was based on topical searches and name-oriented searches (Hill, 1993).
This included searching for topical categories: Abu Ghraib, Torture, War crimes in
Iraq, Detainee abuse, ghost detainees, scandal Abu Ghraib, etc. The name oriented
search involved searches from secondary source bibliographies to attain a
triangulation for presented facts as well contrasting accounts with formal documents
(primary data). The data that were found by utilizing this procedure included media
reports of events leading up to the war on Iraq and subsequent abuses (international
coverage as well as domestic including but not limited to CNN, BBC, A1 Jazeera,
New York Times, Progressive, Common Dreams, The Nation). Other secondary
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sources included legal scholars, state crime scholars, historical scholars, and
journalistic prints o f leaked memos. The secondary data were used only when at least
two sources substantiated the descriptive information given.
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CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law? I better call my lawyer. . .
I do n ’t know what you ’re talking about by international law.
— George W Bush, December 11, 2003
(Sands 2005: 204)

My research on state crime operates under the assumption that the best
standard for classifying state behavior as criminal is the body of international law.
This chapter seeks to clarify the central tenants international law and describe the
relevant laws pertaining to the cases of abuse and torture that have occurred since the
war on terrorism, and more specifically, Abu Ghraib.

History

The evolution of the modem nation state, along with changes in the level of
international commerce, presented practical and ideological challenges to
conceptualizations of international law and international relations. Natural law,
embodied in the principle of the social contract, was the major organizing principle of
intra and inter-state relations. Natural law, as a conceptualization of social control,
has subsisted for 2,500 years in a variety o f forms. This tradition dates back to the
system of Roman law, the Court of Chancery, and to philosophers such as Aquinas,
Grotius, Locke, and Hume (Friedmann, 1967). It is rooted in the ideal that there
53
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exists an objective, Natural Law, not one of human origin, rooted in norms of conduct
seen to be an essential part of human nature and found “existing in the reason and
conscience o f every human being” (Brown, 1960: VI). The rise o f the modem nation
state and the expansion of international commerce produced numerous minor and
major conflicts which began to erode the core o f Natural Law. The base tenants of the
philosophy were variously replaced by core ideologies of nationalism, capitalism,
relativism, modem science, or positivism (also known as utilitarianism and
pragmatism), and the rise of the Austinian jurisprudence (Brown, 1960). The
Austinian model brought the central tenants of state sovereignty to bear on
international law.
The Austinian model drew upon Kant’s rejection o f yoking law to morality
(Friedmann, 1967; Koskeniemi, 2003). Austin insisted that supreme power as
embodied in a state limited by positive law is contradictory. The sovereign state, by its
very nature, can impose positive law on itself vis-a-vis treaties, but is not under
obligation to be fully bound by such self-imposed limitations. Thus, a polity can
abrogate these mutual agreements regardless of positive law. With the acceptance of
the positivistic legal philosophy that began to guide international law and international
relations, legal scholars (e.g., Max Hubor and N. Politis) refused to recognize the
existence of an international code of conduct external to a nation-state. Such a
position in and of itself stymies the development of an international society as, “if all
states claim to be sovereign, then there can be no higher authority, no international
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law, or restraint o f any kind” (Ziegler, 1977: 103). Attempting to resolve these
contradictions, a movement toward establishing such boundaries arose.
Most clearly seen in the development of the Hague and Geneva Conventions’
articulation o f “rules” o f war, the process was hastened by Europe’s collective horror
at the devastation o f World War I. By 1919, the first international political
organization developed as an attempt to organize and encourage inter-state relations
and peaceful settlement of international disputes. The League o f Nations was formed
with the purpose o f unifying an international arena composed o f sovereign states with
divergent political interests, economic interests, cultural disparities, religions, state
practices and traditions (Carty, 1991). However, even with the establishment of the
League, international relations deteriorated. An economic crisis engulfed the world
beginning in 1929. Conflicts increased and European powers found themselves in the
middle of another world conflict.
The end of World War II brought new alliances and new attempts to generate
and legitimate an international institution designed to foster peaceful cooperation
among nations. In 1945, representatives of fifty states assembled in San Francisco,
USA, to develop the charter o f an international organization to maintain peace and
security called the United Nations (UN) and to dissolve the failed League of Nations.
With the development of the UN, international relations and law began to take on a
fundamentally different character (Rothe and Mullins 2006). By the 1950’s “there
existed an embryonic global constitutional order, with rules that remain in place to
this day” (Sands 2005: 10).
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International law does indeed have a long history; however, it is only in recent
years (relatively speaking) that it also has become a regular feature of modem
political life (Sands 2005). The second half of the twentieth century marked
significant developments within the codification o f public law (including the
codification o f criminal liability for individuals that violate public law) and the
establishment of a permanent institution of international social control, the
International Criminal Court. During the 1990’s the vision o f a rules based
international system appeared to be becoming a reality. International mles now
codified as criminal law provided a framework forjudging and prosecuting individual
behavior and state actions, and in theory, an end to impunity (Sands 2005).
International criminal law is composed of substantive law and procedural law.
For the purposes of this case study, it is the substantive law that is relevant. This is
the body of mles indicating what acts amount to international crimes, elements
required for them to be considered prohibited, and under what conditions States must
prosecute or bring to trial those accused of violating such laws (Cassesse 2002a).
International criminal law is a branch of public law. Public law is best defined
as the body o f law that comes from treaties, Charters, Protocols, Resolutions, and
Customary law. As previously stated, it was only after WWII that new categories of
crimes developed. These include crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and most
recently terrorism. International criminal law is a “hybrid branch of law: it is public
international law impregnated with notions, principles, and legal constructs derived
from national criminal law, human-rights law, and customary laws” (Cassesse 2002a:
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19). However, with the recent creation of the ICC (1998), the world has entered a
new phase wherein international criminal law is a full-fledged body o f law.

Customary Law, Jus Cogens, and Erga Omnes

Customary laws are based on common and constant practices o f states out of
a sense of opinio juris— an ideal of natural law based upon legal obligation and
principles. Simply stated, the fundamental principles behind customary laws are
founded on willing state participation and a historical recognition o f consistent state
practices. For example, torture is considered to be within this paradigm o f law.
Moreover, eleven treaties, along with the principle of customary ju s cogens law, have
substantiated crimes of torture. Customary laws are viewed as jus cogens—a
compelling la— in that they are internationally accepted principles, norms, and
binding without exception. Unlike treaties, charters, and resolutions (which are
codified laws and compelling for the signatory states), customary or ju s cogens laws
may or may not be erga omnes—or law which flows to all Many times customary law
becomes codified into treaties or statutes between states; however, the compulsory
nature of customary law and general principles remain as the scaffold of international
law. Moreover, the principles o f jus cogens (compelling law) and erga omnes
(flowing to all) can often be conflicting (Bassiouni, 1999; Danilenko, 1991). If a law
is jus cogens it should follow that it is erga omnes (Bassiouni, 1999). When
something is compelling to and for everyone, it would stand to reason that it should
be expected for all. However, this is not always the case. For example, International
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Human Rights Laws are compelling but not necessarily flowing to all. This is, in part,
due to pre-existing agreements that can cover specific situations. In the case of
Human Rights Law, they are not applicable during a time of war, as these legal
conditions are addressed by the Geneva Conventions, which articulate similar
principles, as they are to play out within a theatre of combat. As stated, customary
laws, jus cogens, often find their way into multilateral treaties.

War Crimes

International humanitarian laws are the foundation for classifying behaviors
that constitute war crimes. This body of law consists of humanitarian principles and
international treaties aimed at constraining the affliction o f combatants and noncombatants during international or non-intemational armed conflicts. They are by
definition ju s in bello meaning the law governing how war may be fought once
underway. They protect persons or property that are affected by the conflict and limit
states’ rights, within a conflict, to use methods and means o f warfare of their choice.
Thus, these rules limit the means and extent o f permitted violence in armed conflicts.
All actors involved in a conflict are bound by these international laws. Accordingly,
when actors violate these rules their actions may be deemed war crimes and could
potentially be penalized by a domestic nation/state or international court.
As a result of immense suffering, devastation, and death, laws o f war were
created to regulate acceptable state behavior during times o f international armed
conflicts. The first attempt to regulate acts during war occurred at the Diplomatic
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Conference o f Geneva in 1864 which resulted in the first treaty to establish
international humanitarian law also known as the rules o f war: The Geneva
Convention fo r the Amelioration o f the Condition o f the Wounded in Armies in the
Field. Additional conferences were held that extended the laws of war to other
categories including principles for war at sea (Hague Convention o f 1899) and for
treatment o f prisoners including their status (Geneva Conventions o f 1907), the
Hague Rules of Ariel Warfare of 1923, the Geneva Convention of 1929 (.Articles
2,3,4,46, and 51), and the International Military Tribunals o f German War Criminals
(The Nuremberg Principles 1945) (see Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1950, Vol. II, pp. 374-378; English Text published in Report of the
International Law Commission Covering its Second Session, 5 June-29 Duly 1950,
Document A/1316, pp. 11-14).
After the Nuremberg Trials were conducted, the United Nations took the first
step to combine the previously established rules of war into four separate conventions
and added provisions for the protection o f civilians during armed combat (The
Geneva Conventions o f 19491, II, III, IV). These include Convention I (relative to
the Amelioration o f the Condition o f the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field) which provides for the care of the wounded and sick combatants to eliminate
torture, murder, and biological experiments; the II Convention (relative to the
Amelioration o f the Condition o f Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members o f
Armed Forces at Sea) which covers the wounded, captured or sick combatants at sea;
the III Convention (relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War) that covers
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prisoners of war to be treated humanely, provide adequate housing, food, clothing,
medical care, the prohibition of torture, medical experiments, acts o f violence, insults
and public curiosity against those captured and; the IV Convention {relative to the
Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War) which covers civilians by stating that
all parties to the conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatants and direct
their operations only against military targets. Civilians must be permitted to live as
normally as possible and be protected against murder, pillage, torture, reprisals,
indiscriminate harm, indiscriminate destruction of property and being taken hostage.
Their honor, family rights, and religious convictions must be respected. Occupying
forces shall ensure safe passage of food and adequate medical supplies and establish
safety zones for the wounded, sick, elderly, children, expectant mothers, and mothers
of young children (Geneva Conventions, August 1949).
Two additional Protocols were added to the body of law by which war crimes
/

are classified. These include Protocol I and II (additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949) that relate to the Protection o f Victims ofNon-Intemational Armed
Conflicts (8 June 1977). Protocol I provides further details of civilian protections in
international conflicts and Protocol II that extends protection to victims o f internal
conflicts in which an armed opposition controls enough territory to enable them to
carry out sustained military operations (Rothe 2005).
Further Precedence for the body of international humanitarian law was set by
the recent development o f the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
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(ICC) 1998. The International Criminal Court utilizes customary law, human rights
law, and the Geneva Conventions as a basis for what constitutes war crimes.
The International Criminal Court1 is the first full-time international judicial
institution, containing within the Rome Statute Treaty the first codification of criminal
laws culminated from over a century of state practice. Currently the ICC covers the
most heinous crimes o f the international order: crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and genocide (crimes o f aggression are still to be defined within the treaty).
Subsequentially, war crimes are defined within this text representing all the
aforementioned Charters and Protocols.
There is not a single unified Convention or text for the laws o f war as they
have been assembled throughout history in attempts to minimize the atrocities of
armed conflicts and they continue to expand and change in specificity. However,
individual and state obligations to abide to the mles o f war are well founded and
legitimized to the point that they are considered to be one o f the leading crimes of
international law (Rothe 2005).
The mles of war also include two other components for regulating armed
conflict behaviors that are crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. While
these crimes are considered crimes of internal or international armed conflict (in a
broader sense, crimes o f war) they cover a more expansive component of principles
than war crimes.

1 For more information on the ICC see Rothe and Mullins 2006.
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In summary, war crimes cover a vast array o f offenses and acts (see Appendix
A). Included within later Conventions, Protocols, and legal precedence, torture was
included as an act falling under the purview o f war crimes (Geneva Conventions II).
Moreover, the illegalities o f torture can be found in several Charters, Protocols,
Treaties, and within the text of ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC. With the cases of cruel and
inhumane punishments and torture at Abu Ghraib, these treaties are of significant
importance to the overall analysis. Therefore, a succinct review of torture and
international law is provided.

Torture

Universal condemnation of torture is not merely the abstract ideology of
political theorists, philosophers, or international legal scholars. The principle can be
found in most of the basic documents of international law including The Fourth
Hague Convention, Annex Article 4 of 1907, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights,
the 1975 Declaration Against Torture, two UN covenants against human rights
violations in 1976 (making torture a crime against humanity), and the UN Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(1987).
The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (1948) was drafted by the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1947-1948 and adopted by the

2

See Appendix A for a complete history of legal documents banning torture.
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United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Article 5 prohibits torture
and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment: No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The 1975 Declarations Against Torture Article 1 defines and prohibits torture
as follows:
1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at
the instigation o f a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act
he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or
other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment o f Prisoners.
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form o f cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
(General Assembly Resolution 3452 (XXX) o f 9 December 1975)
Article 3 then prohibits even cruel and inhumane treatment:
3. No State may permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency may not be invoked as a justification o f torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhumane Treatment or
Punishment of 1987 defines and prohibits torture as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
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inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. {Part One, Article 1, Paragraph
1)
The United Nations Committee further delineated specific practices for
inclusion under torture and/or cruel and inhumane treatment in response to several
cases (e.g., observations concerning the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Turkey,
Azerbaijan, Germany, Australia, and the Netherlands). These include, but are not
limited to, daily beatings, detaining individuals in small uncomfortable spaces for two
weeks, forcing individuals to sleep on the floor while handcuffed following
interrogation, sleep deprivation, depriving food and water, being hooded, loud music
for prolonged periods, using cold air to chill, and the threat o f torture. The UN
Committee has also recommended that the use of blindfolds during questioning be
prohibited by states (Committee Against Torture, United Nations Documents).
Torture is also defined within the context of the ICC under both war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Article 7 defines crimes against humanity as acts that are
widespread or a systematic attack against a civilian population. This includes acts of
torture, intentional causing of great suffering to body or mental health, murder, and
attacks directed against a civilian population. It is also listed in Article 8 with other
war crimes that include torture or inhumane treatment, biological experiments,
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, and willfully denying a prisoner
of war or other protected person the right to a fair and regular trial.
Legal precedence has also been set reinforcing the notion o f torture as
universally condemnable and prosecutable offense, domestically and internationally.
For example, dating back to 1900, in Paquette Habana 175 US 677, the U.S.
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Supreme Court ruled, “like all the laws o f nations, it rests upon the common consent
of civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior
power but because it has been generally accepted as a rule o f conduct” (Harbury
2005: 127). More recently (1980) the U.S. Appeals 2 Circuit Court in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala stated:
Turning to the act of torture, we have little difficulty discerning its universal
renunciation in the modem practice and usage of nations. . . . In fight of the
universal condemnation o f torture in numerous international agreements, and
the renunciation o f torture as an instrument o f official policy by virtually all
the nations of the world, we find that an act o f torture committed by a state
official against one held in detention violates established norms of international
law of human rights, and hence the law of the nations. (Harbury 2005: 114,
127-8).
Again in 1992, in Siderman v. Republic o f Argentina, the Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, stated. “The right to be free from official torture is fundamental and
universal, a right deserving of the highest statutes under international law, a norm of
jus cogens.” This reinforces not only binding codified laws, domestic and international
(even with reservations), but also precedence as customary law.
While torture is universally prohibited and reinforced via criminal law and
customary law (jus cogens) it is more than a crime against the victims. It is a crime
against every individual as it not only corrupts those directly involved, it corrupts the
whole social fabric as it prescribes a silencing of what happened by those that
committed the acts as well as the rest o f the society that sits by and does nothing
(Levinson 2004). Likewise, it destroys the social fabric as every regime that tortures
does so under the guise of some higher ideology (superior goal, name of salvation, or
for the greater good). However, it cannot be denied that torture continues to be used
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by both supporters o f the universal judgment against it (state signators) as well as
those opposing or non-signators.
For example, states that ratify treaties outlawing torture do not necessarily
have a better record for adhering to their obligations than do those that do not
(Hathaway 2004). Likewise, states that have a worse record of using torture are
slightly more likely to ratify the Convention than those who have been found to use
torture less. Specifically out of 160 states, Hathaway reports that 41% of countries
that seldom practice torture are ratifiers of the Convention Against Torture. This is
compared to 47% of countries that have ratified the Convention that use torture as a
military or political means more often. Simply stated, there is a larger percentage of
signators and ratifiers that use torture more commonly than those that rarely use it.
Comparing democratic with non-democratic states, 24% of non-democratic states
with better torture ratings have signed the convention compared to 40% of
nondemocratic with worse torture ratings. Moreover, among democratic states 57%
of those with better torture ratings ratified the Convention compared to 62% with
worse torture ratings. Hathaway further found that torture is not limited to the myth
of dictatorship; 43% of dictatorships signed and ratified the Convention. However,
democratic states that have signed and ratified (which is necessary for a state to be
legally bound by its signator) the Convention, and where torture is the most prevalent,
constitute 60% of all the states legally bound domestically and legally by their
ratification (Hathoway 2004). Thus, it appears that a state’s public support of the
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Conventions and Treaties as well as their legal obligations do not dissuade them from
the practice of torture.
Torture has a long historical record of uses that vary in their extremism (e.g.,
death and dismemberment to stress and duress positions). Some o f the “lesser” means
of torture, such as sensory deprivation and stress positions are common methods used
by modem intelligence services (including Britain and Israel). Other extreme forms of
torture are commonplace in states (overtly and covertly practiced) such as
Afghanistan, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea, and Russia.
Moreover, the U.S. has covertly used torture tactics over the past 50 years. One need
only remember the CIA’s “Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual” (19631975), the Phoenix Program (1968-1971), the “U.S. Psychological Operations
Manual” (1962), the “Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual” (1983), and
the “Handling of Sources Manual” (U.S. School o f the Armies guide) to recall the
systematic training and use of such practices covertly in Vietnam, Latin America, and
the Philippines.
The ideology for and/or the nullification o f practicing torture is far from being
recognized as it persists today just as it did during times of the Gulag and the
Holocaust predating criminal liability. What is more, states not only ignore their legal
obligations by pursuing this tactic but many attempt to create legal loopholes
justifying the systematic use and practice of torture. This is well illustrated by the U.S.
attempt to create a legal loophole excluding its obligations to IHL with the
classification o f detainees as enemy combatants versus prisoners o f war (which alleges
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to guarantee treatment o f detainees in a conflict). The following section addresses
relevant international law concerning the status o f detainees in conflicts followed by a
section addressing the source and history of the term enemy combatant and its
relevance to international law.

Enemy Combatants

I don’t care what the international lawyer says . . .
we are going to kick some ass.
—G. W. Bush, September 12, 2001

POW Status

The Geneva Convention III and IV specifically regulates treatment of POW’s
and the treatment of civilians based on precedent standards dating back to the early
1900’s as well as in response to atrocious treatment o f POW’s and civilians during
WWII. Specifically Convention III states:
In the case o f armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect
to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the
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carrying out o f executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
Article IV continues to define those falling under POW status: A. Prisoners of
War, in the sense o f the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power o f the enemy:
(1) Members o f the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members
of militias or volunteer corps forming part o f such armed forces.
(2) Members o f other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of
being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of
having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying
arms openly; (d) that o f conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
(3) Members o f regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government
or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
In the case of the U.S. war on terrorism Article III and IV (A:3) are relevant
to the classification o f detainees. Moreover, Article V specifically addresses
conditions of contest regarding status:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by
a competent tribunal.
Despite the clear legal requirements, the Bush Administration chose to ignore
International Humanitarian Law. In 2001, the Administration coined the term
unlawful combatant (later renamed enemy combatant) to describe certain individuals
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the U.S. had either captured during the war in Afghanistan or suspected of having
links to the terrorist organization A1 Qaeda. The Administration set a new precedent
using an Executive Order to classify any individual as an enemy combatant that the
Administration deems a threat or danger to the United States, including “citizens who
associating themselves with the enemy and with its aid, guidance, and direction, or
enter into this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents” (U.S. District
Court, Lower Manhattan, U.S. v. Padilla, 2002).
The term enemy combatant derives from two sources: international law and
the 1942 US Supreme Court Ex parte Quirin (317 U.S. 1) decision. International law
recognizes combatants and non-combatants in Article 3 of the Geneva Convention
Rules of War (Hague 4, Chapter #1, Article 3, October 18, 1907). These terms
articulate who qualifies for prisoner of war status in order to establish who is then
duly protected with rights. Article 3 states: “The armed forces o f the belligerent
parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the
enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.” International law
standards for non-combatant status are reserved for persons accompanying the armed
forces without being members, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews,
war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or o f services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces (Article 4:4, Hague Convention 3,
1949). Combatant is defined by the following standards:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of
carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs o f war. (Article 4:2, Hague Convention 3, 1949)
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The origins o f the terms unlawful and enemy combatant can be traced to the
1942 Supreme Court Quirin case. The U.S. Supreme Court drew from the distinction
in international law between armed forces and peaceful populations o f belligerent
nations and lawful and unlawful combatants. Quirin pertained to eight suspected Nazi
saboteurs, one of whom was a U.S. citizen.
The court defined enemy combatant with the same terminology as spy under
international law stating that unlawful combatants— including U.S. citizens—were
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts that render their
belligerency unlawful. The decision by the court was based on the existing legal
definition o f spy which includes the secretive passage through military lines, without
uniform, (a criteria under international law for POW) in a time o f war for the purpose
of waging war by destruction of fife or property making them belligerents (who are
not entitled to the status of POW) or offenders against the law of war and therefore
subject to trial. The two most significant points that should be taken into account
from this decision is the emphasis on enemies in uniform or non-uniformed attire and
the covert crossing of belligerent lines. Since Quirin, no new case has elaborated
upon or superseded this definition. However, that did not stop the Administration
from creatively misusing the term to create a legal loophole wherein it would appear
as if the U.S. was not obliged to adhere to IHL.
Categorization as an “enemy combatant” denies a captive access to the rights
of the Geneva Convention to which those categorized, as “prisoners of war” are
entitled. Enemy combatants are not permitted contact with lawyers, family, or friends.
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Individuals labeled enemy combatants may be denied counsel, held incommunicado,
without due process and without review of their designation as enemy combatants by
the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Once classified as an enemy combatant, U.S. citizens or foreigners could be
detained indefinitely. The government argues that military interrogators must be
allowed to question suspects at length and detain some suspects indefinitely on the
grounds that exceptional measures are necessary to protect homeland security. Critics
counter that the elimination of due process is unconstitutional. The American Bar
Association claims that it ignores the precedent set by 18 U.S.C. 4001(a) which
sought to restrict the detention of U.S. citizens to situations in which statutory
authority for their incarceration exists. The inclusion o f U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants is contrary to the legal precedents set in international law and U.S. case
law.
On September 5, 2002 letters from Senator Carl Levin and Senator Russ
Feingold were sent to Attorney General John Ashcroft and Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld raising questions about the new categorization o f enemy combatant (Press
Office Documents 9/2002). The intent of these letters was to clarify eight major
points concerning the category, including the operative definition along with a
document providing a clear and distinct definition (and its sources), the process of
designation of the label, the criteria used in determination, the rights (specifically of
U.S. citizens named enemy combatant), time line for detention, any documented
changes to existing U.S. military regulations implementing the Geneva Convention of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

73

1949, and an un-redacted copy of the President’s orders designating Padillo and
Hamdi as enemy combatants were requested. The term enemy combatant is also being
used for those currently detained in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, which has
created a forfeiture o f their rights by the state. The significance of these letters defines
the pragmatic problem o f the Administrations efforts to create a category for those
individuals the state wants to detain. Indeed, equating terrorists as enemy combatants
is contrary to all codified and customary Rules of War. Nor is it defined under the
U.S. Code or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, the Geneva
Conventions address that a contracting party (U.S.) cannot suspend any part of the
Geneva Conventions. Common Article I states that parties are to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
Nonetheless, even with the ambiguous and unprecedented classification as
enemy combatant, detainees are covered under domestic laws that prohibit the use of
torture. The following section briefly discusses relevant domestic laws to the cases of
abuse and torture at Abu Ghraib.

United States Legal Codes

There are several legal codes of conduct governing interrogation of detainees.
Specifically, there is the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S.
Torture Statue (18 USC 2340), and the United States Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) that all provide a basis for the illegality of such torture. Furthermore, the
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War Crimes Act of 1996 and the Expanded War Crimes Act of 1997 provide further
domestic legal culpability in response to the development o f the Rome Statute.
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. Specifically it states, Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The annotation to the
Amendment further states:
Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments
shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments o f torture [such
as drawing and quartering, emboweling alive, beheading, public dissecting,
and burning alive], and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution.
Cruel and unusual punishment has been interpreted and further delineated by
U.S. courts to include such acts as prolonged confinement (see Ingraham v. Wright
1977; Whitley v. Albers 1986, and Hudsen v. McMillian 1992) and sleep deprivation
(see Singh v. Holcomb 1992; Green v. CSO Stack 1995; and Ferguson v. Cape
Giradeau Count 1996).
The U.S. Torture Statue (18 USC 2340) is the domestic codification of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment of
Punishment (ratified by the U.S. in 1994). While establishing torture as a federal
crime it also provides a definition. Section 2340 reads:
(1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control;
2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from—
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(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction o f severe physical
pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened the administration
or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated
to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
As will be discussed in later chapters, this statute has great significance wherein legal
counselors for the DOD, DOJ, and the White House have systematically attempted to
reinterpret or restrict the law to fit with requests for expanding interrogation
techniques.
The UCMJ is the Code that subjects all military personnel to criminal
responsibility for acts such as:
(Article 93) Cruelty and Mistreatment: Any person subject to this chapter who
is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person
subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(Article 118) Murder: Any person subject to this chapter whom without
justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he—
(1) has a premeditated design to kill;
(2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;
(3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to others and
evinces a wanton disregard o f human life; or
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson.
(Article 125) Sodomy: Any person subject to this chapter who engages in
unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex
or with an animal is guilty o f sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient
to complete the offense.
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While rape and carnal knowledge are also listed as offenses, they are defined as male
upon female other than wife without consent or under the age o f 16.
(Article 128) Assault:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers with
unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another person,
whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault
and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1) commits an assault with a dangerous weapon or other
means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily
harm; or
(2) commits an assault and intentionally inflicts grievous bodily
harm with or without a weapon; is guilty o f aggravated assault
and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Moreover, Article 77 (1) states that criminal culpability for any o f these crimes
include “anyone who commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, or procures its commission” (USC 18, Section 2340).
Just as the UCMJ provides criminal culpability, the 1996 and 1997 War
Crimes Act further support this doctrine (though these were legislated to bypass legal
responsibility from the developing Rome Statute (see Rothe and Mullins 2005, 2006).
This legislation enforced the State’s position that, as a sovereign nation, it could and
would domestically prosecute its own citizens for breaches of international war crimes
that were to be included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In
1997, The Expanded War Crimes Act, 18 USC & 2401 (SEC. 583) amended and re
defined the circumstances that were necessary for State prosecution and recognition
of international law. Domestic prosecution for war crimes could and would be
convened with a military trial (a court martial) or a civilian court (Rothe 2005). More
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specifically, the 1996 WCA was amended in 1997 (USC & 2401 hereafter called USC
& 2441) further ensuring jurisdiction o f an ICC would not be imposed upon the U.S.
as it pertained to war crimes (this includes torture). This also included limiting the
previous text of 1996 which originally included “Grave breaches” to “war crimes”:
(1) in subsection (a), by striking “grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”
and inserting “war crime”;
(2) in subsection (b), by striking “breach” each place it appears and inserting
“war crime”; and
(3) so that subsection (c) reads as follows:
(c) Definition.—As used in this section the term “war crime” means
any conduct—
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international
conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol
to such convention to which the United States is a party;
(2) prohibited by Articles 23, 25, 27, or 28 o f the Annex to the
Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a violation o f common Article 3 o f the
international conventions 12 August 1949, or any protocol to
such convention to which the United States is a party and
which deals with non-intemational armed conflict; or
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and
contrary to the provisions o f the Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as
amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to
such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to
civilians.
Thus, the revised act replaced grave breaches with war crimes so the 1996 WCA now
reads:
(a) Offense.— Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits
a war crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if
death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.
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(b) Circumstances.— The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that
the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a
member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national o f the United
States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
(c) Definition.— As used in this section the term “war crime” means any
conduct—
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions
signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention
to which the United States is a party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land,
signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 o f the
international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any
protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party and
which deals with non-international armed conflict; or
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to
the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva
on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the
United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes
serious injury to civilians.
The Expanded War Crimes Act, 18 USC & 2401 (SEC. 583) amended and re-defined
the circumstances that were necessary for State prosecution and recognition of
international law focusing solely on war crimes as defined through the Geneva
Conventions. Recall this would include the Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time of War and the Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War. While the War Crimes Act serves as protection
against international prosecution, it does so only if domestic prosecution occurs. This
means if a state fails to charge those responsible with war crimes, potentially, the
international arena could take jurisdiction (or another state) and prosecute those
alleged to have committed the offenses of war crimes or torture.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

79

Summary

The various domestic and international laws reviewed within this chapter constitute
the legal frame I use in this study of events at Abu Ghraib. Historically, during
conflicts such as Vietnam and Korea, the policy o f the U.S. was to presume that all
military prisoners were entitled to POW status regardless o f potential non
qualifications under Geneva III. This was a direct policy guided by the ideology that
in so treating prisoners or detainees as POWs, potential future cases o f U.S. military
being held would be treated in accordance with the Convention. However, from the
onset of the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration labeled individuals captured as
unlawful combatants (AKA enemy combatants), thus claiming the Conventions were
inapplicable to their treatment. This had a direct impact on the Administration’s
decisions and expansions of interrogation techniques allowed by U.S. military
personnel in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. Additionally, the expanded interrogation
techniques were in violation of both, domestic law and international conventions.
Furthermore, these techniques spilled over into Abu Ghraib prison once the official
war on Iraq began. However, before exploring the events at Abu Ghraib, it is
necessary to first survey the events leading up to the war on terrorism and the
occupation of Iraq.
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CHAPTER IV
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the events at Abu Ghraib and subsequent cases of torture
and abuse, we must first have an understanding o f the historical events leading to the
war on Iraq. Furthermore, to explore the war on Iraq, we must examine the
neoconservatives within the Bush Administration, their underlying agenda, ideology,
and roles. This chapter provides a glimpse into each of these phenomena. I begin with
a brief exploration o f the neo conservative movement and the unipolar moment that
surfaced following the end of the cold war. This is followed by a brief discussion of
Presidents Bush Sr. and Clinton’s years in office as they relate to the neocon agenda
including the significance of the Project of the New American Century. Then I
examine the 2000 election which resulted in the neo cons placement in office and the
subsequent tragedy of September 11, 2001, which provided the opportunity for their
agenda to be put into motion. I then briefly discuss the war on terrorism, focusing on
the events surrounding Afghanistan and Guantanamo, and including the torture
memos and their relevance to international law. I close this chapter with an account of
the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the growing Iraqi resistance.
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Neoconservatives and the Unipolar Moment

The collapse o f the Soviet Union in 1991 brought the Cold War to an end and
presented the United States with a new set of opportunities. With U.S. military
supremacy unrivaled, the primary means at Washington’s disposal to achieve global
hegemony could be used with relative impunity (e.g., invading Panama and Grenada,
or using Iraq’s incursion into Kuwait to establish a more permanent U.S. military
presence in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region). Indeed, the unipolar moment had arrived
(see Krauthammer 1989, 1991).
The unipolar moment was not without its challenges (Kramer and
Michalowski 2005). The end of the Soviet Union weakened domestic political
support for expanding military budgets or the permanent war economy and removed
the ideological rationalization of an individual nationalistic agenda. In general, the
U.S. general population expected the end of the Cold War to produce a “peace
dividend” (Zinn, 1980).
Economic and political elites (often the same actors), did not acquiesce to the
reduction in their power that would have resulted from such a realignment of U.S.
foreign interest goals, however. A stmggle emerged between rival factions over how
to capitalize on the opportunities offered by the breakup of the Soviet Union (Kramer
and Michalowski 2005). One group supported an internationalist approach,
particularly the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations, while the other,
often referred to as “neoconservatives,” argued for a more nationalist, unilateralist,
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and militarist approach. It was this latter group that would find itself in a position to
shape U.S. policy in the middle of 2001.
The term neoconservative, neocons, was first used in the early 1970’s by the
U.S. democratic sociahst leader Michael Harrington to describe a group of political
actors who had been his companions in the U.S. Sociahst Party, but were moving
politically to the right. Many of the original neoconservative group had been
associated with Henry Jackson’s faction of the Democratic Party (e.g., Irving Kristol
and Norman Podhoretz). In reaction to the liberalism and anti-Vietnam war stance of
the Democrats, they moved to the right, joining the Republican Party (Dorrien 2004:
9-10).
A number of neocons affiliated with the Reagan administration provided the
political justification for the administration’s policies of military growth and use of
covert activities. Moreover, as the Soviet Union was weakening, neocons in the
administration of President George H. W. Bush began vigorously promoting an
aggressive neoimperialist ideology. This included staving off cuts in the military
budget in response to the weakened Soviet threat and the popular expectations for
peace.
Although the first Gulf War temporarily reduced the pressure to cut the
defense budget, “the swift victory in Kuwait and the complete disintegration of the
Soviet Union in 1991 reinvigorated calls for a peace dividend and with them the
threat of cuts to critical military-industrial budgets” (Kramer and Michalowski 2005:
26).
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In 1992, aides under then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney prepared a
draft document titled Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG was an internal
classified Pentagon policy statement used to guide military officials in their planning
process. The draft provides the first look at the emerging neoconservative agenda. As
Armstrong (2002: 78) notes, the DPG “depicted a world dominated by the United
States, which would maintain its superpower status through a combination of positive
guidance and overwhelming military might. The image was one o f a heavily armed
City on a Hill.”
The draft DPG endorsed the use of preemptive military force to achieve its
goals. The document called for the United States to maintain an extensive arsenal of
nuclear weapons and the development of a missile defense shield. The DPG was a
clear statement of the neoconservative vision of “unilaterally using military supremacy
to defend U.S. interests anywhere in the world, including access to vital raw materials
such as Persian Gulf oil” (Kramer and Michalowski 2005: 457; see also Armstrong
2002; Halper and Clarke 2004b; Mann, 2004). Upon a firestorm of criticism that
ensued after the draft was leaked to the press, President George H. W. Bush and
Secretary Cheney publicly distanced themselves from the DPG. Additionally, they
ordered a less unilateralist and nationalistic version be created.
The election of the democratic President, Bill Clinton, removed the neocons
from political positions of power within the U.S. government. Moreover, the rapid
collapse o f the Soviet Union had already revealed that the neocons had been wrong
on almost every issue concerning the Soviet threat. Consequently, neoconservatism
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lost much of its legitimacy as a mainstream political ideology, and eventually they
found themselves in political exile, labeled as the far-right wing o f the Republican
Party. However, from the sidelines they continued to generate a steady stream of
books, articles, reports and op-ed pieces in an effort to influence the direction of U.S.
foreign policy (Kramer and Michalowski 2005). Many of the neoconservatives joined
well-funded conservative think tanks to advocate for their agenda as well. One of the
most important of these was the Project for the New American Century (PNAC).
Throughout the Clinton years, the neocons opined about new threats to
domestic security, calling for greater use of U.S. military power to address them
(Mann 2004). Some o f the “threats,” a persistent theme in their writings, included the
need to eliminate Sadaam Hussein’s regime from Iraq, consolidate U.S. power in the
Middle East, and change the political culture o f the region (Dorrien 2004).
However, where Iraq was concerned, the Clinton administration had a policy
of “containment plus regime change” (Rai 2003). This included the comprehensive
and devastating economic sanctions that had been imposed on Iraq following the
1991 war, low intensity warfare in the form of unauthorized no fly zones (Rai 2003;
Ritter 2003; Simons 2002). Moreover, while the Clinton administration hoped to
provoke regime change in Iraq, it did not consider doing so without sanctioning and
support o f the UN.
Neocons, however, continued to “subject the Clinton administration to a
barrage o f foreign-policy criticism, particularly with respect to Clinton’s handling of
the Middle East and Iraq” (Kramer and Michalowsi 2005: 458). During the early
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1998’s, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) released a letter to Clinton
urging him to militarily remove Hussein from power (Halper and Clarke 2004; Mann
2004).
In September of 2000, the Project for the New American Century issued a
report entitled Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources fo r a
New Century. This report grew out o f the previously mentioned controversial draft
Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 and clearly stated the ideology that would come
to guide George W. Bush’s foreign policies and the war on Iraq. Recall that the
report called for massive increases in the military budget, the expansion o f military
bases, and the establishment of client states supportive of United States’ economic
and political interests. Moreover, the agenda included getting rid of Saddam Hussein
and his regime, the realignment of the Middle East,1 and a preemptive military action
to combat terrorism (as state defined).
Preemption and unilateralism would emerge as the overriding ideology behind
the Bush Administration (Hersh 2004a). The imperial goals o f the neocons were
clear. The opportunity to implement these goals came from two unanticipated events,
the first being the appointment of George W. Bush into the office of the Presidency
(Kramer and Michalowski 2005).

1 See Appendix D for map of area.
For a full analysis of the Neocons and their political agendas see G.
Dorrien. 2004. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax
Americana. New York: Routledge.
2
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The Bungled 2000 Election

The primary “happenstance” was the appointment o f the Bush/Cheney ticket
to the White House. This put the neocons in political positions near the center of
power. In December 2000, after a botched election put the question in their lap, the
Supreme Court of the United States awarded the U.S. Presidency to George W.
Bush, despite his having lost the popular vote by over one-half million ballots. This
political debacle restored the neocons to state power, with more than 20
neoconservatives and hard-line nationalists being awarded high-ranking positions
within the administration (Dorrien 2004).
Moreover, the Pentagon and the Vice-President’s office became unipolarist
strongholds as a result o f the close links between neoconservatives, Vice-President
Dick Cheney and the new Secretary o f Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Moore 2004).
However, at this point, Bush’s political ideology “remained more persuaded by
‘pragmatic realists’ in his administration such as Secretary o f State Colin Powell, than
by their aggressive foreign policy agenda” (Kramer and Michalowski 2005: 26). Yet,
the neocons had expected this as the PNAC report predicted that “the process of
transformation is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic or catalyzing
event-like a new Pearl Harbor.” Consequently, they still needed another
happenstance.
The second “happenstance” was September 11, 2001. The terror attacks
created a climate o f fear and anxiety which the neocons mobilized as now they found
themselves in empowered positions to again promote their geopolitical strategy to a
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president who lacked a coherent foreign policy and to the nation as a whole (Hartung
2004). This included the long-time goal of invading Iraq, regime change, and the
reconstruction o f the Middle East. As former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill
revealed, the goal o f the unipolarists in the Bush administration had always been to
attack Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein (Susskind 2004). This would allow the United
States to consolidate its power in the strategically significant Middle East and to
change the political culture of the region.

Post September 11th and the War on Terrorism

I am driven with a mission from God. God would tell me, “George, go and
fight these terrorists in Afghanistan. ” And I did. And then God would tell me
“George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq. ” And I did. And now, again, Ife e l God’s
words coming to me, “Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their
security, and get peace in the Middle East. ” And, by God, I ’m gonna do it.
— G. W. Bush, stated to Nabil Shaath, News
24; BBC; and Guardian October 6, 2005

On the evening o f September 11, 2001, and in the days following, neocons in
the Bush administration campaigned to attack Iraq immediately (Clarke 2004b;
Woodward 2004). The Bush administration implied on numerous occasions that there
was a strong connection between Saddam Hussein and the A1 Qaeda terrorist
organization that was responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United
States. While they never stated it directly, administration officials repeatedly implied
that Iraq was somehow involved in the 9-11 terrorist attacks. During the build up to
the war, no major statement on Iraq by the Bush administration was made without
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multiple references to terrorism in general and A1 Qaeda specifically (see Prados
2004). Attacking Iraq, they argued, was part o f the broader war on terrorism. This
campaign was highly successful as evidenced by the fact that prior to the start o f the
invasion, 70% o f U.S. citizens believed that Iraq was responsible for 9-11 (see Com
2003). The clear implication o f the Administration was that Saddam Hussein was
responsible for the terrorist attacks against the U.S. and that war on Iraq was a
legitimate form of self-defense (Kramer 2005).
There is, however, no evidence that Iraq had any ties to A1 Qaeda or any
responsibility for the 9-11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration claims
concerning Iraqi connections to A1 Qaeda have been thoroughly investigated, most
recently by the 9-11 Commission, and found to be false (see Rampton and Stauber
2003; Scheer, Scheer, and Chaudhry 2003). Richard Clarke (2004b), the
Counterterrorism expert, reported that he personally informed President Bush that A1
Qaeda was responsible for the terrorist attacks and that Iraq had no connection to A1
Qaeda (see also Dorrien 2004; Suskind 2004). Yet statements implying such a
connection became a staple of the pre-war campaign to build public support for an
invasion.
After an internal struggle between the “pragmatic realists” led by Secretary of
State Powell and the unipolarists led by Vice President Cheney and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, the decision was eventually made to launch a general “war on
terrorism,” beginning with the attack on A1 Queda’s home-base in Afghanistan and
removing the country’s Taliban government (Mann 2004). The Administration’s war
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on terrorism began with A1 Qaeda but would not stop there. G. W. Bush (September
24, 2001) stated, “Tens of thousands o f trained terrorists are still at large. These
enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever
they are.” Again in his State of the Union speech he declared that this war on
terrorism “will not end until every terrorist group o f global reach has been found,
stopped, and defeated” (Bush, September 23, 2001). While the legalities ofthe war
on terrorism remain dubious at best, it was largely supported as the U.S. went after
Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

The initial invasion in Afghanistan had already occurred before the official
announcement and embedded media coverage o f the Army Rangers arrival nearly 60
miles west of Kandahar on October 20, 2001. The first to arrive was an Army
Pathfinder team (a behind the lines specialty unit) sent ahead to ensure there were no
Taliban near the airfield where the strategically planned parachuting of the Army
Rangers was to take place. A second Special Operations (SO) unit also arrived right
outside of Kandahar October 20th, at a complex that included a house used by Mullah
Omar, the alleged Taliban leader. The previous two weeks had consisted of an air war
against Afghanistan, the Taliban, and A1 Qaeda. The arrival of the second SO,
consisting of a Delta Force unit, displayed the intensity of Rumsfeld’s displeasure of
the military command structure. When the assault on Omar’s complex had not been
successful or as one Delta member stated “a total goat fuck” (a military slang for
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everything that could go wrong did go wrong), Rumsfeld claimed the military
operations were “far too cautious and clumsy” and as the after-actions arguments
continued over the next few weeks, the new philosophy o f “gloves off” became
prevalent. (Hersh 2004a: 121).
By the middle of November 2001, Bin Laden remained at large and fighters
continued to put up resistance to U.S. military presence. After fleeing from defeats at
Mazar-i-Sharif, Taloqan, and Pul-i-Khumir, many Afghanis and Taliban fighters
arrived in Kunduz, a haven from the bombing and a place to attempt to negotiate
surrender terms. However, the Bush Administration adamantly and successfully
opposed all surrender negotiations. The Northern Alliance stormed and took Kundez.
On November 25, 2001, the Northern Alliance upon taking Kunduz, captured
nearly four thousand alleged Taliban and A1 Qaeda fighters. Within weeks of the
invasion o f Afghanistan, the U.S. and allies were inundated with prisoners. While
Afghani Taliban were allowed to return to their local villages, all foreign-bom
“soldiers” were taken as detainees and relocated to Mazar-I-Sharif, the Qala-I-Jangi
fortress (except for Pakistan military, intelligence, and other underground individuals
who were flown out of Kunduz back to Pakistan per an agreement with the
Administration). Others, as we know now, were handed over to allies “who were not
afraid to get very rough with prisoners.” A former intelligence official stated that the
allies would tell U.S. intelligence officers that “we pulled out teeth and fingers from a
prisoner, but we got some good shit. He’s dead now, but we don’t care” (Hersh
2004a: 49). It was also at this time when Rumsfeld authorized the establishment of a
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highly secretive program (SAP or Special Access Programs) that endorsed a blanket
approval to kill or capture and if possible interrogate “high-value” targets. The
program was strategically located in a secure part o f the Pentagon that as previously
mentioned was now one o f the strongholds of the neocons.
The targeting and killing o f A1 Qaeda members, without any judicial process,
came to be seen and justified as necessary military action as this was a “new kind of
war” composed o f terrorist organizations and failed states. Moreover, Defense
Department lawyers emphatically stated that this type of assassinations was not illegal
under the Army’s Law o f War as the targets were “combatant forces of another
nation, a guerilla force, and or terrorists whose actions pose a threat to the security of
the United States”3 (Hersh 2004a: 264).
At this same time (end o f November 2001) at the Qala-I-Jangi fortress a
prisoner detonated a hand grenade, killing himself and two o f the Northern Alliance
General’s aids. The prisoners were then hand bound for the CIA to interrogate. A
fight ensued between CIA Johnny Spann and a prisoner that led to the death of Spann
(after Spann had shot and killed 4 prisoners). The prisoners then charged the guards
and attempted to retrieve their guns. In the following days U.S. forces killed the
majority of detainees. It has been claimed by some media and NGOs that U.S. Special
Forces had Northern Alliance troops pour diesel into the basement of Qala-I-Jangi

-3

This is a direct contradiction to the 1976 Presidential Executive Order
signed by President Ford that bans all political assassinations, which is still in effect.
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setting it on fire killing all the detainees in hiding. The London Times and British
Broadcasting Company aired on November 29, 2001 a report showing U.S. Special
Forces firing down on prisoners (that were hand bound) from outside the compound.
On November 13, 2001 President Bush signed an Executive Order authorizing
military tribunals for suspected terrorists. This was an example o f the blatant
disregard for international law that would come to be the standard practice for this
Administration (e.g., Geneva Conventions Article 5: International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the UN Principles of Protection Under any Form of
Detention of Imprisonment). Under Bush’s Executive Order, any foreign national
who has been designated as a suspected terrorist or as a terrorist’s aid could be
detained, tried, convicted, and executed without a public trial or counsel, without the
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and without right o f appeal. Ironically, the
State enacted an order that it had previously denounced. The State Department
routinely criticized the use of military tribunals, practices of secret trials that do not
adhere to “fair public trials,” and omissions of due processes in similar situations
around the world. In the annual Human Rights Practices Country Reports the U.S.
condemned Burma in 1990, China in 2000, Colombia in 1996, Egypt in 2000,
Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia in 1975, Nigeria from 1966-1999, Peru in 1996, Russia in 1999,
Sudan in 2000, and Turkey (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
Additionally, by mid December 2001, U.S. operatives had participated in the
kidnapping of two Egyptians who were sent to Cairo where they underwent brutal,
repeated and extensive interrogation techniques (Hersh 2004a; The Guardian
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September 13, 2004).4 The position ofthe Administration towards international law
was becoming very clear: international law would not act as a control against their
interests—it was seen as irrelevant.
December 2001 was the high point of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan as the
Northern Alliance, U.S. airpower, and Special Force units took Kabul, removing the
Taliban from power. On December 22, Hamid Karzai was sworn in as the new leader
of Afghanistan and within a few months the most highly skilled U.S. units and CIA
paramilitary teams were diverted from Afghanistan. As Clarke (2004b) noted, “The
U.S. Special Forces who were trained to speak Arabic, the language of A1 Qaeda, had
been pulled out of Afghanistan and sent to Iraq.” While this was not in response to
the stated goals ofthe invasion of Afghanistan (finding Bin Laden, A1 Qaeda, and
removing the Taliban from power) and as “warlordism, banditry and opium
production” got a new lease on fife, it does symbolize the underlying priorities and
agenda of the neocons (Rothstein 2002). The invasion o f Iraq was the priority.

Guantanamo

Guantanamo, strategically placed in a legal black hole o f U.S. leased land in
Cuba, soon became “home” to over 650 detainees from over forty states; all were
claimed to be officials or supporters of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime or of the AlQaeda terrorist organization responsible for September 11, 2001. A Senior Fellow at

4 One of those men was later released in October 2003; the other is serving a
25 year prison sentence in Egypt.
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the Brookings Institution (a well known liberal think tank in Washington, DC),
Michael O’Hanlon, stated in a radio interview on January 6, 2002 the underlying
ideology behind choosing Guantanamo:
We can sort of do what we want to there. It’s on foreign soil and yet the
foreign government doesn’t have much say in how we use the place . . . and
it’s close enough to the United States, you can imagine flying in various
intelligence experts to interview these detainees and try to get information
from them. So for a number of reasons, it seems the best choice and I think
Rumsfeld is right here to have selected it.
Within weeks o f the high point of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and the
capture of 4,000 prisoners, the first detainees arrived at Guantanamo, January 11,
2002 (Strasser 2004). Photographs of detainees in orange jumpsuits hooded and in
chains provoked an international outcry against the treatment o f detainees the
Administration had put in place. They were labeled as the “worst of a very bad lo t. . .
devoted to killing millions of Americans” (Cheney 2002). The issue of their guilt was
not questioned as Bush (2003) stated: “The only thing we know for certain is that
these are bad people.” Days before their arrival at Guantanamo, the Administration
had already begun discussing the United States’ legal obligations (as they so chose to
interpret them) to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees.
A memo dated January 9, 2002 from Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo of the DOJ to General Counsel of the DOD William Haynes reinforced the hard
liners position within the Administration: “We conclude that these treaties do not
protect members of the Al-Qaeda organization . . . we further conclude that these
treaties do not apply to the Taliban militia.” The DOJ goes as far as dismissing even
the most fundamental principles guiding international relations: customary law. Yoo
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states, “We also conclude that customary international law has no binding effect on
either the President or the military because it is not federal law, as recognized by the
Constitution” (2002: 41). On January 19, 2002, nearly a month before the public
declaration or Executive Order by President Bush, Rumsfeld sent a memorandum to
the Joint Chiefs o f Staff to transmit the following orders to all Combatant
Commanders:
1) The U.S. determined that A1 Qaeda and Taliban individuals under the
control of the DOD are not entitled to prisoner of war status for the purposes
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
2) The Combatant Commanders shall, in detaining A1 Qaeda and Taliban
individuals, under control o f the DOD, treat them humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent
with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. [italics my emphasis]
Several other memos continued to circulate between the DOD and DOJ,
including the January 26, 2002 memo by Colin Powell to the Counsel to the President
reinforcing the need for the Administration to adhere to international law and provide
the necessary and customary status of POW. However, his efforts failed and the stage
was again set for blatant misuse and abuse o f international law as it conflicted with
the larger goals and interests of the Administration, specifically those of neocons.
Alberto Gonzales, Counselor to the President, also participated in the legal
discussions of classifying detainees. In a memo dated January 25, 2002, he advised
President Bush to declare the prisoners in the war on terrorism outside o f the
protections of the Geneva Conventions with this declaration:
As you have said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war. The nature
o f the new war places a high premium on other factors, such as the ability to
quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order
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to avoid further atrocities against American civilians. . . . This new situation
renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning o f enemy prisoners
and renders quaint some o f its provisions.
On February 7, 2002, the White House Spokesperson announced that
President Bush had determined that the Provisions o f Geneva applied to Taliban
detainees, but not al-Qaeda detainees. However, Bush stated:
Common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either A1 Qaeda or the Taliban
detainees. . . . I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants
and, therefore do not qualify as prisoners o f war under Article 4 o f the
Geneva, I note that, because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with A1
Qaeda, A1 Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.
(Memorandum for the Vice President)
The announcement confirmed that neither group was entitled to prisoners of
war status; instead they would be left without a classification or at best classified as
an enemy combatant. Moreover, on March 21, 2002, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld asserted that the U.S. had the right to hold detainees without a trial until the
end o f the war against terrorism (Sands 2005). Without the privileges and or
protections of the Geneva Conventions, the legal status and treatment of detainees
would soon come to also be defined by the Administration and justified as wholly
legal. Moreover, the underlying ideology of the neocons, now in charge of much of
the day-to-day operations and decisions within the Administration, was coming to
fruition by means o f military force.
By February 26, 2002, discussions were already underway for easing or
redefining the application of international rules constraining interrogation techniques
of persons captured in Afghanistan. Moreover, getting the interrogation process to
work was seen as crucial as “this is a war in which intelligence is everything . . .
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winning or losing depends on it” (Pentagon Consultant John Arquilla in Hersh 2004a:
2). Yet, the interrogations at Guantanamo were not producing any intelligent or viable
information. By this time a report by a CIA analyst not only showed most of those
detained at Guantanamo should not have been, but that the conditions and their
treatment were horrendous. For example, detainees included one 13-year-old, one 14year-old, two 15-year-olds, one 16-year-old, an 88-year-old, and a 98-year-old
(Human Rights Watch 2004). The issue was not only direct torture, which was
observed, but also cruel and inhumane treatment (Hersh 2004a). The first week of
August 2001, 598 detainees were being held in Guantanamo.5 However, the worst
was yet to come. On August 1, 2002, internal memos again began to circulate
attempting to circumvent U.S. obligation under international law pertaining to issues
of torture and interrogation methods. The stage for torture was being set not only for
detainees at Guantanamo and Afghanistan, but would also spillover to Abu Ghraib.

Torture Memos

At the height of the holding of detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo,
strategic and legal manipulation of international and domestic torture laws was taking
place within the Administration. As previously mentioned, little to no valued
information was being obtained from detainees leading to the capture or death of Bin
Laden and/or other high ranking A1 Qaeda members that the Administration needed to

5 For an updated account of detainees at Guantanamo, see Appendix E dated
2005.
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justify the billions o f dollars being spent on the vast and ambiguous war on terrorism.
Moreover, to achieve some success in the area of capturing terrorists could boost
public support for the silent but growing plans to attack Iraq as part o f the larger war
on terrorism. With over 600 detainees being held in Guantanamo, and thousands in
Afghanistan, little progress was made in the way o f actionable intelligence. However,
some actionable intelligence was reported to have been gotten from the illegal
transportation of detainees to states viewed as harsh interrogators or those willing to
torture for the U.S. For example, Vincent Cannistraro, a former intelligence official,
told reporters at Newsday:
Better intelligence has come from a senior al Qaeda detainee who had been
held in the U.S. base at Guantanamo, Cuba, and was “rendered to Egypt after
refusing to cooperate. . . . They promptly tore his fingernails out and he
started to tell things.” (Newsday, February 6, 2003)
While a practice of transporting detainees (ghost detainees) to other states
was systematically practiced, the interrogators at Guantanamo also wanted increased
interrogation techniques to be justified in a cloak of legal interpretations.
In a memo (August 1, 2002) to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
addressing the CIA’s request for guidance on interrogation, Jay Bybee, Legal Counsel
of the DOJ, reinterpreted the Torture Convention and other international laws setting
the stage for harsher interrogation techniques. Bybee states that the Torture
Convention “prohibits only the most extreme acts by reserving criminal penalties
solely for torture and declining to require such penalties for cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment” (Bybee August 1, 2002). Moreover, he suggests
that “Certain acts may be cruel, inhumane, or degrading, but still not produce pain
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and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within a legal proscription against
torture” (Bybee 2002; Hersh 2004a; Greenberg and Dratel 2005; Danner 2005).
Bybee (currently a federal appeals court judge) stated that torturing al-Qaeda
detainees in captivity abroad “may be justified,” and those international laws against
torture “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted in the war on
terrorism. The memo also discussed how the doctrines o f “necessity and self-defense
could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability” on the part of
officials who tortured the al-Qaeda detainees. Consequently, Bybee provided an
extremely narrow vision for which acts constitute torture asserting that “physical pain
amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death”
and that “mental torture” only included acts that resulted in “significant psychological
harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”
Dana Priest and Jeffrey Smith, in the Washington Post, June 27, 2004, cited
unnamed U.S officials as saying that the Bybee memo was prepared after a debate
within the government about the methods used to interrogate alleged al-Qaeda leader
Abu Zubayda (see below) after his capture in April 2002. Other reports suggested
that CIA interrogation methods were authorized by a secret set of rules, endorsed by
the DOJ and others in the Administration. These were said to include feigned
drowning and refusal of pain medication for injuries. According to the New York
Times,
The methods employed by the CIA are so severe that senior officials of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation have directed its agents to stay out of many of
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the interviews of the high-level detainees, counterterrorism officials said. The
F.B.I. officials have advised the bureau’s director, Robert S. Mueller III that
the interrogation techniques, which would be prohibited in criminal cases,
could compromise their agents in future criminal cases, the counterterrorism
officials said. (Risen, Johnston, and Lewis, May 13, 2004)
Of course, what is new here is that the U.S. is trying to make torture legal and
is being bold enough to bring it out o f the closet. But this has been the unofficial
practice, despite claims otherwise by Senator John McCain, as far back in history as
one wants to go. Most, but not all, o f the methods o f the CIA agents, private
contractors, and the military personnel employed today, for instance, were field-tested
in Vietnam as part of the Phoenix program, and later imported to Latin America and
Asia under the guise of police training “counter-terrorism” programs. More
specifically, declassified training manuals from the School ofthe Americas, in both
English and Spanish, speak volumes to how military and police officers from across
the hemisphere and beyond were instructed in many of the same “coercive
interrogation” techniques that have since migrated to Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib:
hooding and blindfolding, forced nudity, sensory overload and deprivation, stress
positions, mock drowning, etc. (Barak 2005).
By October 2002 a series of memos were issued considering alternative
acceptable counter-resistance techniques: interrogation techniques wavering between
torture and cruel and inhumane treatment. In fight o f what key Administrators of the
Office ofthe Secretary of Defense and Joint Task Force 170 saw as ’’tenacious
resistance . . . despite our best efforts” for gathering key intelligence, more memos
circulated discussing the legality of additional techniques (General Hill, Memo
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October 25, 2002: 1). The official stated problem was that the “current guidelines for
interrogation procedures at GTMO limit the ability o f interrorgators to counter
advanced resistance” (Phifer JTF-J2). Hill’s memorandum includes the Joint Task
Force 170’s proposed counter-resistance techniques divided into three categories: the
first two were “believe(d)” to be legal but the Task Force wanted legal clarification
and approval for the third category. While stating reservations regarding the third
category, Hill asserted that he
desires to have as many options as possible at my disposal and therefore
request that Department o f Defense and Department o f Justice lawyers review
the third category. . . . I welcome any suggested interrogation methods that
others may propose. I believe we should provide our interrogators with as
many legally permissible tools as possible.
Others within the DOD and Joint Task Force included similar memos on
October 11, 2002 with their determination that the proposed techniques are legal
under domestic and international law (e.g., Dunlavey, Beaver, and Phifer). While
overtly requesting verification of the suggested techniques legality, what was being
surreptitiously sought were “exquisitely refined lawyer skills to justify some part o f’
or all ofthe expanded techniques (Weisberg 2004: 301).
The specific requests of the Joint Task Force 170 of Guantanamo included
Category I, II, and III techniques:
Yelling; techniques of deception; multiple interrogators; and interrogator
identity (identify himself as from a country with a reputation for harsh
treatment).
Use of stress positions for a maximum of 4 hours; use of falsified documents
or reports; isolation for up to 30 days or beyond with approval by the
Commanding General; interrogating detainee in environment other than the
standard interrogation booth; light deprivation and auditory stimulation;
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hooding; 20 hour interrogations; removal o f all comfort items (including
religious items); switching from hot rations to MRE’s; removal o f clothing;
forced grooming; using detainees phobias (such as fear o f dogs) to induce
stress.
The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely
painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family; exposure to cold
weather or water; use o f wet towel and dripping water to induce the
misperception of suffocation; use of mild, and non-injurious physical contact
such as grabbing, poking and light pushing (any techniques requiring more
than this is to be administered only by individuals specifically trained in their
safe application).
Along with the legal department exploring these techniques, General Counsel
William Haynes sent Rumsfeld a memo asking that all o f Categories I and II be
approved along with one of Category III (use o f mild physical contact). Rumsfeld,
made a specific remark in a notation on the memo that he stands for 8-10 hours a day
so “why is stands limited to 4 hours?” (November 27, 2002). On December 2, 2002
Rumsfeld approved Category I, II, and the final article o f Category III (the same
conditions that Haynes approved). However, six weeks later, Rumsfeld sent a
memorandum to the Commander USSSOUTHCOM and rescinded his December 2
approval (January 15, 2003). It was at this time a working group within the DOD
began to assess the legal policy and operational issues relating to interrogations.
Nearly two months later, March 6, 2003, the Working Group submitted its
report. The report outlines the Administrations position regarding international law
and techniques of interrogation, potential defenses, intent, necessity, superior orders,
potential civil cases against the U.S, and transporting detainees to other states for
interrogation: The U.S. understanding relating to Article 3 ofthe Convention, is that
it only applies if it is more likely than not that the person would be tortured (p. 2).
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Less than two weeks later, President Bush announced that upon his orders
“coalitions forces have begun striking selected targets o f military importance” in Iraq
(Presidential Address to the Nation, March 19, 2003). While hundreds of detainees
were being held in Guantanamo and Afghanistan in disarray and violence, unclear,
inconsistent and open orders for interrogation techniques continued to guide the
treatment of thousands of individuals, the official war on Iraq had begun.
It was not until April 4, 2003, when the working group provided an updated
version and revision o f its reporting in which they argue that it might be essential to
interrogate detainees “in a manner beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner of
war who is subject to the Geneva Conventions.” The report also recommended 35
interrogation techniques be used on unlawful combatants. Moreover, it provides an
in-depth discussion of legal technicalities that could be used to create a “good faith
defense against prosecution” (see also Appendix F for details of the techniques and
their consistency with domestic and international law). On April 6th, Rumsfeld sent a
memo to USCCO Hill that included a new list of approved techniques that varied
significantly from his earlier approved methods and from the working group report.
Within a matter o f months the methods approved and/or disapproved by high officials
changed causing uncertainty and an unclear, inconsistent mandate for interrogators
guidance.
These memos depict the erroneous legal analysis that guides the Bush
Administration’s decisions and policies in an effort to pursue their geo-political and
ideological agenda. Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI, the
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assessment o f international law is in blatant error. Yet, these “are the memorandum
the White House was willing to put in the public domain” (Sands 2005: 214).
Furthermore, the global war on terrorism, as a new form of war based on intelligence,
was used to justify additional interrogation techniques in Afghanistan, at
Guantanamo, and in Iraq. Moreover, the inconsistency between approved methods,
regardless of legality, the receded orders, and the obscure classification of enemy
combatants contributed to the already existing quagmire ofthe war on terrorism.
As previously mentioned, the U.S. was now officially in a war on Iraq.
However, in many ways, the war on Iraq had begun well before March 19, 2003.
Months before the official public declaration was made: coalition forces were
attacking. In November 2002, British and U.S. warplanes were already attacking
Iraq’s defenses daily. While indiscriminate bombing o f Iraq had occurred throughout
the 1990s, post-the first Gulf War and UN sanctions/boycott of Iraq, the consistency
of daily attacks on Iraq’s defenses aiding the upcoming invasion was significantly
different. Additionally, U.S. Special Forces were deployed in Western and Northern
Iraq at the same time officials were claiming they would attempt diplomatic means to
deal with Iraq.
The Iraq Build-up

While the Afghanistan war was still underway, the Administration began
planning an invasion of Iraq (Clarke 2004b; Fallows 2004). By November, barely one
month after the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush and Rumsfeld ordered the Department
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of Defense to formulate a war plan for Iraq (Woodward 2004). In late 2001, Richard
Pearle and James Woolsey helped to create a surge o f articles and columns calling for
the extension o f the war on Afghanistan into Iraq, exactly as had been planned. Pearle
stated:
The question in my mind is: Do we wait for Saddam and hope for the best?
. . . What is essential here is not to look at the opposition to Saddam as it is
today, without any external support, without any realistic hope of removing
that awful regime, but to look at what could be created with the power and
authority ofthe United States. (November 2001, Meeting ofthe Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, in Sands 2004:169)
Throughout 2002, as plans for the war on Iraq were being formulated and
covert activities were underway, the Bush administration made a number of formal
pronouncements demonstrating that the goals of the neocons were now the official
goals of the U.S. government. In the January 29th State o f the Union address, Bush
recast the focus of the war on terrorism by associating terrorism itself with states such
as Iran, Iraq and North Korea (the “axis of evil”) presenting them as legitimate and
necessary targets for military action (Callinicos 2003). In a speech to the graduating
cadets at West Point on June 1st, the President provided the fullest articulation of the
strategic doctrine of preventative war that “was critically interpreted to be the most
open statement yet made of imperial globalization” (Falk 2004: 189).
In the campaign to build public support for the invasion and occupation of
Iraq, the Administration exploited the political opportunities provided by the fear and
anger over the September 11th terrorist attacks (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004). In 2002
the Bush administration promulgated a new National Security Strategy (NSS) that
claimed the United States had the right to use force preemptively against any
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perceived threat to U.S. security (Mahajan, 2003). This document not only claimed
the right to wage preventative war as previously discussed, but it claimed that the
U.S. would use its military power to spread democracy and laissez-faire capitalism
around the world as the “single sustainable model for national success” (Callinicos
2003: 29). As Roy (2004: 56) notes: “Democracy has become Empire’s euphemism
for neo-liberal capitalism.” Moreover, the highest stated value o f democracy, liberty,
quickly became what Gramsci (1995: 242) anticipated, “a practical Instrument of
government used as an ideology to pursue international self-interests disguised as a
human value.”
The NSS doctrine was then asserted as legal justification for the use o f force
against Iraq. Testifying in front of Congress on September 19, 2002, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld rejected the idea that a U.S. attack would violate
international law and evoked a right of anticipatory self-defense against Iraq’s alleged
weapons of mass destruction.
Moreover, by linking Saddam Hussein and Iraq to the wider war on terrorism,
the Administration established the necessary propaganda wherein domestic security
required the State’s ability to attack any other nation-state believed to be supporting
terror, no matter how weak the evidence. This obscured the underlying geopolitical
and economic neocons goals of creating a Pax Americana. In Falk’s (2004: 195)
words: “the Iraq debate was colored by the dogs that didn’t bark: oil, geopolitical
goals in the region and beyond, and the security of Israel.”
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Iraq Occupation

This Administration’s views on the irrelevance of international law had direct
effects on the decision to classify prisoners as enemy combatants, expand
interrogation techniques to include torture, and in its efforts to pursue larger geo
political and ideological goals. Consequently, illegal or not, the U.S. invaded a
sovereign nation committing the supreme international crime (Nuremberg Tribunal).
“The Bush administration chose to risk invasion and occupation despite widespread
concern around the world that this choice would result in more rather than less death,
injury, and material destruction for Iraqis” (Kramer et al. 2005: 24).
The onset ofthe invasion of Iraq began with shock and awe bombings as
ground forces made their way in. Days of concentrated bombing o f Baghdad
continued. In other areas o f Iraq, resistance was significant. For example, stronger
than expected resistance fighting continued in the southern port town o f Umm Qasr,
Nassiriya, and Basra. U.S, its allies, and Iraqi forces continued to suffer casualties in
the face o f stronger than expected resistance from Iraqi soldiers (The Guardian,
March 23, 2003).
As the intense and often indiscriminate bombing continued, hundreds off
civilian casualties also occurred. The high civilian death toll was the result of various
military tactics and weapons. Ridha (2004: 1) demonstrates that indiscriminate
“missile attacks caused scores of civilian deaths throughout Iraq without any
discemable military gains.” According to a Human Rights Watch (2003) report,
during the invasion the widespread use of cluster bombs and numerous attempted
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“decapitation” strikes targeting senior Iraqi officials— often based on scanty or
questionable intelligence—were responsible for the deaths of many Iraqi civilians. The
World Tribunal on Iraq came to similar conclusions (Whitson 2004). Coalition forces
have also exposed Iraqi civilians to significant “collateral damage” through the
deployment o f napalm-like Mark 77 firebombs (Buncombe 2003; Ridha, 2004), and
the indiscriminate use o f depleted uranium munitions that release dangerous
radioactive debris in the short term and pose long-term environmental hazards to
people exposed to uranium-contaminated soil or water (Michalowski and Bitten
2004).
As Iraqis watched the continued devastation o f their country from the
bombings, the U.S. further fueled resistance when on March 31, 2003, U.S. forces
killed seven women and children at a checkpoint in southern Iraq. Less than 24 hours
later another civilian was killed while another was injured after troops fired on their
car as it approached a roadblock (The Guardian, April 1, 2003). The pattern of
civilian deaths continued throughout April, as did the growing resistance. Once
Baghdad was taken over by U.S. and allied troops, mass protests against the
occupation began. On April 18, 2003, tens of thousands of Iraqis demonstrated
against the U.S. occupation of Iraq in central Baghdad. Ten days later, as protests
continued U.S. forces fired on a group of Iraqi demonstrators near Baghdad, killing
13 people and wounding approximately 75 others.
On May 7th, Paul Bremer was named as Iraq’s new civil administrator. The
Bush administration’s agenda in Iraq went far beyond “regime change.” The
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Administration’s goal from the outset was to transform Iraq from a state controlled
economy into a showpiece for Middle East capitalism characterized by free trade,
supply-side tax policy, privatization of key economic sectors, and widespread foreign
ownership in those sectors (Bacon 2004; Juhasz 2004; Krugman 2004a). However,
the economic transformation also was prohibited by international law. As Greider
(2003: 5) notes:
The obstacle is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which codified in
greater detail the principles o f “occupation law” first framed by the Hague
Convention of 1907 rules of warfare meant to prevent a military power from
plundering a defeated nation or reordering the country to conform to the
conqueror’s ideology and economics.
International law governing military occupation requires the occupying power
to respect the domestic laws of the subjugated country unless absolutely prevented
from doing so by military necessity. Yet in a series o f Orders in 2003, L. Paul Bremer,
the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, rewrote Iraqi law in order to make
the country available for foreign investment and ownership. As Juhasz (2004: 2)
notes:
These orders include the frill privatization of public enterprises, full ownership
rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation o f foreign profits,
the Flat Tax, the opening of Iraq’s banks to foreign control, national treatment
for foreign companies (which means, for example, that Iraq cannot require
that local firms able to do reconstruction work should be hired instead of
foreign ones), and (with an earlier Order) elimination of nearly all trade
barriers. (Kramer and Michalowski 2005)
In essence, Bremer’s reconstruction was given over primarily to U.S.-based
corporations, with Bechtel and the Halliburton subsidiary of Kellogg, Brown and
Root being the major winners (Rothe 2006).
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U.S. efforts to remake Iraq into a U.S.-like free-market economy had a
devastating impact on ordinary Iraqis. Privatization led to 70% unemployment at a
time when there was no unemployment insurance or system o f public welfare to offset
the effect o f privatization (Klein 2003). According to Bacon (2004: 1),
the violence of grinding poverty, exacerbated by economic sanctions after the
first Gulf War, has been deepened by the U.S. invasion. Every day the
economic policies of the occupying authorities create more hunger among
Iraq’s working people, transforming them into a pool o f low-wage, semi
employed labor, desperate for jobs at almost any price.
The growing conditions of occupation, deaths of civilians, and the structural
conditions within Iraq fueled the existing resistance.
The use of privatization (PMC) by the U.S. in the war on terrorism also
reached an unprecedented high. An article on PMCs in Iraq in the New York Times,
April 19, 2004, commented:
Far more than in any other conflict in United States history, the Pentagon is
relying on private security companies to perform crucial jobs once entrusted
to the military. In addition to guarding innumerable reconstruction projects,
private companies are being asked to provide security for the chief of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer III, and other senior officials;
to escort supply convoys through hostile territory; and to defend key
locations, including 15 regional authority headquarters and even the Green
Zone in downtown Baghdad, the centre o f American power in Iraq.
All said, the presence of private contract workers exceeded the number of
British troops (14,000) (Rothe 2006). As previously mentioned, corporations such as
Bechtel and Halliburton were attaining vast contracts for logistic contracts. Other
corporations were used for mercenaries for hire and/or protection services (see
Blackwater, including protection of U.S. high ranking personnel and for the newly
formed Interim Iraqi Government). Other corporations were given contracts for
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interrogations and or interpretations such as CACI International, Inc. from Arlington,
Virginia, and Titan o f San Diego, California.
On May 1, G. W. Bush declared “major combat operations” over. During this
period and in the following weeks, U.S. military and allies captured and imprisoned
thousands of Iraqis. Many of those captured would find themselves in the facility
Bremer had recently dedicated as a temporary holding prison: the infamous Abu
Ghraib (an Iraqi prison under Saddam alleged to have been the site o f vast cases of
torture). By late summer o f 2003, resistance to the occupation soared in comparison
to the first months. Uprisings began and the U.S. and allies were overwhelmed
(Strasser 2004). Yet, despite the claim of “mission accomplished,” U.S. forces were
“being ambushed, hit by rocket-propelled grenades, and surprised by roadside bombs
that exploded under army vehicles” (Peacework 2005: 1). In their attempts to control
insurgents, U.S. and British forces shot and killed demonstrators, bombed civilian
areas, demolished homes and destroyed property in acts of collective punishment.
They deployed excessive and sometimes lethal force in encounters with Iraqi citizens,
even when there was little evidence that these Iraqis were resistance fighters or guilty
of any other crimes (Amnesty International 2004). Coalition forces have used hostage
taking as way of rooting out insurgents, effected arbitrary arrests, and held detainees
indefinitely without charges or access to lawyers.
The U.S. DOD and the military were eager to get more information from
prisoners to help in the growing resistance with Iraqi fighters. A decision was made to
send Guantanamo commander Major General Geoffrey Miller to Iraq in September
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2003. His job was “to review Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for
actionable intelligence,” according to Major General AntonioTaguba (Taguba Report:
Annex II 2004).
According to the Taguba, Miller stressed that “detention operations must act
as an enabler for interrogation.” Miller also briefed military commanders in Iraq on
interrogation methods used at Guantanamo: sleep deprivation, exposure to extremes
of cold and heat, and placing prisoners in “stress positions for agonizing lengths of
time” (Hersh 2004b). Prison guards were assigned to prepare the conditions for
interrogation. Moreover, he brought with him Rumsfeld’s April 16, 2003 policy
guidelines for Guantanamo to Iraq, handing them over to General Sanchez. Recall
that these methods were approved by the Administration originally for those classified
as enemy combatants; however, all detained Iraqis should have been classified with
POW status. Moreover, the techniques themselves are not considered legal under
international law.
By November, the number of attacks by Iraqi resistance increased as did the
death toll of U.S. forces, increasing from 41, when Bush declared major combat over,
to 110 (Danner 2004a). At this point, U.S. officers had little to no idea who was
behind the killing of troops or the mounting resistance and were becoming desperate
to find out. In response, U.S. forces began conducting a cordon and capture offense
to try to gather intelligence to find those responsible. General Fay (August, 2004)
states in his report:
As the pace of operations picked up in late November-early December 2003,
it became a common practice for maneuver elements to round up large
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quantities o f Iraqi personnel (i.e., civilians) in the general vicinity of a specified
target as a cordon and capture technique.
Thousands of Iraqis were arrested as a result. This included men, children, and
women. The population o f the U.S. detention system in Iraq alone was nearing ten
thousand (Danner 2004). Moreover, the “flood o f incoming detainees contrasted
sharply with the trickle o f released individuals” (Schlesinger, August, 2004). In
December 2003, the Bush Administration authorized an escalation of Special Forces
designated as Task Force 121 (Army Delta Members, Navy Seals, and CIA
Paramilitary operatives). The task was the neutralization of the insurgents by capture
or assassination. The critical goal, however, remained intelligence (Hersh 2004a).
Many individuals captured by Task Force 121 added to the growing numbers of
detainees already held at the designated intelligence gathering prison: Abu Ghraib.
The numbers o f detainees being held were believed to be between 5,000 to 8,000
during high points o f cordon and capture (Strasser 2004; Danner 2004; and Hersh
2004a). This is reminiscent of the Phoenix program where agents o f the CIA, based
on press reports and Congressional and Senate probes, operated some 40
interrogation centers in South Vietnam that killed more than 20,000 suspects and
tortured thousands more (Barak 2005).
Summary

While cases of abuse and murder of Iraqi detainees (as well as those at
Guantanamo and in Afghanistan) were sporadically reported (e.g., media reports,
ICRC, HRW, and AI) the most prominent ones occurred at Abu Ghraib. But the
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question remains what separates Abu Ghraib from the rest o f abuses that occurred
elsewhere during the war on terrorism? Perhaps it is not the specific methods of
physical and psychological techniques as these have been a systematic covert practice
for decades, but the images themselves. Until the images surfaced in the media, the
suppression o f visual information regarding military operations had kept invisible to
the public and those high in the echelon of political ranks the devastation due to war
or state covert activities. The images of abuses and torture that came out of Abu
Ghraib left nothing for the symbolic imagination to elaborate or deny. Instead, they
presented a literal fact of the image and what it represented (Stein 2004).
Representation and what it represented coincided: a long history o f state torture as
practiced within the U.S. prison system, a legacy of CIA tactics abroad, and the
inherent contradiction between values and practice. Indeed, the images out of Abu
Ghraib serve as more than the archetype of interrogation tactics since September 11,
2001. They represent a side of the U.S. and its population that can no longer be
dismissed. Accordingly, exploring the actual events that occurred within the walls of
Abu Ghraib leads to a better understanding of what the images represent.
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CHAPTER V
TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
You may remember it was a place o f torture under Saddam Hussein
and most recently o f the abuse scandal.
— HCNN 4/14/2004

Before analyzing why torture and abuse occurred, we must first look at the
organizational structure o f Abu Ghraib. This chapter provides a glimpse into the
history, actors, and standard operating procedures at the prison. I begin with a brief
exploration o f the history behind Abu Ghraib and the subsequent choice by the U.S.
to use it as a detention center. From this, I provide a descriptive account of the formal
and informal chain of command and daily operating procedures. I then provide a voice
for the victim’s accounts with detailed transcripts recalling their experiences. In
closing this chapter, I explore the Administration’s response to the cases of abuse and
torture.

Introduction to Abu Ghraib

Since Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979, Abu Ghraib was the symbol of
death and torture. Over 30,000 Iraqis were executed there and thousands more were
tortured and mutilated only to be returned to society as visible evidence to others of
Saddam’s power (American Enterprise Institute 2004; Kupelian 2004). A film of
mutilation and torture carried out by Saddam’s regime, released by the American
115
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Enterprise Institute (2004), depicted some o f the horrors that occurred within the
walls of Abu Ghraib. This included amputations o f body parts, rape, the removal of
tongues, and systematic beatings. Executions were routine at Abu Ghraib. For
example, during 1984 up to 4,000 prisoners, respectively, were said to have been
executed. The pattern continued through the 1990’s until October 2002 when
Saddam granted amnesty to most prisoners in Iraq including those at Abu Ghraib.
(e.g., 2,500 prisoners were said to have been executed during 1997 through 1999;
during June 2000 through April 2001 130 Iraqi women were beheaded) (Amnesty
International 2002).
Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Abu Ghraib was completely abandoned,
leaving only the memories o f executions, torture, and mutilations that occurred under
Saddam’s rule. After the fall of Baghdad, coalition forces needed a detention center
for the growing numbers of prisoners captured by U.S. forces. Abu Ghraib was
chosen by Ambassador Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional
Authority. Less than one month after the invasion, April 2003, the Abu Ghraib prison
complex was stripped of everything that was removable. Coalition authorities had the
cells cleaned and repaired, floors were tiled, and toilets and showers installed, all in
preparation to become a place of detention for Iraqi resisters (Danner 2004a).
Bremer’s choice o f Abu Ghraib as a detention operations center placed a strict
detention mission-driven unit assigned to operate in the rear o f enemy lines in the
middle o f a combat environment (Schlesinger Report, August 2004). To Iraqis, the
facility served in the national imagination as a constant reminder of past abuses that
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now coincided with the current occupation and abuses as suspected resisters or
supporters o f Saddam were taken away bound and hooded often in the middle of the
nights (ICRC Report, February 2004). An Iraqi translator alluded to the connection of
past with present, represented at Abu Ghraib when he said “I always knew the
Americans would bring electricity back to Baghdad. I just never thought they’d be
shooting it up my ass” (November 2003, quoted in Hersh 2004a: 29). While many
U.S. media outlets and politicians now refer to Abu Ghraib as a place where abuses
occurred, most Iraqis see it as a place of torture under both Saddam Hussein’s rule
and now under U.S. occupation.
By late summer 2003, thousands of Iraqis were being detained, all loosely
defined as suspected of crimes against the coalition, common crimes against Iraqis or
high value detainees (Hersh 2004a). According to the ICRC between 70 and 90% of
the approximate 8,000 of those being detained had been arrested by mistake. For
example, a former Commander of the 320th MP Battalion stated in a sworn statement:
It became obvious to me that the majority of our detainees were detained as
the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and were swept up
by Coalition Forces as peripheral bystanders during raids. I think perhaps only
one in ten security detainees were of any particular intelligence value.
Nonetheless, Abu Ghraib continued to fill with few detainees being released (Danner
2004a). According to General Fay’s report (2004):
Combat Commanders desired that no security detainee be released for fear
that any and all detainees could be threats to coalition forces.. .The Chief of
Intelligence, Fourth Infantry Division informed Major General Fast that the
Division Commander did not concur with the release o f any detained for fear
that a bad one may be released along with the good ones. . . .We wouldn’t
have detained them if we wanted them released.
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Command o f Abu Ghraib

While the strategic decision to use Abu Ghraib as a detention facility is
attributed to Paul Bremer, he had no authority over the facility. Mr. Lane McCotter,
director of business development for Management & Training Corporation, a Utahbased firm claiming to be the third largest private prison company, was picked by
Attorney General Ashcroft to go to Iraq as part o f a team o f prison officials, judges,
prosecutors and police chiefs to rebuild the state’s criminal justice system. While 80
to 90% of Abu Ghraib had been destroyed, McCotter was chosen to direct the
rebuilding and reopening of the prison as well as to train the guards deployed to Abu
Ghraib.
In June 2003, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was named Commander of
the 800th MP Brigade and was put in charge of all military prisons in Iraq. While
having no experience in running a military prison, she was put in charge o f three jails,
eight battalions, and 3,400 Reservists (Hersh 2004a). Within 6 months, Karpinski
would be admonished and suspended, a result of the abuses that occurred under her
watch. Ironically, the month prior to her suspension, December 2003, Karpinski was
quoted as saying that for many of those detained in Abu Ghraib “living conditions
now are better in prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they
would not want to leave” (St. Petersburg Times, quoted in Hersh 2004a: 21). In June,
2003 the Chain of Command was as follows in Figure 1.
In the summer of 2003, the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion headed by
Captain Carolyn Wood left Bagram (Afghanistan) despite an ongoing criminal

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

119

President G. W. Bush
Over
Donald Rumsfeld

George Tenet

Over

Over

General Richard Myers

CIA

Over
General Ricardo Sanchez
Over
Brigadier General Karpinski

Major General Barbara Fast

Over
Lt. Colonel Jerry Phillabaum

Over
Colonel Thomas Pappas
Over
Lt. Colonel Jerry Phillabaum
and
Lt. Colonel Steven Jordon
Over

800th MP Brigade including the 372nd and 320th MP Company; Civilian
contractors

Figure 1. Chain o f Command, June 2003

investigation into alleged cases of abuse and murder, and were redeployed to Abu
Ghraib. There, Wood proceeded to implement new interrogation rules that, as a
Pentagon report later noted, were “remarkably similar” to those she had developed at
Bagram (Hersh 2004a). These included adding nine techniques to the existing practice
of interrogations approved by Army interrogator Chris Mackey. These additional
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techniques were not approved by military doctrine or included in Army field manuals
(Bazelon 2005; Harbury 2005). Specifically, the list included “the use o f dogs, stress
positions, sleep management, [and] sensory deprivation,” according to the Fay-Jones
report. Moreover, the report noted other techniques, such as “removal o f clothing and
the use of detainee’s phobias,” that had been used at Bagram were now to be fully
implemented at Abu Ghraib. In September 2003, an internal Army probe headed by
Brigadier General John Furlow, received tips from military police officers that
members of the 519th had beaten prisoners at Abu Ghraib, but the investigators found
the allegations unsubstantiated. Members of the 519th have not been directly
implicated in the photographed abuses that set off the scandal.
On August 31, 2003, General Miller, once Commander o f Guantanamo,
arrived in Iraq bringing with him a team o f experts to review the Army’s procedures
and to make recommendations to aid in more effective information gathering (Hersh
2004a; Danner 2004b; and Strasser 2004). Miller filed his assessment of Counter
terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations on September 13, 2003. The report
laid out his recommendations that the “detention operations function must act as an
enabler for interrogation” (p. 1). This included “setting the conditions to exploit
internees to respond to questions that answer theatre commanders’ critical questions”
(p. 3). He further stated that the current conditions of interrogation did not enable the
interrogation mission, therefore it was his recommendation to “dedicate a detention
guard force subordinate to the JIDC Commander that sets the conditions for the
successful interrogation and exploitation of detainees” (p. 4). Thus, the MP’s should
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be supportive of the M i’s interrogations. In essence, Miller’s intent was to
“Gitmoize” the prisons in Iraq and shift the focus to interrogation and intelligence
gathering (Hersh 2004a). However, this was in conflict with Army Regulations since
MP units are to have control o f the prison system (Taguba Report, Annex 19).
Nonetheless, on November 19, 2003, General Sanchez issued an order giving the
205th MI Brigade tactical control over the prison. During Miller’s visit, he also met
with and briefed military commanders on interrogation techniques used in
Guantanamo. This included leaving behind Rumsfeld’s April 2003 list o f approved
(though extended and meant for enemy combatants) interrogation tools. In March
2004, Miller was transferred from Guantanamo to Iraq and was named as the Head of
Prison Operations in Iraq (Karpinski’s previous position). Once the images from Abu
Ghraib became public, Miller was promoted as the General who would clean up the
Iraqi prison system and instill respect for IHL (Sanchez 2004, in Hersh 2004a: 32).
Hidden from the official chain of command was Stephen Cambone,
Undersecretary o f Defense. Cambone answered directly to Rumsfeld and was heavily
involved with the creation and implementation of the Special Access Program (SAP)
enacted several weeks after the invasion of Afghanistan. Directly under Cambone was
Army Lieutenant General William Boykin.1 The SAP was composed o f elite forces
from Navy Seals, Delta Force, and CIA Paramilitary experts. The SAP Forces were

1 Recall that Boykin came under fire in the Fall of 2003 when it was reported
that while giving a speech in an Oregon church he equated Satan with the Muslim
religion (Hersh 2004).
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heavily involved in the operations called Black Special Access and Copper Green.
Their job was to covertly and effectively obtain time sensitive intelligence. Using
secret detention sites, detainees were interrogated with techniques most generally
associated with the crudest dictatorships.
While initiated and overseen by Rumsfeld, President Bush was also well aware
of the Special Access Programs operating in Iraq and Abu Ghraib. A member of
Congress confirmed this in May 2004 stating that Bush had signed the mandated
finding notifying Congress of the program (Hersh 2004a). Moreover, back in June
2002, the Administration objected to a provision o f the annual Pentagon
Appropriations Bill that would have provided for a thirty-day advance notice to
Congress before any SAP’s were initiated. The White House stated “Situations may
arise especially in wartime . . . in which the President must promptly establish special
access controls on classified national security information.” While the provision
remained, Bush stated to Congress as he signed the Bill “The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that the President’s authority to classify and control access to information
bearing on national security flows from the Constitution and does not depend upon a
legislative grant o f authority” (Bush 2002, quoted in Hersh 2004a: 47-48).
It was also Cambone, along with Rumsfeld, who sent Miller to Iraq to assess
interrogation procedures. Moreover, it was Cambone who would bring MI officers in
Iraqi prisons under the SAP forces and CIA. The role of the CIA in the war on
terrorism was extensive. Many missions were overseen and carried out by CIA agents
acting independently or in conjunction with Special Forces.
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Ghost Detainees

Prior to September 11, 2001 U.S. covert practice o f rendering detainees
abroad as well as interrogating them in secret did indeed exist (e.g., Guatemala 19841986); however, post September 11, 2001 the practice surged. It is now known that
over 100 individuals have been detained as ghost detainees: those being secretly
detained without being recorded or identified to any MP or MI personnel, essentially
disappeared persons (Hersh 2004a).
The SAP operations called Black Special Access and Copper Green included
hiding ghost detainees during interims between interrogations and/or renditions to
other states. This included utilizing the site o f Abu Ghraib as a temporary holding area
and for hiding ghost detainees in special dedicated sections (including Tier 1{A}).
Operating in segregated parts o f Abu Ghraib, the CIA and SAP Forces carried out
methods of interrogation beyond the scope of any extended authorized techniques.
The protocol was also to place detainees in Abu Ghraib secretly and undocumented.
The Taguba report states:
The detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade routinely held
persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGA’s also known
as CIA) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the
reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees “ghost detainees.” On at least one
occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful o f “ghost
detainees” for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them
from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team.
This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of
international law. (Taguba Report: Findings and Recommendations, Part II,
No. 33)
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This illustrates the existence o f an entirely off-the-books detention system
within Iraq and even more importantly within the walls of Abu Ghraib, run by the CIA
and the Special Access Program Forces. Drogin (2004: 1) writes that NGO Human
Rights Organizations said “the practice of keeping prisoners off written lists and
physically concealing them from humanitarian aid groups and independent monitors
has been well known over the years in dictatorships from Guatemala to Sudan.”
U.S. Army investigators reported to Congress that ghost detainees at Abu
Ghraib prison ranged from two dozen up to 100 and were hidden from the ICRC
upon request o f the CIA. General Kern, senior officer who oversaw the Army inquiry,
reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “The number [of ghost
detainees] is in the dozens, to perhaps up to 100,” while Fay put the figure at “two
dozen or so.” Both officers said they could not give a precise number because no
records were kept and because the CIA refused to provide information to the
investigators (Schmitt and Jehl 2004: 2).
Two separate sworn statements confirm an arrangement regarding detainees,
who were kept “off the records” for CIA interrogation. In one of the statements it
was claimed that Colonel Thomas Pappas met with CIA and Task Force 121 officials
and signed a memorandum regarding procedures for dropping ghost detainees at Abu
Ghraib. In the May 17, 2004 New York Times, Douglas Jehl reported on the practice:
Army Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, second in command o f the intelligence
gathering effort at Abu Ghraib while the abuse was occurring, told military
investigators that 'other government agencies’ and a secretive elite task force
‘routinely brought in detainees for a short period of time’ and that the
detainees were held without an internment number, and their names were kept
off the books.
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The Fay report also discusses Jordon’s claim that it was difficult to track the
ghost detainees and that he had requested that a memorandum be drafted between the
205th MI Brigade, the 800th MP Brigade, and the CIA. Fay’s report further shows
how one Major suggested processing detainees via fingerprints and giving them
assumed names; however, Col. Thomas M. Pappas, the acting top MI officer, decided
against it. Jordan’s statement continues and states that Pappas then began a formal
written memo o f understanding in November of 2003 between the CIA and Task
Force 121 for procedures of dropping off ghost detainees.
The Washington Post reported on March 12, 2005, that they had obtained
documents showing that “Top military intelligence officials at the Abu Ghraib prison
came to an agreement with the CIA to hide certain detainees at the facility without
officially registering them” (White 2005: 1). In a separate deposition, Brigadier
General Karpinski confirmed that there were indeed orders to hide these prisoners so
that the ICRC would not be allowed to see them (ACLU 2005).
While these reports show that knowledge about ghost detainees existed at the
highest level o f officials, the documents “also demonstrate the collaboration between
the military and the CIA in torturing detainees while hiding them from the Red Cross”
(ACLU 2005: 1). Senator McCain stated, “The situation with the CIA and the ghost
prisoners is beginning to look like a bad movie” (Schmitt and Jehl 2004) As the
Taguba Report concluded, the practice of putting ghost detainees at the prison was
deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law.
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Beyond the illegalities, the U.S. use of this practice added to the existing
quagmire of an overpopulated and understaffed detention facility. Furthermore, the
interrogation tactics o f these SAP forces and the CIA encouraged and endorsed
physical coercion and sexual humiliation of prisoners in an effort to gain actionable
intelligence to end the increasing Iraqi resistance (Hersh 2004a). Likewise, as Military
Police were placed under the authority o f Military Interrogators who answered to
Special Forces, the lines o f authority at Abu Ghraib became further tangled.

Private Contractors

To further complicate matters, the role of private contractors (PC) in prisons
in Iraq, specifically Abu Ghraib, was pivotal to the lack o f command and inconsistent
policies regarding detainee treatment. The use of private contractors in the war on
terrorism is unprecedented. This integration began with efforts to adapt to a
downsized military through increased reliance on just on time privatized logistic
contracts. The move to an active war footing following the attacks o f 9/11, including
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the permanent “war on terror,” further cemented
the private-public strategy for war-making by the United States (Rothe 2006). While
many private corporations were contracted to provide logistical services (e.g.,
Halliburton, Bechtel, Blackwater Security, and Lord and Abbott), others were
contracted for more sensitive jobs, interrogation and interrogation assistance (Titan
and CACI International).
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CACI’s mission statement declares that they are ready to “Help America’s
intelligence community collect, analyze, and share global information in the war on
terrorism” and to “uncover terrorist activity by providing capabilities ranging from
complex space based operations to human source intelligence” (CACI 2006). Of
course, they desire that all potential employees have “experience in conducting
tactical and strategic interrogations in accordance with local standard operating
procedures and DOD regulations” (CACI 2002).
Both CACI and Titan employees have been implicated in torture, abuse, and
murder in Iraq, more specifically Abu Ghraib. This is contrary to General Miller’s
testimony to Congress when he stated, “no civilian contractors had a supervisory
position” (Miller 2004: 2). O f the 37 “formal” interrogators at Abu Ghraib, 27
belonged to CACI and 22 linguists’ interpreters assisting interrogators were employed
by Titan.
As with CIA and SAP personnel, civilian employees are not bound by the U.S.
Uniform Code o f Military Justice or the Code o f Conduct. This alarmed the many in
the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. According to the Chairman of the NY City Bar
Association, Scott Horton, the use of civilian contractors in interrogation processes
created an “atmosphere of legal ambiguity . . . as a result o f a policy decision at the
highest levels in the Pentagon” (quoted in Hersh 2004a: 66; see also Chaffin 2004).
Previously I documented how the command structure of Abu Ghraib had both
a direct formal chain o f command and a secretive chain. Whether it was Military
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Police, Military Intelligence, Special Forces, CIA agents, or civilian contractors, the
command structure was inadequate, as Karpinski stated:
I thought most o f the civilians were interpreters, but there were some civilians
that I didn’t know . . . I called them the disappearing ghosts . . . they were
always bringing somebody for interrogation or waiting to collect somebody
going out. . . . I had no idea who was operating in my prison. (Karpinski, in
Hersh 2004a: 61)
More importantly, the distinction between civilians and M i’s was further
blurred as MI personnel often wore unmarked uniforms or civilian clothes while on
duty. The blurring o f identities and organizations made it nearly impossible for the
MP’s or the detainees to know who had authority to give orders. Regardless of the
unclear command structure, the systematic practice o f torture and abuse was present
in Iraq from the onset.

Abuse and Torture

From the onset o f the Iraq invasion torture and cruel and inhumane treatment
was practiced by U.S. forces. However, these practices intensified as the number of
detainees continued to grow into the thousands. The images o f abuse and torture that
briefly penetrated the media and the public’s conscience were not representative of
the vast numbers of actual cases that were occurring in the war on terrorism or at
Abu Ghraib specifically.
As noted, by late summer 2003 thousands o f Iraqis were being held in Abu
Ghraib. The command structure had already experienced several changes. Recall that
in late August into September 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller, the commander
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at Guantanamo Bay, was sent to Iraq to assess detention centers, subsequently
sharing his interrogation techniques with interrogators. That same month, General
Sanchez, authorized expanded interrogation techniques. These quickly became
standard U.S. practice and, according to a Human Rights Watch report; prisoners
started dying during interrogation sessions almost immediately thereafter. During this
same time, the number of ghost detainees being brought into the prison increased
along with the presence of CIA and Special Forces.
During October 2003, the heaviest uprisings against the U.S. occupation
occurred. At this point, several cordon and capture missions were carried out,
significantly increasing the numbers within the confines of Abu Ghraib. Specifically,
there were 7,000 prisoners in Abu Ghraib and only 92 MP’s to keep control. When
the 372nd MPs arrived at Abu Ghraib, they were but a fraction of their supposed
Company total. Their roles had already been significantly altered from prison guards
to support for MI personnel and moved right into Tier 1 where CIA, SAP, and MI
held high value detainees. Likewise, the practice of torture and abuse appeared to be
part o f the standard operating procedure of the prison. For example, in early October
2003, Staff Sergeant Fredrick was found abusing a detainee. When two other soldiers
arrived, they demanded the prisoner be clothed and then took him back to the general
population. Sergeant Fredrick was quoted as saying, “I want to thank you guys,
because up until a week or two ago, I was a good Christian” (Fay Jones Report
2004). He also states in a note to his family that “I questioned some o f the things that
I saw . . . and the answer I got was this is how the MI wants it done.” Sergeant Davis

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

130

also told the Criminal Investigating Department “he witnessed prisoners in the MI
hold section being made to do various things that I would question morally.”
Testimony given to Taguba also shows that during this month several other cases of
abuse were noted (see Detainee #151108, #151362, 150542, #7787, and #151365).
During this same month, the International Committee for the Red Cross made
two unannounced visits to Abu Ghraib and noted cases o f abuse and torture that
violated the rules of war governing the treatment of Iraqi detainees. This included the
practice of keeping detainees naked and bound in stress positions.
By mid-November the complete takeover of MP supervision by MFs had
occurred. Simply stated, the “frago” order stated that the 205th MI Brigade under
Pappas would have tactical control over Abu Ghraib. A report done during this period
when tactical control was handed over to the M i’s by General Ryder discusses
concerns over the tensions between the missions of the MP’s and their new role as
interrogators. The conditions in Abu Ghraib continued to deteriorate leading to
additional frustration o f the already strained guard unit. Additional cases of abuse and
torture occurred. For example, Detainee #152529 reported to Taguba that during this
month he was picked up by U.S. forces, taken to Abu Ghraib, where he underwent
extreme treatment and abuse. By mid November 2003 the Associated Press aired that
they had received a report of abuses occurring in Abu Ghraib. Yet, few stations aired
the news story.
We now know from testimonies of U.S. soldiers, available in investigative
reports, that systematic abuse continued to occur and that multiple attempts were
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made to notify high command officials regarding the “questionable” treatment of
detainees. Nonetheless, reports were ignored and the practice continued all in the
name of attaining actionable intelligence. During November, MP guards killed four
detainees during a riot. The detainees were alleged to have gathered near the front
gate where guards panicked and open fired using five ammunition (a method
approved o f by commanders). Furthermore, the ICRC was denied access to several
detainees during the course of their visits. Some of these detainees were ghost
detainees being held by the CIA and SAP forces. Their treatment and or condition
remain a mystery at this time.
The numbers at Abu Ghraib continued to be in the thousands. This included
numbers of ghost detainees being interrogated by CIA agents, civilian contractors,
and Special Forces. The insurgency continued, and little to no actionable intelligence
was coming from the interrogations. Additionally, expanded interrogation techniques
were consistently used leading to the use of torture and abuse.
At the beginning of December, a confidential report was given to Army
Generals that warned that members of the CIA and SAP forces were abusing
detainees. The report, by Colonel Stuart Herrington, (Commissioned by Major
Barbara Fast) claimed members of a Special Operations Force had been abusing
detainees throughout Iraq, including Abu Ghraib. While little to no public disclosure
of the CIA’s role in Abu Ghraib has emerged, one account speaks volumes of what
the OGA was capable of. Al-Jamadi, one of the CIA’s “ghost” detainees, died in a
prison shower room in a position known as “Palestinian hanging,” during about a
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half-hour of questioning. “One Army guard, Sgt. Jeffery Frost, said the prisoner’s
arms were stretched behind him in a way he had never before seen” and he was
surprised al-Jamadi’s arms “didn’t pop out of their sockets,” according synopsis of his
interview (Democracy Now 2005: 1). Frost along with several other guards were
called to reposition al-Jamadi, when an interrogator said he was not cooperating.
When the guards released the “shackles and lowered al-Jamadi, blood gushed from his
mouth as if a faucet had been turned on according to the interview summary”
(Democracy Now 2005: 1). Moreover, the pathologist discovered several broken ribs.
Staff Sergeant Fredrick wrote in November 2003 to his family that Jamadi was
brought to his unit for questioning and
they stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put his body in a
bag and packed him in ice for approximately 24 hours in the shower . . . the
next day the medics came and put his body on a stretcher, placed a fake IV in
his arm and took him away. (Fredrick, quoted in Hersh 2004a: 45)
His death became known when photos were released o f Abu Ghraib guards giving a
thumbs-up over his bruised, puffy-faced corpse, packed in ice (see Appendix 1(b)).
On December 14, 2003, Saddam Hussein was found and a general hope
surfaced that the insurgency would significantly decrease. Nonetheless, the culture
within the confines of Abu Ghraib was already well established and the systematic
practice o f cruel and inhumane punishment continued. For example, videos made by
MP’s sent back to family members were showing signs o f the growing frustrations
and boredom as they often depicted aggressiveness and violence.
Less than one month later, January 13, 2004, the Command received a written
notice from the ICRC claiming abuse and torture had been witnessed by them during
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their spot visits. This included the systematic practice o f keeping prisoners naked and
bound in cruel positions. Yet, as Brigadier General Karpinski stated in her testimony
to the Senate Panel, “senior officials treated it in a lighthearted manner” (Danner
2004b: 1). Moreover, the military response was to require ICRC inspectors to make
appointments before visiting the cellblock, thus trying to “curtail the international
organization’s spot inspections o f the prison” (Danner 2004b: 1). Karpinski’s redress
to the ICRC was that “military necessity” required this of those designated as SIV
(significant intelligence value) who were not entitled to “obtain full Geneva
Conventions Protection.” The ICRC also alleged that it had alerted U.S. authorities
repeatedly to practices that were “serious violations o f international humanitarian law
and in some cases tantamount to torture” (ICRC 2004).
On this same day, January 13, 2004 Specialist Darby handed over a copy of a
CD containing photos depicting abuses and acts tantamount to torture to the MCID
when attention focused on detainee treatment. With images that could not he denied,
the Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), Central Command, Chairman of the
Joints Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense were all informed. Even at this
point, officials did not recommend that the images be shown to more senior officials.
On January 16th, the Central Command issued a press release stating there was an
ongoing investigation into reported incidence of detainee abuse (Final Report of the
Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations) and on January 19th
Lieutenant General Sanchez requested a secret outside investigation, one to be
headed by Major General Taguba (Memo to U.S. Central Command, January 19,
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2004). Rumsfeld claimed that up until January 16th, with the release o f the Central
Commands press release, he had no knowledge o f abuses. It was also on the 16th
when Rumsfeld informed President Bush of the photos. On the 28th o f January, the
Army’s Criminal Investigation Division Report o f allegations of abuse was released to
Taguba.
Public accounts also began to surface yet were largely dismissed by the media
and the general public. For example, on January 21, 2004, the Washington Post
published a sworn statement released from the Military Criminal Investigation
Division describing a detainee’s account of his abuses during his time at Abu Ghraib
(the MCID was released January 28, 2004) (Greenberg and Dratel 2005). This case of
abuse was also included in the Taguba Report as Detainee #151365.
Another investigation was conducted after a complaint was submitted January
18, 2004, regarding detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. A detainee stated that he had
witnessed a” translator forcibly sodomizing a male juvenile detainee while a female
U.S. soldier observed and took pictures.” However, the CID did not investigate the
allegation until May 28, 2004. Moreover, “the Special Agent in Charge determined
further of the [sic] investigation would be of little or no value” (Army CID File O/ssI0132-04-CID 259-80138/6F8A/6X1).
By mid-March an interim report of the investigation was given to CJTF-7 and
Central Command. The Taguba Report was also released. Upon receiving the Taguba
Report, Sanchez requested a separate investigation into the allegations o f involvement
of MI personnel. This request, attributed to the Taguba Report, may also have been
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sparked by an earlier report done by General Ryder, at Sanchez’s request, after
having received several troubling reports coming from Iraq jails. While not released at
the time of the Taguba Report, Ryder’s Report was filed November 2003. In it, Ryder
discussed serious concerns regarding the tensions between the missions of the MP’s
and the M i’s wanting to interrogate them (Ryder, November 2003, in Hersh 2004a:
29). Taguba (2004) noted “many o f the systematic problems that surfaced during
Ryder’s assessment are the very same issues that are the subject o f this investigation.”
By mid-April, the second investigation into the role o f M i’s in cases of abuse
was concluded. Lieutenant General McKieman (appointed official) reported the
results through the chain of command to the DOA and JAG. He further advised that
the review panel not send a copy to Rumsfeld (Final Report o f the Independent Panel
to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations). By this time, CBS had
attained copies of some of the photographs. General Richard Myers, Chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked CBS to delay the broadcast as intense fighting in Fallujah
and Najaf was underway; CBS accommodated them. While cases o f abuse were
making their way into the media-it was well recognized that the images themselves
would be far more damaging than the occasional news story (Schlesinger Report
2004).
On April 29, 2004, 60 Minutes II on CBS aired the photos (see Appendix D).
However, until the publication of these images of abuse out of Abu Ghraib, the Bush
Administration officials took “at best a see no evil, hear no evil approach to all reports
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of detainee mistreatment” (HRW 2004: 5). Nevertheless, the images showed a reality
that could not be denied.
We now know that additional proof exists depicting such cases of torture and
abuse. On September 29, 2005, U.S. District Court Judge Hellerstein ordered the
release of 74 additional photos and three videotapes depicting various brutal images
from Abu Ghraib alone. There are still 13 additional photos and one videotape that
remain sealed due to “so many redactions that they were unintelligible” (ACLU
2005). This coincides with Iraqi claims of widespread abuse and mistreatment during
detention. Additionally, new allegations of abuse in Iraq (with the 82nd Airborne) and
in Abu Ghraib (Iraqi Police) continue to surface (Washington Post 2005b; HRW
Report 2005).
While the images depict a snapshot of the detainees’ treatment, they fail to
provide the emotive and contextual details of the torture and abuse inflicted by U.S.
personnel. Indeed, the images lack the victims’ voices. Consequently, the following
section provides detailed accounts of alleged abuses in Abu Ghraib by Iraqi detainees.

Cases o f Abuse

Testimonies recorded in the Taguba Report:
Detainee #151365
I entered Abu Ghraib 10 July 2003 . . . they put me in a tent and then brought
me to the Hard Site. The first day they put me in a dark room and started
hitting me in the head and stomach and legs. The made me raise my hands and
sit on my knees, I was like that for four hours. Then the interrogator came and
he was looking at me while they were beating me. Then I stayed in this room
for 5 days, naked with no clothes . . . they replaced the Army with the Iraqi
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police and after time they started punishing me in all sorts o f ways. And the
first punishment was bringing me to room one, and they put handcuffs on my
hand and they cuffed me high for 7 to 8 hours. They kept me this way on 24,
25, and 26 October. The following days they put a bag over my head, and I
was without clothes and without anything to sleep on. In November they
started a different type o f punishment, where an American Police came in to
my room and put the bag over my head and cuffed my hands and he took me
out o f the room into the hallway. He started beating me, him and 5 other
American Police. Some o f the things they did was make me sit down like a
dog and they would hold the string from the bag and they made me bark like a
dog. And the policeman was tan color because he hit my head to the wall.
When he did that the bag came off my head and one of the police was telling
me to crawl in Arabic, so I crawled on my stomach and the police were
spitting on me and hitting me on my back, my head, and my feet. It kept going
on until 4 in the morning. The same thing would happen in the following days.
And I remember one of the police hit me on my ear, then the police started
beating me on my kidneys and then they hit me on my right ear and it bleeding
and I lost consciousness. The American Police put red woman’s underwear
over my head and then tied me to the window in my cell with my hands behind
my back until I lost consciousness. When I was in Room #1, they told me to
lay down on my stomach and they were jumping from the bed onto my back
and my legs, others were spitting on me and calling me names and they held
my hands and legs. Then two officers tied my hands to the door while laying
down on my stomach. One of the police was pissing on me and laughing. He
released my hands and I want and washed and then the soldier came back into
the room and the soldiers friend told me to he down, so I did that. And then
the policeman was opening my legs, with a bag over my head, and he sat
down between my legs on his knees and I was looking at him from under the
bag and they wanted to do me because I saw him and he was opening his
pants, so I started screaming and other police starting hitting me with his feet
on my neck and he put his feet on my head so I couldn’t scream. They left and
the guy with glasses comes back with another person and he took me out of
the room and they put me inside the dark room again and they started beating
me with the broom that was there. Then they broke the glowing finger and
spread it on me until I get on to the floor. And one of the police he put a part
of his stick that he always carried inside my ass and I felt it going inside me
about 2 centimeters. And I stated screaming and he pulled it o u t. . . and the
two American girls that were there when they were beating me, they were
hitting me with a ball made of sponge on my dick . . . one o f the girls was
playing with my dick . . . And they were taking pictures o f me during all these
instances.
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Detainee I S N 13077
When I first went to the Hard Site, the American soldiers took me. We stood
in the hallway before the hard site and they started taking off our clothes one
after another. After they took off my clothes . . . they told me to stroke my
penis in front o f her (Ms. Mays). And then they covered my head again. And
then they removed the bag off my head and I saw my friend, he was the one in
front o f me on the floor. Then they told me to sit on the floor facing the wall.
They brought another prisoner on my back and he was naked. Then they
ordered me to bend onto my knees and hands on the ground. Then they placed
three others on our backs naked. After that they ordered me to sleep on my
stomach and they ordered the other guy to sleep on top o f me in the same
position and the same way to all of us. And they were six o f us. They were
laughing and taking pictures and they were stepping on our hands with their
fe e t. . . and they wrote on our bodies in English . . . then they forced us to
walk like dogs on our hands and knees. And we had to bark like a dog and if
we didn’t they start hitting us hard on our faces and chest with no mercy.
After that they took us to our cells, took our mattresses out and dropped
water on the floor and they made us sleep on our stomachs on the floor with
bags over our heads and they took pictures. All that for 10 days.
Detainee #19446
I was in solitary confinement, we were treated very bad . . . they took our
clothes off, even our underwear and they beat us very hard, and they put a
hood over my head. And when I told them I am sick they laughed at me and
beat me. And one of them brought my friend and told him stand here and they
brought me and had me kneel in front of my friend. They told my friend to
masturbate and told me to masturbate also while they were taking pictures.
After that they brought my friends and I and they put us 2 on the bottom, 2 on
top of them, and 2 on top o f those and one on top. Then they beat us. After
the end o f the beating they took us to our separate cells and they opened the
water in the cell and told us to lay face down in the water and we stayed like
that until the morning. Then one of the other shift gave us clothes but the
second shift took the clothes away at night and handcuffed us to the beds. . . .
They forced us to crawl on our hands and knees and they were sitting on our
backs like riding animals and writing on our asses.
Detainee #151108
They stripped me of all my clothes, even my underwear. They gave me
woman’s underwear . . . and they put a bag over my face. One of them
whispered in my ear ‘today I am going to fuck you’ and he said this in Arabic.
Whoever was with me experienced the same thing. This was on October 3 or
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4 2003 . . . when they took me to the cell an American Soldier and his rank
was sergeant I believe he called me faggot because I was wearing woman’s
underwear and my answer was n o .. .And they forced me to wear this
underwear for 51 days . . . and most of the days I was wearing nothing else. I
faced harsh punishment from Grainer. He cuffed my hands with irons behind
my back to the metal o f the window, to the pint my feet were off the ground
and I was hanging there for about 5 hours just because I asked about that time
because I wanted to pray. And then they took off my clothes and he took the
female underwear and he put it over my head. After he released me from the
window, he tied me to my bed until before dawn. He prohibited me from
eating food. They took pictures of everything they did to me. . . . I don’t
know if they took a picture o f me because they beat me so bad I lost
consciousness after an hour or so. They did not give us food for a whole day
and night. Now I am talking about what I saw. They brought three prisoners
naked and tied them together with cuffs and they stuck one to another. I saw
American soldiers hitting them with a football and they were taking pictures. I
saw Grainer punching one of the prisoners right in his face very hard.. .and the
American soldiers told to do like homosexuals (fucking). I saw — fucking a
kid, his age would be about 15. The kid was hurting very bad and they
covered all the doors with sheets. Then when I heard the screaming I climbed
the door because on top it wasn’t covered and I saw who was wearing the
military uniform putting his dick in the little kid’s ass and the female soldier
was taking pictures and that was in cell #23. On the North side, I was right
across from it on the other side, they put sheets again on the doors and they
cuffed one prisoner in room 1, they tied him to the bed and they were inserted
the phosphoric light in his ass and he was yelling for God’s help . . . used to
get hit and punished a lot because I heard him screaming and they prohibited
us from standing near the door when they do that. Not one night for all the
time I was there passed without me seeing, hearing, or feeling what was
happening to me.
Detainee #152307
I am going to start from the first day I went into A l. They stripped me from
my clothes and all the stuff they gave me and I spent 6 days in that situation.
And then they gave me a blanket only. 3 days after that they gave me a
mattress and approximately 2 am the door opened and Granier was there. He
cuffed my hands behind my back and he cuffed my feet and took me to the
shower room. After interrogating m e ,. . . they threw pepper on my face and
the beating started. This went on for half an hour. And then he started beating
me with a chair until the chair was broken. After that they started choking me.
At that time I thought I was going to die, but it’s a miracle I lived. And then
they started beating me again. They concentrated on beating me in my heart
until they got tired from beating me. They took a little break and then they
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started kicking me very hard with their feet until I passed out. The second
scene, I saw a guard that wears glasses. He charged his [pistol] and pointed it
a lot o f the prisoners to threaten them with it. I saw things no one would see,
they are amazing. They come in the morning shift with two prisoners and they
were father and son. They were both naked. They put them in front of each
other and they counted 1, 2, 3 and then they removed the bags from their
heads. When the son saw the father naked he was crying. And then at night
Grainer would throw food into the toilet and said ‘go take it and eat it’. And
in room 5 they brought the dogs and they bit him in the right and left leg. He
was from Iran and they started beating him up in the main hallway of the
prison.
Detainee #150422
First they tortured the man whose name is Anjid Iraqi. They stripped him of
his clothes and beat him until he passed out and they cursed him and when
they took off his head I saw blood running from his head. They took him to
solitary confinement. The evening shift was sad for prisoners. They brought
three prisoners handcuffed to each other and they pushed the first one on top
of the others to look like they are gay, when they refused they beat them up
until they put them on top of each other and took pictures o f them. They beat
up an Iraqi whom they ordered to stand on a food carton and they went
pouring water on him and it was the coldest o f times. When they torture him
they took gloves and they beat his dick and testicles with the gloves and they
handcuffed him to the cell door for a half day without food or water. After
that they brought young Iraqi prisoners and tortured them by pouring water
on them from the second floor until one of them started crying and screaming
saying my heart. They brought six people and they beat them up until they
dropped to the floor and one of them his nose was cut and the blood was
running from his nose and he was screaming but no one was responding. The
doctor came to stitch the nose and the Grainer asked the doctor to leam how
to stitch and its true the guard learned how to stitch. After that they beat up
the rest of the group until they fall to the ground. Grainer beat up a man.. .and
he was beating him until he gotten almost crazy . . . and after they put him in
his cell for four days they were pouring water on him and he couldn’t sleep.
They hanged him and he was screaming but no one helped.
Detainee #150425
One day while I was in the prison the guards came and found a broken
toothbrush, and they said that I was going to attack the American Police; I
said that the toothbrush wasn’t mine. They said we are taking away your
clothes and mattress for 6 days and we are not going to beat you. But the next
day the guard came and cuffed me to the cell door for 2 hours, after that they
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took me to a closed room and more than five guards poured cold water on me
and forced me to put my head in someone’s urine that was already in the
room. After that they beat me with a broom and stepped on my head with
their feet while it was till in the urine. They pressed my ass with a broom and
spit on it. Also a female soldier was standing on my legs. They used a loud
speaker on me for 3 hours, it was cold. The truth is they gave me my clothes
after 3 days, they didn’t finish the 6 days and thank you.
Detainee #150542
Two days before Ramadan the guard came with the other guards, they
brought two prisoners and they made them take off their clothes down to
naked and then they were beating them a lot. One o f the prisoners was
bleeding from a cut he got over his eye. Then they called a doctor who came
and fixed him. After that they started beating him again. They removed all my
clothes down to naked for seven days and they were bringing a group of
people to watch me naked. . . . They brought a prisoner with a civil
case.. .they beat him a lot then they removed his clothing then they put a wire
up his ass and they started taking pictures o f him. . . . One day Grainer
brought six Generals and they stripped them down to naked and started
torturing them and taking pictures and they were enjoying that.
Detainee #152529
One the date o f November 5, 2003, when the U.S. forces transferred to
Isolation, when they took me out of the car, an American soldier hit me with
his hand on my face. And then they stripped me naked and they took me under
the water and then be made me crawl the hallway until I was bleeding from my
chest to my knees and my hands. And after that he put me back into the cell
and an hour later he took me out from the cell the second time to the shower
room under cold water and them be made me get up on a box, naked, and he
hit me on my manhood. I don’t know with what, then I fell down on the
ground. He made me crawl on the ground. And then he tied my hands in my
cell naked until morning time until Joyner showed up and released my hands
and took me back up to my room and gave me my clothes back. About two
days later my interrogation came up when it was done . . . a soldier grabbed
my head and hit it against the wall and then tied my hand to the bed until noon
the next day and then two days later the same soldier and he took all my
clothes and mattress for 3 days.
Detainee ISN #7787
One day in Ramadan, I don’t know the exact date, we were involved in a fight
in Compound 2, so they transferred us to the Hard Site. As soon as we
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arrived, they put sandbags over our heads and they kept beating us and called
us bad names. After they removed the sandbags they stripped us naked as a
newborn baby. Then they ordered us to hold our penises and stroke it and this
was only during night. They started to take photographs as if it was a pom
movie. And they treated us like animals not humans. They kept doing this for
a long time. No one showed us mercy. Nothing but cursing and beating. Then
they started writing words on our buttocks which we didn’t know what it
means. After that they left us alone for 2 days naked and with no clothes, with
no mattresses, as if we were dogs. And every single night the military guy
comes over and beat us and handcuffed us until the end o f his shift.. .this was
for three days. The first night they stripped us naked they made us get on our
hands and knees and hey started to pile us one on top o f the other. . . . When
we were naked he ordered us to stroke, acting like we’re masturbating and
when we start to do that he would bring another inmate and sit him down on
his knees in front o f the penis and take photos which looked like this inmate
was putting the penis in his mouth. Before that I felt like someone was playing
with my penis with a pen. After this they make — stand in front of me to slap
him on the face, but I refused ’cause he is my friend. After this they asked —
to hit me so he punched my stomach, I asked him to do that, so they don’t
beat him like they had beaten me when I refused to hit — .
Detainee N D R S151362
I was arrested on the 7 Oct 2003. They brought me over to Abu Ghraib Prison
they put me in a tent for one night. During this night the guards every one or
two hours and threaten me with torture and punishment. The second day they
transferred me to the hardsite. Before I got in a soldier put a sand bag over my
head. I didn’t see anything after that. They took me inside the building and
started to scream at me. They stripped me naked, they asked me “Do you pray
to Allah?” I said Yes. They said “fuck you and fuck him.” One of them said
your not getting out of here health, you are getting out o f here handicapped.
One o f them said to me “Are you married?” and I said yes, they said “If your
wife saw you like this she would be disappointed.” One o f them said “but if I
saw her now she would not be disappointed now because I would rape her.”
The one o f them took me to the shower, removed the sandbag, he told me to
take a shower and he said he would come inside and rape me and I was very
scared. Then they put the sandbag over my head and took me to cell 5. And
for the next five days I didn’t sleep because they use to come to my cell,
asking me to stand for hours and hours. And this black man took me once
more to the showers, stood there staring at my body. And he threaten he was
going to rape me again. After that they started to interrogate me. I lied to
them so they threaten me with hard punishment. Then the other interrogator
cam over and told me “if you tell the truth we will let you go as soon as
possible before Ramadan” so I confessed and said the truth. Four days later
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they took me to the camp and I didn’t see those interrogators anymore. New
interrogators came. After 18 days in the camp they sent me to the hard site.
Two days before led, an interrogator came to me with a woman and an
interpreter. He said I am one step away from being in prison forever. The first
day of led, the incident o f firing happened. I got shot with several bullets in my
body and got transferred to the hospital. And there the interrogator, Steve,
came to me and threaten me with the hardest torture when I go back to the
prison.. .After several days he came back and said to me, “If I put you under
torture do you think this would be fair?” I said to him why. He said he needed
more information. I told him I already told you everything I know, he said,
“We’ll see you when you come back to prison.” After 17 or 18 days I was
released and went back to Abu Ghraib, hew took me somewhere and the
guard put a pistol to my head. The next morning they took me to the hardsite.
They receive me there with screaming, shoving, pushing, and pulling. They
forced me to walk from the main gate to my cell. Otherwise they would beat
my broken leg, I was in very bad shape. The guards started to hit my broken
leg several times with a solid plastic stick. They stripped me naked . . . one of
them told me he would rape me. He drew a picture o f a woman on my back
and makes me stand in shameful positions holding my buttocks. . . . Someone
else asked me “Do you believe in anything?” I said I believe in Allah, so he
said, “but I believe in torture and I will torture you.” . . . Then they
handcuffed me and hung me to the bed. They ordered me to curse Islam and
because they started to hit my broken leg, I cursed my religion. They ordered
me to thank Jesus that I ’m alive. And I did what they ordered . . . they left me
hang from the bed and after a little while I lost consciousness. When I woke
up I found myself still hang between the bed and floor. Until now, I lost
feeling in three fingers in my right hand. I sat on the bed and one of them
stood in the door and pee’d on me. . . . The second night Grainer came hand
hung me to the cell door. I told him I have a broken shoulder, I am afraid it
will break again, cause the doctor told me don’t put your arms behind your
back. He said, “I don’t care.” Then he hung me to the door for 8 more hours.
I was screaming from the pain the whole night. . . . I told the doctor that I
think my shoulder is broken . . . he checked my shoulder and said to me “I will
bring another doctor tomorrow.” The next day another doctor checked my
shoulder and said to me he taking me to the hospital the next day for x-rays.
The next day they took me to the hospital. . . then they took me back to the
hardsite. I have to crawl back to my cell ’cause I can’t walk. The next night
other soldiers come at night and took photos of me while I ’m naked. They
humiliated me and made o f me and threaten me. After that, interrogators came
over and identify the person who gave me the pistols between some pictures.
And this guy wasn’t in the pictures. When I told them that, they said they will
torture me and they will come every single night to ask me the same question
accompanied by soldiers having weapons and they point a weapon to my head
and threaten they will kill me; sometime with dogs and they hang me to the
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door allowing the dogs to try to bite me. This happened for a full week or
more.
Detainee #18470
On the third day after 5 o ’clock, Mr. Grainer came and took me to room 37,
which is the shower room and he started punishing me. Then he brought a box
of food and he make me stand on it with no clothing except a blanket. Then a
tall black soldier came and put electric wires on my fingers and toes and on
my penis, and I had a bag over my head. Then he was saying “which switch is
on for electricity” and he came with a loudspeaker and he was shouting near
my ear and then he brought the camera and he took some pictures of me,
which I knew because o f the flash of the camera. And he took the hood off
and he was describing some poses he wanted me to do, and then I was tired
and I fell down. And then Mr. Grainer came and made me stand up on the
stairs and made me carry a box of food. I was so tired and I dropped it. He
started screaming at me in English, He made me lift a chair high in the air. . . .
Then the chair came down and then Mr. Joyner took the hood off my head
took me to my room. . . . I couldn’t go to sleep after that because I was so
scared.
These 12 cases, the only specific cases in the Taguba Report, were all
registered between January 16th -19th and the 21st of 2004. With thousands of
detainees and only five days of hearing testimony, the cases here cannot demonstrate
the extent of or extremism of the abuse and torture that occurred at Abu Ghraib.
Sworn statements from the ACLU Lawsuit, filed March 1, 2005 on behalf of eight
plaintiffs, provide additional descriptive accounts of abuse. Three o f the Plaintiffs’
stories are fisted herein:
Arkan Mohammed Ali
A 26-year-old Iraqi citizen who was detained by the U.S. military at various
locations in Iraq, including Abu Ghraib prison. Ali was detained for almost
one year, from July 2003 to June 2004. While in custody, Ali was tortured and
subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment, including severe beatings to the
point of unconsciousness, stabbing and mutilation, isolation while naked and
hooded in a coffin-like box, mock execution and death threats. Military
personnel severely beat Ali during interrogations, sometimes leaving him
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unconscious. U.S. forces stabbed Ali, shocked him with a small metal device,
and urinated on him to humiliate and degrade him. He was repeatedly locked
in a wooden coffin-like box for several days, sometimes after having been
stripped naked and left with a hood tied over his head. On other occasions, Ali
was kept in a “silent tent” in which he was denied sleep for days at a time.
When it appeared as though he might be falling asleep, guards would drag Ali
facedown along the ground and severely beat him. Ah was also repeatedly
threatened and subjected to psychological intimidation while in custody. U.S.
military personnel made multiple death threats against Ah, including
threatening to run him and other detainees down with a large military vehicle
and brandishing guns and swords and threatening to slaughter him. Soldiers
also threatened to transfer Ah to Guantanamo, where he was told soldiers
could kill detainees with impunity. Upon Ah's release, an American official
threatened him by telling him that if he ever reported or discussed the abuse he
and others suffered in detention, the United States government would find him
and he would never see his family again. (ACLU Complaint #402388.1;
#402382.1; #402375.1; #403155.1 2005)
Thahe Mohammed Sabbar
A 36-year-old Iraqi who was detained by the United States military for
approximately six months from July 2003 to January 2004. Sabbar was
detained at various locations in Iraq, including Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib
prison. While in American custody, Sabbar was subjected to acts of torture
and cruel and degrading treatment. Sabbar’s quahty o f hfe has suffered greatly
since his detention. He has nerve damage and pain in his shoulder and is prone
to uncontrollable bouts o f shaking and crying. Sabbar received frequent and
severe beatings from U.S. military personnel. Soldiers used guns and an
electric weapon to beat and shock Sabbar, and forced him and other detainees
to mn through a gauntlet of 10 to 20 uniformed soldiers, who screamed at
them and beat them with wooden batons. Sabbar was also shackled to a fence
with his hands behind his back and was left for several hours at temperatures
exceeding 120 degrees Fahrenheit. In addition to physical abuse, Sabbar was
sexually assaulted by U.S. military personnel. On one occasion, one or more
soldiers inserted their fingers into Sabbar’s anus and grabbed and fondled his
buttocks while making moaning sounds and jeering at him. This was done in
the presence of other soldiers, including females, in order to further degrade
and demean Sabbar. Soldiers also staged mock executions with Sabbar and
other detainees to terrorize and humiliate them. During one such execution,
Sabbar and others were forced to stand against a wall in front of a firing
squad. The squad simulated gunfire and then laughed as the detainees lost
control of their bladders. Sabbar was also threatened by soldiers who told him
they would send him to Guantanamo, where he would be killed. Throughout
his detention, Sabbar was routinely deprived of food and water. At times,
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guards gave Sabbar and other detainees’ spoiled food, which caused some
detainees to vomit. He was also kept shackled for extended periods and
denied access to a toilet, causing him to soil his pants. As a result of this
treatment, and o f the sexual and physical abuse, Sabbar currently suffers from
incontinence, impotence and nightmares. (ACLU Complaint #402388.1;
#402382.1; #402375.1; #403155.1 2005)
Sherzad Kamal Khalid
A 34-year-old Iraqi citizen who was detained by the United States military for
approximately two months from July 2003 through September 2003. Khalid
was held at various locations in Iraq where he was subjected to frequent and
severe beatings, sexual abuse and other cruel treatment. Military personnel
regularly and intentionally inflicted physical abuse on Khalid during his
detention. Soldiers would severely beat Khalid before each interrogation,
leaving his body covered with deep bruises. They also kicked and punched
Khalid repeatedly over a period of hours while he was hooded and shackled
and seated on the ground, terrorizing and injuring him with random and
unanticipated blows. On one occasion, Khalid was forced to run a gauntlet of
10 to 20 uniformed U.S. soldiers who beat him with batons. Like many other
detainees, Khalid was sexually assaulted and humiliated. During a severe
beating, soldiers punched him in the mouth, breaking one of his teeth, and
grabbed his buttocks while brandishing a long wooden pole and threatening to
sodomize him on the spot and on every night of his detention. Soldiers also
simulated anal rape by grabbing his buttocks and pressing a water bottle
against the seat of his pants. Throughout his detention, interrogators
threatened to kill Khalid and subjected him to mock executions in order to
coerce confessions. Soldiers would demand a false confession while holding a
gun to his head, and placed him before a mock firing squad with simulated
gunfire. Khalid was also routinely deprived o f sleep, food and water. At times,
guards gave Khalid spoiled food, causing him to vomit. He was also kept
shackled for extended periods and denied access to a toilet, which would
cause him to soil his pants. On one occasion, Khalid was shackled to a fence
with his hands behind his back and was forced to stand in that position for
several hours at temperatures exceeding 120 degrees Fahrenheit, without any
water or food. At another point of his detention, Khalid was forced to stay in
a so-called “silent tent” for several days, during which time he was severely
beaten whenever he started to fall asleep. (ACLU Complaint #402388.1;
#402382.1; #402375.1 IL; #403155.1 2005)
Accounts o f abuse from U.S. soldiers listed in the investigative reports
included physical abuse (e.g., kicking, punching, twisting the hands o f detainees once

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

147

handcuffed, restricting breathing, poking injuries o f detainees, and dislocating joints),
use of dogs (e.g., biting prisoners, intimidating and creating fear [cases include small
children being threatened by dogs] and for entertainment or competition see who
could make detainees piss themselves first), and humiliating treatment (e.g.,
nakedness, photographing during states of undress or staged sexual acts and/or
positions, improper use of isolation).
The most concentrated violations included brutalities against detainees upon
capture and initial custody (sometimes resulting in death and/or serious injury),
physical and psychological coercion during interrogation, prolonged solitary
confinement, and excessive and disproportionate use of force resulting in deaths or
serious injuries. The ICRC Report states “in Abu Ghraib military intelligence section,
methods of physical and psychological coercion used by the interrogators appeared to
be part of the standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to
obtain confessions and extract information” (9). Perhaps the most disturbing accounts
by the ICRC include the abuse and torture of children at Abu Ghraib (the ICRC states
that at least 107 children are being held in 6 facilities in Iraq including Abu Ghraib)
and the rape of female detainees (see photo la). One case includes the MI
interrogating a 15-year-old girl when MP’s stopped them after finding her half
undressed. Another incident included a 16 year old being soaked with water, “driven
through the cold, smeared with mud, and then presented to his weeping father, who
w a s also a prisoner” (Pitt 2004: 1).
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From the ICRC, Fay-Jones Report, the Taguba Report, and the ACLU
lawsuits against Rumsfeld, Karpinski, Pappas, and Sanchez, a pattern o f abusive
behavior by U.S. military (MP and MI) and draconian interrogation techniques
emerge. Moreover, most instances o f abuse and torture listed within these reports are
reflected in some version in the modified and re-modified expanded interrogation
techniques approved by the Administration. This is in contradiction to Schlesinger’s
report (August 2004) which states, “the pictured abuses, unacceptable even in
wartime, were not part o f authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at
intelligence targets.” The Fay-Jones Report alludes to similar conclusions wherein it
stated that there was only “circumstantial connections” to MI officers regarding
detainee abuses, yet 27 MI officers were implicated in cases o f abuse. Moreover, how
uninvolved could the M i’s be when the Fay report also tells us that one o f the
notorious images o f the human pyramid served as a screen saver on one o f the
computers in the MI office? (Danner 2004a).
Top military officials now claim that interrogations at Abu Ghraib yielded little
to no new intelligence and most of the detainees were not linked to the insurgency in
Iraq. Furthermore, techniques approved for Guantanamo detainees or “high value
terrorist targets” were used on people pulled off the streets and cab drivers. For
example, the hooded prisoner, whose story is listed in this section, was picked up for
“getting out o f a cab in a suspicious manner” (Danner 2004a: 100-101). While we
know o f the aforementioned cases revealed in the Taguba Report, Fay-Jones Report,
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Schlesinger Report, and the ICRC, we also know that many of the cases of abuse
have not been disclosed to the general public.
Recall earlier in this Chapter, I discussed Judge Hellerstein recent order for
the U.S. government to release additional video and over 70 photos depicting other
instances o f abuse. Due to the governments reluctance to release this data to the
ACLU in lieu of their on-going court case against the government, it is highly unlikely
that the released data will contain duplications but instead reveal a much more
systematic and widespread SOP o f abuse and torture in Abu Ghraib. Moreover, the
Taguba Report failed to include these incidents that provided further “detailed witness
statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence” because of
their “extremely sensitive nature” (Taguba, quoted in Hersh 2004a: 22). Seymour
Hersh, who first broke the story o f torture in Abu Ghraib, has seen the video now
being released and stated that young “boys were sodomized with the camera rolling,
and the worst part is the soundtrack, of the boys shrieking . . . and this is your
government at war” (in Pitt, July 20, 2004: 1).

Images o f Brutality: The Administration’s Response
Oh, I ’m not one fo r instant history.
— Donald Rumsfeld, May 4, 2004

Taguba recommended “strongly” that immediate “disciplinary action” be taken
against several higher-ranking officers. The recommendations included the following:
that Brigadier General Karpinski and Captain Reese be relieved of command and

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

150

reprimanded; Colonel Pappas be given a Memorandum o f Reprimand and further
investigated; LTC Phillabaum be relieved from command, given a Memorandum of
Reprimand, and removed from the Colonel/0-6 Promotion List; LTC Jordan, Major
DiNenna, Lt. Raeder, Sergeant Major Emerson, and Sergeant Lipinski be relieved
from duty and given a Memorandum o f Reprimand; Sergeant First Class Snider be
relieved from his duties, receive a Memorandum o f Reprimand, and receive action
under the UCMJ; and Civilian Stephanowicz and Civilian Israel (CACI 205th MI
Brigade) be given a Reprimand to be put in their employee files and have their
security clearances reviewed (Taguba 2004).
Taguba also recommended the initiation o f a Procedure Inquiry 15 to
determine the full extent of culpability. As previously noted, the Procedure Inquiry 15
did not occur. Moreover, Taguba’s recommendations overall were ignored as were
previous recommendations by other investigations into abuses that revealed
inefficiencies within higher ranks. For example, the investigations by Schmidt and
Furlow concluded that General Miller should have been reprimanded for degrading
and abusive interrogation techniques (specifically involving Al-Qahtani) in
Guantanamo. However, the recommendation was rejected by General Craddock
(USA Today, July 13, 2005). Miller not only escaped reprimands but the following
month he was given the authority to overhaul the dysfunctional prison system in Iraq
shortly before the Abu Ghraib scandal was revealed to the public).
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Senator Warner, Chair o f the Armed Service Committee, whom convened
public hearings in early May targeting General Miller and Stephen Cambone’s roles in
the abuses, despite pressure from the Administration, stated:
This mistreatment of prisoners represents and appalling and totally
unacceptable breach of military regulation and conduct. . . . There must be a
full accounting for the cruel and disgraceful abuse of Iraqi detainees consistent
with our law and protections of the Uniform Military Code o f Justice.
(Senator Warner, May 11, 2004, before the Armed Service Committee)
He did not succeed and no independent committee investigation occurred.
Moreover, Warner backed down in his call for such an investigation and
acknowledged that there had been a lot of pressure on him. With limited resources
and extreme pressure, Senator Warner temporarily ended convening witnesses until
the Army completed the prosecutions of the low ranking MP’s. This put any further
hearings delving into deeper issues of the Administration’s policies in the distant
future, if any, until after the elections o f 2004. With the lack o f an investigations into
the abuses and without a tacit acknowledgment or willingness to probe how the
Administration’s policies led to the systematic abuses of Afghanistans, Iraqis, or
captives from over 44 states in Guantanamo, only 27 individuals have been cited/or
reprimanded. The results are further limited when we consider who is being held
accountable for the abuses that occurred in Abu Ghraib.
What has occurred as of October 2005 includes several small reprimands
against Commanding Officers and several low ranking MP’s being found guilty in
Military Courts. To date, the U.S. military has reprimanded six senior commissioned
and non-commissioned officers in connection with the abuse o f prisoners at the Abu
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Ghraib (Al-Atraqchi 2004)). Recall Taguba “strongly” recommended a course of
action; however, the military was not under obligation to follow through with the
specifics. Additionally, U.S. officials claim that the punishments are considered
private, thus, no details were released on the names or ranks o f those receiving
reprimands or admonishment letters. However, it is known that at least two of the
senior commissioned officers included Karpinski and Pappas.
In January 2004, Lieutenant General Sanchez formally suspended Karpinski.
On April 8, 2005, Karpinski was formally relieved o f command o f the 800th MP
Brigade. On May 5, 2005, Bush approved Karpinski’s demotion to Colonel. As a
high-ranking official, the demotion was not linked to the Taguba Report or the cases
of abuse and torture at Abu Ghraib. Instead it was stated that she was demoted for
“dereliction of duty, making a material misrepresentation to investigators, failure to
obey a lawful order and shoplifting” (stealing less than $50 worth of cosmetics from a
military store) (Wiklopedia, JK, 2005).
Colonel Pappas was reprimanded only by being denied any further promotions
and fined $8,000 with no criminal charges or investigations pending. LTC Phillabaum
is pending “Relief for Cause,” for dereliction o f duty. He has already been removed
from duty. Captain Reese was simply admonished for failing to supervise his
subordinates.
The only individuals being held criminally accountable are the low ranking
military personnel. Of the nine accused in the Abu Ghraib abuse and torture cases,
seven have pleaded guilty. Spc. Ambuhi pled guilty, lost her rank, and was given a
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“other than honourable discharge.” Spc. Cruz pled guilty and received 8 months in jail
along with a bad conduct discharge. Staff Sergeant Fredrick also pled guilty and
received 8 years in jail and a dishonorable discharge. Spc. Sivits pled guilty and
received 1 year in jail along with a bad conduct discharge. Sgt. Davis, upon guilty
plea was sentenced to 6 months in jail and received a bad conduct discharge. Spc.
Krol also entered a guilty plea and received 10 months in jail and a bad conduct
discharge. Spc. Harman was found guilty and given 6 months in jail and received a
bad conduct discharge. Private Graner took his case to trial and was convicted and
sentenced to 10 years in Fort Levenworth in January 2005. He was also reduced in
rank and will be given dishonorable discharge upon completion o f his sentence.
Private England was also found guilty, after her earlier plea entry of guilty was
denied, and was sentenced to three years in jail and received a dishonorable discharge
(BBC News 9/29/2005:1; MSNBC 9/28/2005).
As no senior Commander received criminal charges and as the Bush
Administration failed to acknowledge the implicit role of its policies in the cases of
torture and inhumane and cruel treatment, the ACLU has moved forward and
registered formal Civil Complaints. On March 1, 2005, the first federal court lawsuit
to name a top U.S. official, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in the ongoing
torture scandal in Iraq was officially filed. The suit claims that Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld bears “direct responsibility for the torture and abuse of detainees in
U.S. military custody” (ACLU and Human Rights First Lawsuit 2005). The lawsuit
was filed in federal court in Illinois on behalf o f eight detainees (three of which their
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stories appear in this section) “who were subject to torture and abuse at the hands of
U.S. forces under Secretary Rumsfeld’s command.” Rumsfeld is charged with
violations o f the U.S. Constitution and international law prohibiting torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment. The ACLU and Human Rights First say they filed
these suits in response to the Administration’s unwillingness to provide an
independent investigation of senior commanders and U.S. policy:
Since Abu Ghraib, we have vigorously campaigned for an independent
commission to investigate U.S. policies that have led to torture and cruel
treatment o f detainees. These calls have gone unanswered by the
administration and Congress, and today many of the illegal policies remain in
place. We believed the United States could correct its policy without resort to
the courts. In bringing this action today, we reluctantly conclude that we were
wrong. (Michael Posner, Executive Director of Human Rights First, 2005: 1)
The ACLU and Human Rights First have also filed three similar complaints
against Colonel Thomas Pappas, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski and Lt. General
Ricardo Sanchez on behalf of the torture victims who were detained in Iraq. These
three complaints were filed in federal courts in Connecticut, South Carolina, and
Texas due to court requirements regarding jurisdiction. Time will tell if these suits
precede or if they bring any type of accountability.

Summary

Cases of cruel and inhumane treatment and torture clearly took place within
the confines of Abu Ghraib. As testimonies from prisoners and military personnel
have shown, it was not a matter of a few rogue MP’s on the night shift. However, not
everyone stationed at Abu Ghraib (or serving in general in the war on terrorism) was
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active in these offenses. Nonetheless, there were widespread abuses occurring from
Afghanistan, Guantanamo, Iraq, and into Abu Ghraib. The question is not if abuse and
torture occurred, the larger questions still remaining are how and why did these
abuses occur? Moreover, if torture was mandated from the highest levels within the
State, why didn’t everyone at Abu Ghraib participate? This brings us to the
significance of exploring multiple levels o f analysis, from the international to the
interactional, in an effort to understand the correlations between the decision making
process within the Administration to the realities o f serving in Abu Ghraib. The next
chapter attempts to answer these fundamental questions by addressing the forces of
motivation and opportunity.
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CHAPTER VI
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS I
In the following two chapters, I provide a criminological analysis of the
torture that took place at Abu Ghraib prison. This analysis will draw on the multi
level and multi-catalyst framework discussed in Chapter II. While this analytical frame
is rather complex, I believe that it is necessary if we are to consider the holistic
environment of a phenomenon such as the torture at Abu Ghraib. Before proceeding
to the analysis, let us briefly revisit the integrated model.
It is clear that singular societies are not atomistically separated from each
other. Institutional arrangements and forces do not cease their influence at the
arbitrary political boundaries currently drawn upon our maps. At the international
level, existing relations based on specific conditions create broad social forces that
can act as constraints on a state’s intended policy. Moreover, international relations
have an influence on states’ opportunities to engage in illegal acts. Global economic
forces can produce or constrain competition and goal attainment. The larger
international culture or ethos can also produce an environment where a set of
objectives can be accomplished by states using covert or overt activities.
At the structural or institutional level o f analysis, the national social structure
and its major social institutions are examined. When broad cultural, economic,
political, and ideological goals are blocked, political organizations and actors within
156
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them can be pushed toward the violation of law in order to accomplish their
objectives. Within this level, I include the governmental political apparatus defined as
the state. Being a nation-state strongly enhances the ability to create and capitalize
upon criminal opportunity. Clearly law can serve to control actions, but due to the
unique position of a state vis-a-vis its own domestic law and the problematic ways in
which it is enforced, law may not hold the same deterrent power over a political body
as it does over citizen actors. Furthermore, public forces embodied in the media,
public opinion and social movement activism can potentially operate as constraints on
state criminality at this level. The process of legitimation plays a significant role in
state decision-making processes as well as official responses (e.g., state propaganda
and the role o f the media).
At the organizational level, elements of organizational culture and goals
structure decision-making environments that can lead either toward or away from
criminal activity. In this case, the organizational level analysis focuses on Abu Ghraib
prison. Certain organizations utilize instrumental rationality within decision making
processes (see Perrow 1986; Weber 1947) that can enhance the perceived value of
criminal behaviors and reduce the perceived harm of the same act. Cultures can
develop within organizations or subunits that can motivate criminal endeavors.
Moreover, bureaucracies can maintain levels of secrecy on how their resources are
utilized; external actors need not know what was done within the organization or by
whom. Codes of conduct and other internal controls and checks may serve to block
organizational criminal activity. Punitive measure may be utilized when conduct

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

158

norms are broken, thus serving as a form of deterrence. Constraints, on the other
hand, include a general culture o f compliance and reward structures. As previously
noted, constraints generally act as temporary barriers and do not generally produce a
deterrent effect as some legal reactions or penalties may.
At the social-psychological or interactional level, motivation is affected by
one’s socialization within a specific environment and the social meaning given to
objects in the social world. Individual goals and issues of personality such as personal
morality and obedience to authority are relevant factors in understanding state crimes
at all levels o f power within the polity—from the decision makers, to those who
organize the act’s implementation, to those who actually carry out the actions.
Individual level motivations can be personal, but these individualized outlooks and
motivations are highly malleable within the organizational culture and context that
encapsulates the social actors. Again, cultural elements discussed above come to
bear—both in the broader socio-cultural sense (singular actors motivated for personal
success and advancement) but also in terms of organizational cultures into which the
individual has been socialized.
This brief review alludes to the complexities and bulkiness of such an analysis.
For this reason I have divided the theoretical analysis into two separate chapters: the
first chapter deals with the catalysts of motivation and opportunity while the
following chapter focuses on constraints and controls. More specifically, in Chapter
VI, I examine the motivations and opportunities in relationship to international
relations and economic conditions, political and ideological interests, organizational
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culture and ethos, socialization, rationalization, and other core variables suggested by
the theoretical frame. In Chapter VII, I examine constraints and controls in relation to
international reactions and political pressures, international and domestic laws, the
role of the media, the perceived legitimacy of law, religion, and morality.

Motivation and Opportunities

When the Abu Ghraib scandal broke in April 2004, the images, sadistic and
evil, left no doubt that abuse and torture had occurred at the hands o f the U.S.
military. Senior officials in the Bush administration claimed that the prisoner abuse
was committed by only a few rogue, poorly trained reserve personnel at one facility
during the nightshift in Iraq. Since then, hundreds of other cases from Afghanistan to
Iraq have surfaced. Indeed, torture was and is being used by the U.S. in the name of a
“greater good,” to secure information deemed necessary to prevent terrorism and to
quell the Iraqi insurgency. Furthermore, some of the acts continue to be done
systematically below the “radar screen, without political accountability, and indeed
with plausible deniability” (Dershowitz 2004: 257). Thus, this “torture lite,” as
classified by military and civilian officials, was not just the acts o f a few bad apples
(Dershowitz 2004: 264). While the military acted by initiating investigations which led
to nine prosecutions o f lower-ranking personnel and closed administrative hearings
which handed down soft administrative punishments such as pay reductions and
reprimands, the military made no effort to conduct a broader criminal investigation.
Moreover, the administration continues to insist that the reported abuse had nothing
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to do with its decisions on the applicability o f the Geneva Conventions or with any
approved and expanded interrogation techniques. Nonetheless, a case can be made
that the U.S. government was criminally responsible for the torture that took place.
We can analyze the specific motivations and opportunities o f the Bush Administration
in relation to the crimes at Abu Ghraib.

Motivation

The fundamental factor of motivation is goal attainment. However, there are
often multiple layers of goals. These can be further delineated into what I call general
and specific goals. While both o f these types o f goals are present in the motivation for
the case o f Abu Ghraib, they differ in their affect. I use the term general to refer to
the larger goals that had an affect on the decision making processes that would come
to define other or more specific goals. For example, general goals include factors such
as the pursuit of an Imperialist agenda, economic gain, revenge for the attacks of
September 11, 2001 and international interest in reducing terrorism. Specific goals
include those directly related to the torture that occurred such as the push for
actionable intelligence and the strain experienced by U.S. forces. After all, motivation
for crimes of the state can vary in degree, content, and intent. For example,
motivation must not be assumed to be solely in terms of the state accumulating capital
or in terms of legitimacy. This negates the agentic force that composes the state
political apparatus. Factors such as morality and religion may play a significant role.
Consequently, this section is divided into two subsections: general and specific goals.
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In doing so, the international and state structural levels are combined to discuss the
larger general goals. I then combine the state structural, organizational, and
interactional levels to discuss the specific goals.

General Goals

The end o f the Cold War weakened domestic political support for expanding
military budgets and the permanent war economy, and removed the ideological
rationalization for a nationalistic agenda. However, economic and political elites did
not acquiesce to the reduction in their power that would have resulted from such a
realignment of U.S. foreign policy goals. The “neo-conservatives,” argued for a more
nationalist, unilateralist, and militarist approach along with a disdain o f international
law and/or constraints. Moreover, as the Soviet Union was weakening, neo-cons in
the administration o f President George H. W. Bush began vigorously promoting an
aggressive neo-imperialist ideology.
In 1992, aides under Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney prepared a draft
document that later came to guide President George W. Bush’s foreign policies after
September 11, 2001. This Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 (DPG) “depicted a
world dominated by the United States, which would maintain its superpower status
through a combination of positive guidance and overwhelming military might”
(Armstrong 2002: 78). This included the use of preemptive military force to achieve
such goals and the need to eliminate Sadaam Hussein’s government from Iraq,
consolidate U.S. power in the Middle East, and change the political culture o f the
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region (Dorrien 2004). Recall also, in September o f 2000, the Project for the New
American Century (PNAC) issued a report entitled Rebuilding Am erica’s Defenses:
Strategy, Forces and Resources fo r a New Century. This report grew out of the
earlier DPG. PNAC called for massive increases in the military budget, the expansion
of military bases, and the establishment of client states supportive of United States’
economic and political interests. Moreover, the agenda included getting rid of
Saddam Hussein and his regime, the realignment o f the Middle East,1 and a
preemptive military action to combat terrorism (as state defined). A general
motivation to create a new Pax Americana (U.S. Empire) permeated this document.
As noted in Chapter IV, with the happenstance o f the 2000 elections, the
neocons found themselves in a position to shape U.S. policy. Consequently, the
underlying motivation o f the global war on terrorism was the pursuit and realization
of the neocon’s imperial designs. The invasion and occupation o f Iraq was the first
step in this plan. Economic and strategic interests that included the opening o f a new
capitalistic market for U.S. corporate exploitation as well as the eventual political
control of the Middle East were all general motivations that would have an indirect
impact on the use of torture and cruel and inhumane punishment that occurred
throughout the war on terrorism and Abu Ghraib specifically.
Directly related to this was the need to respond to the changing global
economic order wherein the dollar was being seriously challenged. In late 2000,

1See Appendix D for map of area.
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Saddam Hussein switched from the dollar to the euro and then converted his $10
billion reserve fund at the UN from dollars to euros. Iraq profited immensely from the
switch further motivating the Administration to overthrow Saddam and put in place a
U.S. driven economy (The Observer, February 16, 2003). The dollar-euro changeover
was powerful enough to risk any economic backlash in the short-term to stave off the
long-term dollar crash o f an OPEC transaction standard change. This reinforced the
broader general motivation to invade Iraq. The Observer states:
A bizarre political statement by Saddam Hussein has earned Iraq a windfall of
hundreds o f millions of euros. In October 2000 Iraq insisted upon dumping
the U.S. Dollar—“the currency of the enemy”—for the more multilateral euro.
It was also reported that Iraq’s UN oil for food reserve fund swelled from $10
billion dollars to $26 billion euros. As Saddam changed to the euro for oil and with
talks of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) following
suit, the Bush Administration became alarmed. They began planning to block OPEC
momentum towards the euro as the currency standard as well as to return the Iraqi
reserves back to the U.S. dollar. In order to pre-empt OPEC, the Administration
needed to control Iraq and its oil reserves.
Otherwise U.S. economic supremacy could potentially be challenged as the
situation would have presented an overarching macroeconomic threat to the
hegemony of the U.S. dollar. As Clark (2003: 2) noted:
The Federal Reserve’s greatest nightmare is that OPEC will switch its
international transactions from a dollar standard to a euro standard. The real
reason the Bush administration wants a puppet government in Iraq—or more
importantly, the reason why the corporate-military-industrial network
conglomerate wants a puppet government in Iraq—is so that it will revert
back to a dollar standard and stay that way. While also hoping to veto any
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wider OPEC momentum towards the euro, especially from Iran—the 2nd
largest OPEC producer who is actively discussing a switch to euros for its oil
exports.
Moreover, Clark (2003: 3) suggests that the following scenario would occur if
OPEC made a collective switch to euros:
Otherwise, the effect of an OPEC switch to the euro would be that oil
consuming nations would have to flush dollars out o f their (central bank)
reserve funds and replace these with euros. The dollar would crash anywhere
from 20-40% in value and the consequences would be those one could expect
from any currency collapse and massive inflation (think Argentina currency
crisis, for example). You’d have foreign funds stream out of the U.S. stock
markets and dollar denominated assets, there'd surely be a run on the banks
much like the 1930s, the current account deficit would become unserviceable,
the budget deficit would go into default, and so on. Your basic 3rd world
economic crisis scenario.
The ultimate result could potentially be the U.S. and the E.U. switching roles
in the global economy, thus the U.S. would lose its sole status as superpower.
The attacks that occurred September 11, 2001 provided further general
motivations. This included both, a motivation to address the growing concern of
terrorism that had emerged at the international level for several decades and as a
response to the attacks themselves. Throughout the twentieth century, the
international arena sporadically focused on terrorism. For example, in May o f 1937,
the League of Nations appointed Council for the Repression o f Terrorism convened a
conference in which thirty-six nations attended. The Final Act o f the international
conference was signed in November 1937 and it created a multilateral treaty for the
Prevention and Repression of Terrorism (League of Nations Proceedings of the
International Conference on the Repression o f Terrorism, 1937). At the III
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International symposium in Syracuse, Sicily, 1973, the topic was again investigated
(Bassiouni 1973; Rothe and Mullins 2006).
Yet, during the Cold War, terrorism was the “trade o f the superpowers . . .
they fought wars by proxy across the world by funding local armed groups with legal
or covert operations” (for example the Contras in Central America) (Napoleoni 2003:
1). However, with changes in ideology, international relations, and globalization at
the end of the cold war, the use of terrorism as a political tool greatly increased by
states as well as independent political or religious groups (e.g., Israel, World Trade
Center, Belfast, Russia, Kizlar, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Tokyo, Iran,
Egypt, Turkey, Japan, Al-Qaeda, IRA, Hamas). Indeed, as international economic and
financial barriers between states were lowered, terror groups expanded their activities
becoming transnational. Terrorism came to be seen as endemic. There emerged an
ordinariness o f brutality used by states and independent organizations.
With the renewed interest in and international focus on terrorism, the terrorist
attack on the U.S. provided the motivation to pursue a global war on terrorism.
Immediately after the September 11th attacks, the West Wing o f the White House
wanted action and Rumsfeld led the charge. While there was an ongoing neo-con
agenda driving the invasion and occupation o f Iraq, the onset o f the Afghanistan
invasion was stimulated by political and public reactions to the terrorist attacks and

Again, in 1989, Trinidad and Tobago approached the UN with a proposal
for an ICC as a device to address drug trafficking and terrorism.
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the motivation to suppress future attacks. Consequently, the attacks themselves were
useful as a motivating force.
Once the global war on terrorism began and the U.S. invaded Afghanistan,
another significant variable, motivated by international practice as well as state
interest, was stepped up: the use of covert governmental programs to aid in the
state’s political agendas. Since WWII, many states have used covert activities for the
pursuit of state or individual interests. For example, the French have been accused of
having its police covertly acting in Spain and sponsoring the GAL (anti-terrorist
liberation group) death squads in their war against the leftist and Basque separatists.
Chile, under Pinochet, used covert means to assassinate General Carlos Prats in
Argentina as well as the attempted assassination of Bernardo Leighton in Italy. Iran
under the Shah (1953-79) was notorious for its state terrorism through its covert
intelligence agency SAVAK (which was founded in 1957 with the aid of the CIA).
Israel covertly planned an assassination of Yasser Arafat on two separate occasions.
In Spain, numerous groups such as the Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey, Batallon Vasco
Espanol, Antiterrorismo ETA (ATE), and Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion
(GAL), alleged to consist of Spanish police and funded with secrete money, violently
attacked suspected members of the ETA (Vidgen 1995).
As state sponsored covert activities flourished, the U.S. remained one o f the
leading users of covert activities against other nation states and/or their representative
puppet governments. After the assassination o f Kennedy in 1963, the CIA’s use of
covert operation programs or SAP’s increased on a dramatic scale (Vidgen 1995).
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Recall that in President Bush’s speech to the nation on September 24, 2001, he
declared a global open-ended war on terror, which would “not end until every
terrorist group o f global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” To attempt to
do this, resources far beyond the U.S. traditional military would be needed. The
increased use o f special operations and clandestine activities was a potential resource
for the Administration. Moreover, the increased use o f SAP’s and other clandestine
activities in the war on terrorism was motivated by the fact that during the 1990s,
intelligence funding suffered deep cuts (Annual Report on Military Expenditures
1991-1999; H. Res. 229).
As discussed in Chapter IV, the CIA and SAP’s were heavily involved in
“intelligence gathering,” rounding up, and killing suspected Al-Qaeda members.
Moreover, they were heavily involved in Iraq and Abu Ghraib as SAP’s were granted
authority over M i’s and MP’s. As with any state covert activity, the goal was to
achieve its mission without outside scrutiny and at a quicker pace than could be done
using traditional military techniques or through diplomatic channels.
Private military firms were also used extensively in the global war on
terrorism. In part motivated by need and also for self-serving interests, the role of
PMC’s reached an all time high (Rothe 2006). While the Administration made the
claim that utilizing private corporations was more cost effective than the military, thus
saving the public’s tax money, it was much more complex (this will be discussed in
the following sections). For example, personal financial interests were at stake (e.g.,
Cheney and Halliburton; G. H. W. Bush with Carlisle; and Lord and Abbott). There
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was also a level of deniability and legal ambiguity that using PMC’s provided. For
example, the funds to pay corporations for wartime efforts were taken from funds
unregulated by Congress (see also Rothe 2006). Moreover, with an expansive war
on terrorism and with the underlying motive to move quickly into Iraq, the
Administration openly began advertising in multiple countries (e.g., Russia) for PC’s
and or individual rogue ex-military personnel to aid in the Afghanistan invasion. The
uses of these PC’s continued and were expanded in the subsequent war on Iraq and in
prisoner handling and interrogations.
While the initial war on terrorism, beginning with Afghanistan, was framed as
a new type o f war, the ideological underpinnings coincided with the neocon agenda: a
militaristic nationalistic response wherein “the gloves come off.” The assertion of the
Bush Administration after September 11, 2001 was that fighting terrorism was
justified by whatever means chosen (Greenberg and Dratel 2005). Moreover, a
political cultural change was in the making. This included the Administrations disdain
for a soft military and for international law. Thus, the policies set forth by the
Administration were an effort to alter U.S. military policy and practice while at the
same time disavowing allegiance to international law. As Yoo stated, “this was a new

2

In Iraq, contractors were originally to be paid with money approved by
Congress, but the CPA decided to use Iraqi money through the DFI funds, which was
subject to “fewer restrictions and less rigorous oversight” (Mother Jones 2004, in Rothe
2006).
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kind of war wherein we had to adapt to a war wherein the enemy was not a traditional
state” (Frontline, October 18, 2005).
The redefining of the way war was to be fought included Rumsfeld’s
longstanding “desire to wrest control of clandestine and paramilitary operations from
the CIA” (Hersh 2004a). With the bungled elections o f 2000, Rumsfeld found himself
in a position to make real his long-standing desires. Not only did he initiate the first
SAP clandestine effort in the war on terrorism in August 2003, but he also expanded
the highly secretive programs into the prison o f Abu Ghraib.
This “new kind of war” also motivated a change in military techniques to
gather intelligence. There was a brutal tug of war occurring within the State between
the FBI and the CIA over detainees considered high value intelligence (HVI). The
FBI had a practice of repertoire building in interrogations while the CIA was using
harsh tactics and practices of rendition: outsourcing of torture for intelligence. The
CIA did not take most prisoners in Afghanistan so they fell under the auspices and
responsibility of Secretary of State Rumsfeld. His priority was “actionable
intelligence.” However, little to no actionable intelligence was being attained on the
whereabouts of Al-Qaeda or Bin Laden. This was the specific motive for finding ways
around the Geneva Conventions. The DOD lawyers did just that. In Chapter III, I
discussed these memos as well as the attempts by DOD and Counsel to the President
to ignore and manipulate the legal interpretations from legal precedence and existing
laws, domestic and international (this will be discussed further within the specific
opportunity and the controls sections). In doing so, the Administration paved the way
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for what eventually came to public attention, the abuses and torture o f Abu Ghraib.
Additionally, the change in military tactics and ideology o f gloves off had a direct
impact on more specific goals related to the torture and abuses that occurred at Abu
Ghraib.

Specific Goals

From the onset o f the Afghanistan invasion, the need for intelligence was high.
With the failure to capture Bin Laden, mass roundups of detainees were conducted in
an effort to obtain some sort of actionable intelligence. With the growing number of
prisoners, the U.S. needed additional places to detain them. As will be discussed in
the following section, opportunities, Guantanamo was chosen.
With the arrival of detainees at Guantanamo, the quest for actionable
intelligence amplified. However, interrogations were not going well and an intensive
process ensued. This was in part due to the Afghanis putting up resistance to
interrogation but was mostly associated with the fact that most o f the detainees were
insurgents against the U.S. “but none had any knowledge that was useful for
intelligence on Al-Qaeda or Bin Laden” (Frontline 2005). This was contradictory to
Rumsfeld’s claim that “they were the most dangerous and the worst o f the worst” of
terrorists. Moreover, as the M i’s were “young and inexperienced active duty reserve
service personnel” they were not equipped to obtain the information Rumsfeld was
pushing for. In Washington, the military command knew Rumsfeld was unhappy with
the amount of usable information coming out of Guantanamo. The general belief was
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that the MP’s were coddling detainees and a harder stance was needed. This
motivated the Pentagon to expand the interrogation tactics being used (Baccus 2005).
This resulted in the multiple memos discussing interrogation techniques that could
bypass international law if manipulated and redefined (this will be discussed further in
the state opportunity section). This also resulted in Rumsfeld’s decision to reheve
Baccus of his duty and to send General Miller to Gitmo. Camp X-Ray became Camp
Delta with 625 detainees at this time.
Miller’s presence at Gitmo brought “noted improvements” in the daily
operating procedures; however, little intelligence was being gathered (Baccus 2005).
With the arrival o f Miller, the atmosphere and structure changed. MP’s and M i’s
were to work together as a combined team. Moreover, Rumsfeld authorized the
harshest techniques for interrogation “ever in U.S. history” (Baccus 2005). These
techniques were discussed in Chapter IV and included using dogs, stress, shackling in
stress positions, standing, isolation, and “other innovating” (getting in the detainees’
heads) tactics. While Rumsfeld approved these methods, the desire for even harsher
ones was alluded to in Rumsfeld’s memo wherein he added “I stand for 8 hours, why
only 4?” The uses of psychological techniques were further generated by the
availability of a team of U.S. psychologists for advice and aid in finding mental and
cultural vulnerabilities the MP’s and M i’s could use. Some o f these methods of
innovating were later visible in the cases at Abu Ghraib. For example, female MP and
M i’s committing sexual innuendos (females straddling detainees and using red
substance claiming it was menstrual blood to smear on detainees) were used for
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cultural vulnerabilities, detainees wearing bras, and putting them on leashes and
walking them like dogs.
As Human Rights Organizations and international political actors continued to
press the Administration on its classifications of enemy combatants and the treatment
of detainees at Gitmo there was further motivation to move quickly, to attain more
information, and to proceed with the invasion o f Iraq. Moreover, international
support began to dwindle and was replaced with scrutiny and or outright protests,
thus motivating the Administration to move quickly in Afghanistan to get out, refocus
the war on terrorism off of Bin Laden and recast the threat in a much larger frame. In
the 2002 State of the Union Address, this is exactly what they did. Now the “axis of
evil” was part o f the larger war on terrorism. Moreover, the connection had been
made between Iraq and the ever-looming threat of Al-Qaeda.
In March of 2003, the shock and awe attacks began. Heavily criticized for its
unilateral attack on Iraq, the U.S. needed a quick victory (one which Rumsfeld was
sure would happen). Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, Iraqi street crimes escalated
and a growing insurgency was surfacing. As the resistance intensified pressure from
Rumsfeld for intelligence on who the insurgents were and where were they coming
from. This pressure created an even more intense desire down the chain o f command
to produce some sort of actionable intelligence. With no good intelligence on this
“unexpected” insurgency, the explosive mix of fear, uncertainty, and revenge led to
even larger detention sweeps as well as an increase o f violence by U.S. personnel.
Many of these detainees ended up in Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib was not only chosen as
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the site for detaining the escalating number o f criminals charged with looting but also
for those deemed HIV.
From the onset, the choice of Abu Ghraib for a detention center was
troubling. It was “not a good site-in middle o f combat space . . . you just don’t do it”
(Karpinski 2005a). The 280-acre site, with only three towers, was located in civilian
neighborhoods where insurgent snipers were easily hidden. This added to the already
explosive mixture of emotions that led to the escalation o f violence by U.S. troops on
civilians at large. Moreover, as the resistance to the U.S. occupation continued to
grow, mass roundups were being initiated, detaining thousands o f Iraqis that were “in
the wrong place at the wrong time.” As the ICRC and other Reports noted, at least
90% of the detainees did not need to be detained.
By the Fall of 2003, as the numbers of detainees increased and the necessary
staff within Abu Ghraib was lacking. In that environment a growing brutality surfaced
as MP’s were overwhelmed (380 MP’s to guard thousands of detainees). This was
evidenced by the change in videos MP and M i’s were sending back home to loved
ones that were growing more intense, filled with hostilities amongst each other
(Frontline 2005). Moreover, the push for “actionable intelligence” and the foreign role
of MP’s working under M i’s and SAP’s significantly worsened an already hostile
environment towards more extreme physical reactions as anger and frustration was
growing among U.S. forces. As a constant reminder and motivator, a photocopied
letter with Rumsfeld’s signature was taped to a column in Abu Ghraib, declaring the
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“need for actionable intelligence” along with suggested means such as using dogs, and
a command to “make sure this happens” (Karpinski 2005b: 241).
Command levels within Abu Ghraib were also aware of daily briefings with
the National Security Council for updates on intelligence results. There was direct
pressure from Rumsfeld via teleconferences with Sanchez pressuring for intelligence
to find out “who the hell is responsible for the insurgency . . .who are they”
(Karpinski 2005a). With any line o f command, the need to have success in attaining
goals is significant. Likewise, it was known on the field that the word from high levels
within the Administration (including Cheney and Rumsfeld) was that field
interrogations were not providing the needed intelligence. Consequently, “to a soldier
in the field it meant sometimes using ways that were not in accordance with the
Geneva Conventions and the law o f war” (Wilkerson 2005: 1). Thus, individuals were
motivated to commit or at best ignore abuses and torture to obtain the demanded
goals. Their individual success would be rewarded by future promotions and internal
reviews as well as through verbal confirmations such as “Good job, they’re breaking
down real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information,
Finally, and Keep up the good work” (Taguba 2004: vl 1U (c)). This environment had
a huge impact on generating the individual motivation to torture.
I have noted that every regime that tortures does so in the name o f a greater
good or a superior goal. The U.S. clearly used this strategy, as the greater good was
to bring peace and democracy, and end the evils of terrorism. This philosophical
doctrine o f the greater good is more than a technique o f rationalization. It is a moral
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argument. Scholars have long discussed the acceptable use o f torture in a ticking
bomb scenario. This moral argument is also a motivating factor at the individual level.
Moreover, state actors used the moral debate when discussing expanded interrogation
techniques. As Assistant Attorney General Bybee stated, “In a war like the present
one, the information gained from interrogations may prevent future attacks by foreign
enemies” (Memo, August 2002: 8). This had a direct effect at the Interactional level
of analysis. As Levinson (2004: 16) suggests, “torturers do not generally think of
themselves as evil but rather as guardians o f the common good.” A claim is made to
some higher virtue for acts o f torture. Simply stated, torturers believe they get their
hands dirty to protect others from a greater harm.
While rationalizing one’s behavior as for a greater good or a higher virtue
played a role, so did the variables of adrenaline and power. In an interview with Dan
Rather, 60 Minutes II, Staff Sergeant Chip Fredrick (2004) alludes to both o f these
variables. He stated:
The elixir of power, the elixir o f believing that you’re helping the CIA, for
God’s sake, when you’re from a small town in Virginia, that’s intoxicating . . .
and so good guys sometimes do things believing that they are being of
assistance and helping a just cause, [my emphasis]
Recall that detainees were labeled as Gollum, an animalistic character of
ignorance and stupidity. This coupled with the term PUC (prisoner under control
originally devised in Afghanistan), reinforced the mentality o f the dehumanized
enemy. Moreover, the term PUC became part of a larger organizational isomorphic
affect when it was transmitted from Afghanistan to Iraq. With a label o f under control
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versus the protected status of POW, personnel were able to claim a higher good and
to neutralize their tactics o f torture and abuse through the process o f dehumanization.
Ignoring abuse and torture is also an individual response to the processes of
socialization within the environment.4 As Sergeant Davis told CID investigators, “I
witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section being made to do things that I would
question morally . . . but I assumed if they were doing things out of the ordinary or
outside the guidelines, someone would have said something” (Davis 2004: 30). Due
to the processes o f socialization, studies o f torturers have shown that ordinary
individuals, regardless o f their psychological traits, can be made to torture others by
being socialized to atrocity in terms of necessity. The notion of necessity was
reinforced by the organizational structure of Abu Ghraib. As MP’s were put in the
position to aid M i’s in intelligence gathering, the primary goal was to obtain
necessary intelligence to (1) end the insurgency, (2) save their fellow military
personnel, and (3) to come closer to a date to return to the States. Soldiers learned
that it was acceptable to “’fuck’ (i.e., beat up) and ‘smoke’ (i.e., bring to collapse
through forced physical exertion)” detainees from their initial time of arrival (Captain
Fishback 2005). Low-ranking personnel witnessed OGA civilian and MI interrogators
ignoring the Geneva Conventions and came to believe that anything goes, further
reinforcing their socialization into the systematic practice o f abuse and torture.

4 This is also referred to as the stander-by effect.
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Once the systematic use of abuse and torture was institutionalized within the
walls of Abu Ghraib, some individuals then engaged in a competition with each other,
which escalated the torture and abuse. For example, in General Fay’s Report, one of
the cases noted states that “dog handlers were subjecting two adolescents to terror
from the dogs for the purposes of playing a game . . . dog handlers competed to see
who could be the first to get detainees bowel movements and urination to work.”
At other times, torture occurred in an environment that was filled with
frustration, anger, confusion, and most significantly boredom. The photographs and
videos reveal the immediate effect of this boredom as they were taken as a form of
entertainment. Furthermore, abusing and torturing detainees was used as a stress and
boredom release by enlisted men of all kinds. For example, one of the whistleblowers
in the Human Rights Watch Report (2005) claimed that he witnessed a cook break a
detainee’s leg with a metal baseball bat out o f boredom.

Summary

This chapter distinguishes between general and specific goals that led to the
torture at Abu Ghraib. General goals generate from broader interests such as the
neocon agenda, maintaining supremacy o f the U.S. dollar, a broader focus on
terrorism, and the attacks o f September 11th. Specific goals included the desire and
need for actionable intelligence, the strain on military personnel, and psychological
issues such boredom, frustration, and strain. As previously noted, however,
motivation itself is not sufficient; opportunity must also exist.
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Opportunities

Opportunity for illegitimate means must be present though its significance may
very in degree or circumstances. These variations can be delineated into general and
specific opportunities. I use the term general to refer to opportunities that already
exist due to larger structural factors. These can include the global capital market, time
specific interstate relations, and a complimentary legal system.
On the other hand, a state, or an individual, can be highly motivated but
without an appropriate opportunity will be unable to act on that motivation. Thus,
opportunities are often created. This is more often the case at the state level wherein
its very structure allows for law making or decriminalization of acts that provide
opportunities to obtain goals. Other examples of created opportunities include things
such as, the role o f MP units as interrogators, lack o f an organizational command
structure, or using private contractors for sensitive jobs are all opportunities that were
created or presented as the result of specific decision-making.
The following analysis utilizes these distinctions. Consequently, this section is
divided into two subsections: general and specific opportunities. General
opportunities include both the international and state structural levels and specific
opportunities combine the state, organizational, and interactional levels consistent
with the analysis o f motivation.
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General Opportunities

After the Cold War, the U.S., along with other industrialized nations, began
downsizing its military and privatizing military logistical services. Private military
companies (PMC) have become common and “significant players in conflicts around
the world, supplying not merely the goods but also the services o f war” (Singer 2005:
1). As Singer also points out:
The modem private military industry emerged at the start o f the 1990s, driven
by three dynamics: the end o f the Cold War, transformations in the nature of
warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a general
trend toward privatization and outsourcing o f government functions around
the world.
PMC’s have grown to include nearly 90 companies and they are used in more
than 110 nation-states providing an array o f services (Whyte 2003). The overall
pattern of transnational globalization and military privatization that emerged out of
the early 1990’s reinforced a general symbiotic relationship between states and
corporations. It has long been acknowledged by many scholars that the state plays a
major role in protecting the capitalistic system, thus, corporate interests (Marx 1906;
Chambliss and Zatz 1993; Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000; and Gold et al. 1975).
States and markets have a relationship of interdependence and as markets are
embedded in states, it is often, though not necessarily always in the states’ interests to
maintain a dominant role in forming coalitions with transnational institutions and the
private sector. Moreover, a symbiotic relationship between state and capitalism does
not historically mean ipso facto that it supports corporate interests. It does not mean
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that it is some inescapable law o f capitalism. It is not.5 I am not implying a simplistic
instrumentalist conceptualization o f PMC’s wherein they act to fulfill state foreign
policy by “proxy.” Instead the privatized military corporate activities present a more
complex network of economic, legal and political reciprocity. Furthermore, as the
international arena openly promotes a global market and laissez-faire capitalism,
transnational corporations play an enormous role within the globalizing economy.
This presents the opportunity to use such private corporations as a seemingly natural
phenomenon (Rothe 2006). Thus, the emergence of privatized military markets can
act as an “expansion of the coercive and violent capacities” of nation-states (Whyte
2003: 1). Consequently, the international environment wherein PMC’s were used in
such a large context, facilitating new means for delivering violence and terror,
provided yet another opportunity for the U.S. to expand the “traditional role” of these

5 Historically, it was not always the case that supporting capitalism meant
unregulated deference to corporate private interest. Originally, corporate charters,
etc. were designed to serve and protect the public interest from private abuse. This
did not change in the U.S. until after the 14‘ equal rights amendment intended to
protect freed slaves was used by capitalists like Rockefeller, Dupont, and Mellon to
redefine the corporation as a “person” entitled to these same rights, while at the same
time, the Constitutional safeguards and protections o f freedom to gather or speak or
to due process were no longer applied to the worker/employee or to the common
community, and the only responsibility or obligation o f the corporation became to the
privately owned share holders or to the bottom line, as the individuals making up the
corporation were freed from any personal or individual liability for corporate injury or
harm (Barak 2005).
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companies to one beyond logistical services to include interrogations and other
previously sensitive and specialized military roles.
The use of PMC’s allowed the U.S. to carry out actions that would not
otherwise have been possible such as those operations that would have failed
legislative or public approval. More specifically, the use o f PMC’s allowed the U.S.
an additional resource for achieving a foreign policy goal without the need of
legislative approval as required when using military forces. As Tombs and Whyte
state (2003: 220), accountability is stymied through the use o f private contractors by
absorbing the ‘“corporate veil,’ ‘commercial confidentiality’ and the inapplicability of
Freedom of Information legislation into their security activities.” Conversely, PMC’s
provide an “ambiguous legal status” for private contractors in theatres o f conflict
and/or reconstruction and may extend the shield of national security through keeping
information classified (Jameson and McEvoy 2005). Contractors then further obscure
reality by hiding behind the complexities of corporate structures intermixed with state
contractual arrangements.
Perhaps as significant is the opportunity to minimize the numbers of enlisted
men needed in this global war on terrorism. The desire to keep down the numbers of
troops actively engaged in warfare to appease the public while still having enough
personnel to do the necessary job is in part a reaction to past wartime experiences.
Privatization provides the opportunity, in part, to limit the public’s abhorrence o f the
death and violence that war inevitably inflicts on U.S. soldiers. Since the end of the
Vietnam War, presidents have worried that their military actions would lose support
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once the number of troop casualties climbed and/or news media began distributing
pictures of the remains o f U.S. soldiers on the battlefield or in draped coffins. “They
were afraid of turning this into another Vietnam,” Larry Makinson, a senior fellow at
the Center for Public Integrity said. “They know what it’s like to see casualty figures
day after day. The reliance on civilian contractors in Iraq is really a different variation
on the same theme that led the Pentagon to ban taking photographs o f flag-draped
coffins” (Ivanovich 2004).
This reluctance to commit U.S. troops to overseas conflicts has been termed
by Robertson (2000: 200), the “Mogadishu factor,” wherein risk o f public outcry
weighs heavily in the decision-making to use private resources to achieve foreign
policy goals. When we consider that private contractor casualties are not reported or
talked by the Pentagon, it is logical that the use of PMC’s can indeed keep the number
of “official” casualties down while maintaining the necessary forces.
In essence, PMC’s provided the Administration with a means to carry on an
open-ended war on terrorism, operate in a multi-theatre o f operations, lower the
numbers of official military personnel, and to have an additional source of labor
beyond the scope o f regulation and/or scrutiny. Moreover, it allowed the
Administration to utilize PMC’s to work alongside CIA and within SAP Special
Forces to move unhindered across borders and without a declared operation. As one
senior CIA official confirms, these SAP operations provided the Administration a
shelter wherein if exposed, “would eviscerate the moral standing of the U.S. and
expose American soldiers to retaliation” (Hersh 2004a: 47).
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By using privatized security forces, an atmosphere o f ambiguity was created
and legal culpability was reduced, allowing the Administration to utilize various
mihtary practices and techniques under the radar screen. As reported in the Financial
Times UK on May 22, 2004, high ranking officials believed the Pentagon used PMC’s
to interrogate prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq to obscure its aggressive practices
from congressional oversight. A civilian lawyer, recalling a meeting with JAG lawyers
stated that high ranking officials in JAG, “believed that there was a conscious effort to
create an atmosphere of ambiguity, o f having people involved who couldn’t be held to
account” (Chaffin 2004: 1).
The implication of employees from CACI International in the Abu Ghraib
prisoner-abuse scandal highlights many of the aforementioned negative characteristics
of outsourcing intelligence functions as well as state-corporate complicity. The type
of “blanket purchase agreement” under which CACI provided these services is
advocated by federal agencies in terms of efficiency but often mask the services that
are being supplied. Additionally, the intersection of public-private or state-corporate
agendas has increased the mutual reinforcement of potential illegal practices,
particularly in circumstances of lax scrutiny and oversight, such as Abu Ghraib.
The agreement between the U.S. and Cuba provided the opportunity for the
U.S. to make other strategic decisions that had a direct impact on the cases of torture
and abuse that occurred throughout the war on terrorism including Abu Ghraib. The
U.S. presence in Cuba was established in 1898, when it obtained control following the
invasion o f Guantanamo Bay. The U.S. obtained a permanent lease on February 23,
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1903. The Treaty was incorporated into the Platt Amendment in the Cuban
Constitution. The Treaty stated that the United States, for the purposes of operating
naval stations, had complete jurisdiction and control o f Guantanamo Bay though
Cuba retained ultimate sovereignty (Wilkopedia 2005). The Treaty was reaffirmed in
1934. Consequently, the use of U.S. leased land at Guantanamo provided a realm
wherein accountability o f U.S. actions would be murky at best, internationally and
domestically. Recall from Chapter V, that once the war on terrorism had begun and
over 3,000 Afghanis were being detained, a decision o f what to do with them needed
to be made. As noted above, Guantanamo had been strategically chosen. It provided
the Administration with a place out o f arms reach o f international law or scrutiny.
Moreover, it provided a place wherein the focus on actionable intelligence could be
achieved with gloves off and out o f sight and mind of the general public. The strategic
decision to use Guantanamo as the detention center for alleged Taliban or Al-Qaeda
members provided the Administration with the opportunity to manipulate domestic
and international laws to create a category o f detainees that it deemed as enemy
combatants, thus denying them the basic rights afforded by the Geneva Conventions
concerning methods o f interrogation and treatment.
Closely related to the opportunities provided by the U.S. and Cuba’s
agreement is the current complimentary legal system that operates at the international
level. This provides a realm wherein states have an option to be or not to be held
accountable legally for their actions vis-a-vis multi-lateral treaties (such as the ICC),
thus negating certain components of controls and creating opportunities for
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illegitimate means to be used. Simply stated, the opportunity is then present for state
behaviors without the potential for blocks or controls. Consequently, the existing
complimentary legal system reinforced the strategic decision o f the Administration to
choose Guantanamo as a detention camp. The legal structure and the complimentary
component will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter VII. Yet, it is necessary to
note that as it is structured it does provide a realm of opportunity that may not have
been present under different circumstances such as a universal system o f international
social control.
Another factor that provided the opportunity to torture detainees was the
attack of September 11, 2001. This event provided the Bush Administration with the
perfect opportunity to fulfill the long-planned neo-con agenda. As Bush stated in
reference to the attacks, it was “an opportunity to strengthen America.” This included
carrying out foreign policy agendas in the name o f a global war on terrorism.
Moreover, it provided an immediate environment o f fear. In general, the U.S.
population was in a state of shock, denial, and fear. This fear provided an opportunity
for the Administration to implement its agenda. As stated by Nazi Reich- Marshal
Herman Goering at the Nuremberg War Trials:
The people can always be brought to the bidding o f the leaders. That is easy.
All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the
peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It
works the same in any country.
International support for the U.S. “war on terrorism” immediately after
September 11, 2001 was also striking. NATO’s unanimous and unprecedented
decision to invoke Article V of its Charter, which calls an attack against any one

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

186

NATO member an attack against them all, illustrated the overall support of the
international arena. It is important to note that international support for the
Administration’s foreign policies was significantly higher immediately after the attacks
on U.S. soil than just weeks before. Before September 11, 2001 an opinion poll
conducted by the Pew Research Center, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the
International Herald Tribune showed that Europeans held very low negative opinions
of the Administration. The poll showed the greatest concern was that the U.S. was
pursuing its own interests without the interests of the international arena in general
being considered. This perception was, in part, the result o f Bush’s resistance to
International Treaties including the Rome Statute, the Kyote Treaty, and its plans to
terminate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) (see Rothe and Mullins 2006).
Nevertheless, after September 11th, “for a moment, the terrible events seemed to
change everything, including the perception of Americans by Europeans” (Heinrich
Bull Foundation 2003: 26). As stated on Le Monde’s title page on September 12,
2001, “We are all Americans.”
At this point, Europeans hoped that U.S. policy was changing from the
previous year’s unilateralist stance to one that reflected an internationalist or
multilateralist position. In part, this was due to the Administration’s decision to pay
its long overdue UN dues and asking its allies to invoke Article 5 o f the NATO
Treaty immediately after the terrorist attacks. While international support for the
Afghanistan war quickly waned as reports of abuses started to surface, G. W. Bush
threatened the “Axis of Evil,” and with preparations to attack Iraq, the original
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opportunity to move forward with the Administration’s agenda for the Middle East
was undeniable.
Likewise, September 11th provided a broader cultural climate o f fear and
shock.
Along with the high levels o f fear and shock, patriotism and support of the
government escalated. This was reflected in the support and approval ratings of
President G. W. Bush that reached an all time high since his appointment to the White
House. In the Congress, support o f the Administration suppressed partisan politics
and on September 13, the Senate and House o f Representatives voted to approve the
administration’s “Authorization for Use o f Military Force.” The bill gave President
Bush a virtually unlimited mandate:
To use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harboured
such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States. (White House, 2003)
Congress further abrogated its Constitutional duty in October 2002 when it
provided Bush with an opportunity to assume war powers. Simply stated, the War
Resolution passed on October 10, 2002 did not keep the fundamental right to declare
war in the hands of Congress. According to the U.S. Constitution, there must be a
congressional declaration of war (see Article 1, Section 8). As legal analyst Louis
Fisher (2004: x) has written, “Did Congress actually decide to go to war? Not really.
Members of Congress transferred that choice to Bush. They decided that he should
decide.” The resolution did not declare war against any nation but stated that the
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president “has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and
prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States . .

Additionally, the

authorization specifically provided Bush with the right to defend-not to declare a war.
The resolution by Congress did not grant Bush authority to declare war; the
resolution merely provided the president the facade o f legitimacy, wherein an
opportunity for the use of illegal means was created.
(a) AUTHORIZATION—The President is authorized to use the Armed
Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate
in order to—
1. defend the national security of the United States against the
continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
2. enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq.
The disproportionate reactions by politicians overpowered any scrutiny of the
“legalities” of a global war on terrorism, thus enhancing the opportunity.
The use of fear also facilitated the catalyst o f opportunity. With fear as the
fundamental emotion o f the public, little outcry occurred over the legal manipulations
carried out by the Administration. As the political schema enlarged to include a geo
political agenda o f imperialism, the level of public consensus and support was even
more relevant. Thus, the use of fear was used. As stated in a press release by Ari
Fleisher (September 18, 2001), Press Secretary to Bush, “The A1 Qaeda organization
is present in, as you've heard from the President, more than 60 countries, and its links
are— its links are amorphous.” The threat was repeated and promoted with the
Homeland Security System providing citizens with levels o f danger such as orange,
yellow, and red. The Administration continued to remind citizens o f the lingering and
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ominous threat posed to the state and to its culture as a whole (Rothe and Mullins
2005).
Great tragedy has come to us, and we are meeting it with the best that is in
our country, with courage and concern for others. Because this is America.
This is who we are. This is what our enemies hate and have attacked. And this
is why we will prevail. (President Bush, September 15, 2001)
When the Administration began its campaign for public support to invade Iraq
the use of the public’s fear continued to be used. As Bush stated, “We are in imminent
danger” and pre-emptive measures are now necessary (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004).
For months after September 11, 2001, the press was consumed with coverage
of the September 11th. Every hosted TV show, newspaper editorials, syndicate
columns, panel o f pundits, and news stories dwelled on the terrorist attacks (Parenti,
2002). For one year and fifty days6, a total o f 17,744 stories ran in the New York
Times regarding terror, 10,761 in the Washington Post, and 5,200 in the USA Today
(Rothe and Muzzatti 2004).The U.S. public were presented with a barrage of
newspaper headlines that escalated the shock o f the attacks and general fear that
existed. Everywhere citizens turned a reminder of the terrorists and their potential
threats could be found. Repeated reminders of the fear that people in the U.S. should
be experiencing echoed through the terrorvision. CNN journalists broadcasting from

6 The fifty days was added to encompass the coverage o f the one-year
anniversary o f 9/11 and the following days.
The three newspapers used in the content analysis were searched via the
computer database LexisNexis.
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live from Kosovo remarked, “I probably feel safer here than you do back home in the
states” (CNN News 2001, in Rothe and Muzzatti 2004).
What Der Derian referred to as “media spasms o f a seismic scale” and “hyper
production” was clearly evidenced by the abundance of books written about terrorism
in response to the event. Similarly, following a brief respite from its standard fare of
exploding buildings and vehicles, Hollywood aired weekly drama shows with themes
of terrorism and terrorists, always depicting the evil and horrors of the folk devil (The
Shield, Third Watch, 24, and Law and Order). Conversely, movie reviewers wrote
that this or that film was a welcome antidote to the events o f September 11, 2001
(Parenti, 2002). This rigorous adherence to coverage o f the events and/or the
production o f shows playing on terrorism maintained the level o f fear and provided
the opportunity for the neo-con agenda to be enacted (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004).
While the media propagated fear, it was also heavily censored by the

g

Administration. According to the propaganda model, the media is dependent on
government as an information source leading to political considerations and
overlapping interests as the media is also embedded in the market system.
Additionally, media are also constrained by the dominant ideology, which prevents the
media from criticizing political actions domestically or internationally. This was even
more of an issue after September 11th. The media were not only limited by the

o

Admittedly, the U.S. media participates in self-censorship for political and
economic reasons. For more information on this see Chomsky and Herman’s
Propaganda Model.
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political reigns, but high level executives, fearing State reprisals (i.e., being “cut out
of the loop”) ordered correspondents to remind viewers that the Taliban were evil and
harbored terrorists that killed thousands of Americans whenever they broadcast
reports or footage o f civilian deaths, hunger, or devastation in Afghanistan as a result
of the U.S. war on terrorism (CNN Chair, Walter Isaacson, quoted in Parenti, 2002:
51). Additionally when letters to the editor or viewpoint columns that contained any
criticisms o f the Administrations’ policies were submitted to media outlets they were
rejected. This occurred at home as well as abroad with embedded journalists.
In April 2003, The International Federation of Journalists expressed concern
over the growing number of foreign reporters being harassed and censored by U.S.
forces in Iraq. “There is a growing sense that military frustration over continuing
hostility in Iraq is leading to acts of intolerance against journalists and media,” (Aidan
White 2003: 1). The Pentagon had become increasingly weary o f any unfiltered media
exposure, which would lead to public awareness (especially international awareness)
of civilian casualties or the degree of resistance in the war. Moreover, as was noted in
Chapter IV, the media are often subservient to requests by the Administration to sit
on stories and/or to not cover them at all as was the case with the Abu Ghraib
photographs. Indeed, censorship of the media provided further opportunity for the
Administration to operate under a veil o f secrecy. This allowed the Administration to
conceal its motives, operations, and illegalities. Moreover, in an environment of fear,
shock, and escalated levels of patriotism the state has the opportunity to make
strategic choices that may well not be afforded to it under different conditions. This
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includes creating other opportunities to attain goals that may not have been realized
without these changed circumstances.

Specific Opportunities

Perhaps the most significant factor o f opportunity is the state’s ability to
define violence; including torture and abuse. After all, the contradictions of labeling
violence do not stem from the nature o f violence itself, but are a product of the social
machinery o f structural legitimation. The publicly advanced perceptions (and legal
definitions) o f a violent act are dichotomized into legitimate/legal violence and non
legitimate/illegal violence. Legitimizing or de-legitimizing violence is an ongoing
dynamic process dependent upon the social location o f the perpetrators of violence
vis-a-vis power structures within society (Rothe and Mullins 2006). The partitioning
of these definitions (real and/or perceived) is most problematic at the state level. As
the theoretical models o f the state have illustrated, the position of power the state
holds not only determines the legislative, judicial, and conceptual framework for
controls o f violence, it holds the ability to alter the context and perceptions of
violence deemed in its interests. Moreover, the state is empowered to define what
constitutes a crime and to determine what responses should flow from that
classification. In this case, the illegal call to war or redefining the rules of war
illustrates the state’s ability to alter the context and perceptions of an act as legal or
justifiable (Rothe and Mullins 2006).
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For over a decade, the U.S. had used a “loose definition o f torture” that was
out of line with most o f the rest o f the international arena. Additionally, “officials in
Congress and the executive branch have winked and nodded at practices” such as
SAP’s and OGA’s utilizing torture and or sending prisoners to states “that will do our
dirty work for us” (Levinson 2004: 20). With the placement of the neocons in office
and Rumsfeld leading the way, the definitions of torture and rules of war were further
manipulated and misused.
Recall that on January 19, 2002, nearly a month before President Bush’s
Executive Order, the U.S. Department of Justice under Attorney General John
Ashcroft proposed that the Geneva Convention III on the Treatment o f Prisoners of
War “does not apply to the conflict with A1 Qaeda . . . (or) with the Taliban”
(Gonzales, Memo 7, 2002: 1). Based on this, Donald Rumsfeld sent a memo declaring
“Army regulations on the interrogation of prisoners would not be observed” leading
to many detainees being held incommunicado and without an independent review
mechanism (Internal Memo 5). In essence, Yoo and Haynes claimed the U.S. could
utilize whatever means necessary and ignore international or domestic law in “times of
war.”
The following week several other memos circulated between the DOJ, DOD,
and Counsel to the White House claiming “the new situation renders obsolete the
Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning o f enemy combatants” (Gonzales 2002). On
February 7th, Bush officially opened the door to extensive illegitimate means to carry
on interrogations “to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists” when he
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stated the Geneva Conventions were not applicable to the Taliban or Al-Qaeda
(Gonzales 2002).
The DOD discussed extending the Executive Order by creating several
inconsistent pre-interrogation and interrogation techniques designed to soften up
detainees (Jehl, Myers, and Schmitt, 2004). Recall that in a February 26, 2002 memo,
it was noted that in the war on terrorism, intelligence was everything . . . winning or
losing depended on it. Yet, little to no valuable information was coming out of
Guantanamo. Memos continued between agencies such as the CIA to Bush’s Legal
Counsel, the DOD and the DOJ. These memos not only discussed expanding the
interrogation techniques, but also discussed how laws and precedence could be
reinterpreted to allow the state to use such methods without the worry o f legal
blameworthiness. As Weisberg (2004: 301) states, “the rationalizers o f torture
micromanaged it by bringing our exquisitely refined lawyer-like skills to justify some
part of it.” The end result of these memos was that the opportunity to commit torture
was created via the access to illegitimate means by the state utilizing its resources to
define violence. Torture, according to the Administration, was now almost impossible
to commit, again providing the opportunity to obtain its goals through the creation of
illegitimate means. Moreover, even when Rumsfeld rescinded his fist o f approved
techniques six weeks later, torture had already become an omnipresent and systematic
practice. Additionally, since the memos were classified, the Administration had a level
of concealment that it could operate under.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

195

These decisions created an opportunity (and motivation) for the systematic
maltreatment o f prisoners from the Afghan war held both in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo (Danner 2004a; Ratner and Ray 2004). The state (in this case the DOJ
and the Office o f the Legal Counsel) was in a position to “reinterpret” the rules of
war, treatment and classification o f detainees, and the definition o f torture previously
provided by U.S. Criminal Statute and international precedent (Harbury 2005).
Simply stated, the Administration was able to create and then take advantage of illegal
means to achieve their goals; actionable intelligence, the capture o f Bin Laden, a
quick exit out o f Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq.
The strategies used in Afghanistan and Guantanamo were then subsequently
applied to prisoners in Iraq, often by members of the same units that had abused
prisoners in Cuba and Afghanistan (Jehl and Schmitt 2004b; Taguba 2004; Kramer
and Michalowski 2005). In essence, there was an organizational isomorphic affect
where policy transcended the political boundaries of Guantanamo and Afghanistan
into Iraq. Simply stated, organizational isomorphism is a process where a specific
practice is diffused through knowledge and/or contact via a network linking
individuals and roles.
One key factor that aided the diffusion of these organizational practices was
the knowledge and practice of these torture techniques by other state agencies (e.g.,
the CIA and SAP Forces).The CIA has spent over fifty years trying to master
effective torture methods. These tactics are known as “no touch torture” and included
sensory deprivation, forcing subjects to assume stress-induced positions for long
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periods of time, and sexual humiliation. “Looking at the pictures from Abu Ghraib, it
is not hard to recognize CIA research transformed into practice” (Davidson 2005).
This not only means Abu Ghraib is not an anomaly, but is in part a product of
organizational diffusion. The CIA and the military have not only employed various
torture techniques throughout the last half o f the twentieth century, but they also have
instructed others how to do the same (e.g., Ferdinand Marcos o f the Philippines, the
Shah of Iran, right wing dictators of Guatemala, Nicaragua and the Contras,
Argentina, Chile, etc.). One of the training agencies was the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s Public Safety Program. In 1963 the CIA “developed a
how-to guide to torture known as the Kubark Counterintelligence Interrogation
manual” (Davidson 2005: 1). It was initially to be used on captured Soviet operatives
but by 1967 the Agency was running forty interrogation camps in Vietnam as part of
its Phoenix Program (Harbury 2005). Thousands o f Vietnamese were tortured in
these centers using techniques the CIA had developed.
Along the same lines as the KUBARK manual there was the Human Resource
Exploitation Manual o f 1983, which was used extensively in Latin America during the
Reagan Era. These techniques, along with those being “perfected” by the CIA have
been a part of the training at the School o f Americas (SOA). The SOA also serves as
a recruitment center for the CIA (Harbury 2005). There is also a program at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, known as SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape)
that was intended to be used to train U.S. soldiers to resist abuses they potentially
may face in enemy custody (Bloche and Marks 2005). During a June 2004 briefing,
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General James T. Hill reported that a team from Guantanamo went to SERE and
developed a list o f techniques to be used on high value detainees. He reported that he
had sent this list to Rumsfeld who approved most of the tactics in December 2002
(recall that this was the list that was rescinded 6 weeks later by Rumsfeld).
Furthermore, SERE trained psychologists and psychiatrists sent to Guantanamo
applied the techniques to detainees (along with M i’s).
The process of institutional isomorphism or diffusion can thus be traced back
to clandestine practices o f the CIA, instructional agencies such as the SOA and
SERE, but also to the process of contact and network. This can be direct, as was the
case with General Hill and his team or indirect. Direct diflusion can be linked with the
CIA’s clandestine operations and interrogations in Abu Ghraib as well as SAP forces
that had knowledge of such techniques. The indirect diflusion comes from the role of
the CIA and SAP’s within the walls of Abu Ghraib where these techniques were being
used and occasionally witnessed. A notable example is the murder o f Iraqi Abed
Hamad Mowhoush by CIA forces. Mowhoush was forced into a sleeping bag,
restrained with a cord, and “roughed up,” a technique called the “sleeping bag
technique” directly out o f CIA manuals. He died of asphyxiation and blunt trauma.
There was also the iconic image of the hooded man with arms and feet spread while
attached to alleged electric wires, known as the Vietnam. Clearly the low-ranking
soldiers did not create this technique or name it. Instead, it is a clear indication of
organizational isomorphism (an indirect linkage to past institutional practices by the
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CIA and SAP’s). Thus, it can be concluded that opportunity for torture was created
by the process of diffusion and institutional isomorphism.
The issue o f centralization of power and role specialization was also a factor
that facilitated the abuses and torture. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had a long
standing desire to wrest control of U.S. clandestine and paramilitary operations from
the C.I.A (Hersh 2004a). Rumsfeld wanted control over and an expansion of highly
secret operations, which originally were focused on the hunt for A1 Qaeda, and then
moved into operations which included the interrogation o f prisoners in Iraq. The
Pentagon’s operation, known by several code words, including Copper Green,
included hand-selected individuals from Delta Force, SEALS, and some CIA. This
provided additional opportunities to use torture and for it to become systematically
incorporated into the larger organizational culture. These forces encouraged physical
coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners “in an effort to generate more
intelligence about the growing insurgency in Iraq” (Hersh 2004a). Moreover, this
program was under the sole authority o f Rumsfeld and his Undersecretary of Defense
Cambone. The office Cambone holds, the Undersecretary for Intelligence is the new
office voted by Congress at Rumsfeld’s request in response to his struggle with the
CIA and the other intelligence agencies. As Hersh (2004a: 1) notes, “Certainly he
wants to take over the covert warfare, the idea of being able to operate overseas. I
think one thing he did with his special activity he did, was sort o f bureaucratically ace
out CIA.”
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Furthermore, once the war on Iraq was said to be over, and the UN officially
labeled the U.S. and Britain as occupiers, National Security Directive 24 was signed
by President Bush. The Directive gave the Pentagon overall control over aspects of
Post war Iraq. Thus, the early tug o f war between the DOD and the State Department
was over and the Pentagon won. Power was now centralized within the DOD with
regard to decision making in Iraq including Abu Ghraib.
There was also the issue o f a chain o f command that was counterproductive to
smooth operations within Abu Ghraib. While there was indeed a formal chain of
command, there was also an informal chain. Recall that Stephen Cambone,
Undersecretary of Defense, was answering directly to Rumsfeld and was an active
player in placing Rumsfeld’s clandestine operations into the Iraqi theater, more
specifically Abu Ghraib. It was Cambone who eventually authorized SAP control over
both the MI and MP’s in Abu Ghraib. In doing so there was also an agreement
between Sanchez and the CIA and SAP forces for hiding ghost detainees in Tier 1 of
Abu Ghraib. The turnover of power at Abu Ghraib, first to M i’s and then SAP’s was
counter to military practices. The later agreement by Sanchez to allow ghost detainees
to be hidden within the confines of Abu Ghraib further provided illegitimate means as
well as access for illegal interrogations. Recall also that through the centralization o f
power in the Pentagon, as Rumsfeld successfully gained control over clandestine
operations, the use o f these programs and the presence o f ghost detainees was carried
out with even less transparency. As the ICRC report noted, the fact that ghost
detainees were being held unaccounted for or registered through proper channels was
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a clear violation of international law and further exemplified the dysfunctional
environment within Abu Ghraib.
Additional organizational factors contributed to an environment wherein
torture and abuses became part o f the standard operating procedures in Abu Ghraib.
Not only were the MP’s roles conflicted with multiple tasks such as overseeing
prisoners in Iraq, reconstruction efforts, and battle zone security, they were also being
“assigned” to tasks o f pre-interrogation. Recall that in September 2003, Major
General Geoffrey Miller, the commander at Guantanamo Bay (where abuse and
torture was already routinized) was sent to Iraq to assess detention centers and
subsequently shared his techniques with interrogators. His job was to “Gitmoize” the
process. This included the recommendation that MP’s be used to soften up and
prepare detainees for MI interrogators. What did this mean in practice? As one former
military intelligence officer, familiar with Miller’s directives, put it, “it means treat the
detainees like shit until they will sell their mother for a blanket, some food without
bugs in it and some sleep.” Shortly after his visit, civilian contractors began to show
up to aid in the interrogation process.
That same month, General Sanchez authorized expanded interrogation
techniques. These were a result of Miller’s visit and a CD that was left behind with
Rumsfeld’s previously approved and rescinded expanded techniques. These quickly
became standard U.S. practice and, according to a Human Rights Watch report
prisoners started dying during interrogation sessions almost immediately thereafter.
As these practices became part of the organizational SOP, a sense o f normalization

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

201
also occurred wherein it became routine to see naked Iraqi detainees or to hear their
screams as SAP, CIA, or civilian contractors carried out interrogations.
By mid-November the complete takeover of MP supervision by MI had
occurred. The “frago” order stated that the 205th MI Brigade under Pappas would
have tactical control over Abu Ghraib. By this time, the presence o f civilian
contractors was omnipresent as were SAP forces. The chain o f command was murky
at best. Karpinski overtly stated this in an interview with Frontline (2005), “I did not
know who was there or what role they were playing with all the civilian attire walking
around.”
Not only was Abu Ghraib functioning with a murky chain o f command and
dysfunctional SOP, there was also a general lack of resources and staff. For example,
during October 2003 there were 7,000 prisoners in Abu Ghraib and only 92 MP’s to
keep control. When the 372 MP Company arrived at Abu Ghraib, they were but a
fraction o f their supposed Company total. Their roles had already been significantly
altered from prison guards to support for MI personnel and moved right into Tier 1
where CIA, SAP, and MI held high value detainees. In essence there was a general
lack of role and task segregation that had devastating effects. It created opportunities
for M P’s to carry out torture and abuses that would not have existed without this
intermingling of duties and lack of clearly defined roles. Moreover, the
institutionalization o f instrumental rationality (any means necessary to attain
intelligence) that emanated from the highest levels down to the M P’s played a role in
an already anomic environment. Coupled with inconsistent doctrines on interrogation

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

202
techniques this had a direct impact on the organizational culture that dominated the
walls of Abu Ghraib.
There was also a clear subculture o f resistance present within the military in
general and specifically within the walls o f Abu Ghraib. Recall that the ICRC, after
observing abuses during their October 2003 visit, complained in writing to military
officials on November 6, 2003. Not only did Senior Officers take lightly the alleged
abuses, but reacted by curtailing the ICRC from future spot inspections of the prison,
thus reinforcing a culture where outside regulation was not seen as viable. This was
also reinforced by the significant use o f Abu Ghraib as a base for SAP forces and the
CIA. Neither of these organizations or clandestine forces was subject to outside
regulation of their techniques or mission.
The perception of illegal means being available to MP’s and M i’s can also be
traced back to the White House. As the Administration always called the Iraqi
detainees terrorists, confusion over how to treat them occurred. This coupled with the
propaganda that terrorists “do not abide by the Conventions of War thus, are not
entitled to them” further aided the perception that legal obligations did not pertain to
them. As stated by Frontline (2005), “The Conventions were seen as malleable . . .
moreover they were seen as a joke.”
Techniques of rationalization were also used by individuals from the White
House to Abu Ghraib. Memos by Legal Counsel, DOJ, and DOD offer a variety of
rationalizations by the Administrations lawyers to soften the taboo against torture.
Other techniques of rationalization can be found in the torture memos. These
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justifications were used in an effort to defend initial decisions and objectives, namely
the avoidance of international law and the expansion o f what “could be” viewed as
techniques o f torture used in interrogations (Greenberg and Dratel 2005).
Another issue that was at play in the use of torture at Abu Ghraib was group
think. Groupthink is a concept originally identified by Irving Janis (1972) that refers to
faulty decision-making in a group. Groupthink may potentially occur under conditions
where groups are highly cohesive, in a closed or isolated environment, or under
considerable pressure to make a moral, ethical, or quality decision. Some features of
groupthink include not being critical of each other’s actions, a strong desire for
unanimity, and not examining alternatives or seeking an expert opinion. The
rationalizing of poor decisions, the unquestioning belief in the group’s collective
morality and shared stereotypes that affect decisions are other attributes of
groupthink. Groupthink was present within Abu Ghraib. For example, Private
England stated in her testimony, “I had a choice, but I chose to do what my friends
wanted me to” (Washington Post 2005a). Another example, can be found in a
statement given by Sgt. Davis during the Taguba investigations, “I assumed that if
they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines someone would
have said something” (see Taguba Report 2004).
All actors engage in a social process of defining the situation they find
themselves in. This process can be examined as it operated in Abu Ghraib in relation
to the detainees. In this case, as with all conflicts and war, U.S. forces found
themselves facing off and fighting what they perceived was their enemy. The process
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of dehumanization o f enemies is a common practice during all wars, and as such was
present in the war on terrorism. This facilitated the ability of individuals to commit
torture and abuse. From the onset, George W. Bush declared that the United States
was not involved in a war against political enemies, but a war against “evil,” a
rhetorical move that placed anyone identified as an enemy in the war against terror in
the category o f less-than-human. The fact that Pfc. England could describe the abuse
of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib as “amusing” rather than torture (Zemike, 2004b) is
testimony, not to the depravity of a single soldier, but to the existence o f a frame of
mind that identifies enemies in the “war on terror” as evil ones, thus forfeiting their
humanity. Consequently, as less than human they need not be treated humanely.
Moreover, labeled as PUC’s and Go Hum, the dehumanized enemy was not even
worthy of protections against abuse and torture. This was reinforced with the
Administration’s classification of enemy combatant and the constant referrals to all
detainees as terrorists.

Summary

This section analyzed both general and specific opportunities for goal
attainment. General opportunities exist as a result of factors that are either already
present or come about by happenstance. This included the global transnational and
privatization movement that had been occurring for over two decades, existing
interstate relations such as the one between Cuba and the U.S., and an existing
complimentary system of international law. Then there were opportunities provided
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by happenstance such as the September 11th attacks that generated broader
international and domestic support for the U.S. and a general climate of fear and
patriotism. Specific opportunities were also created that provided additional means to
attain goals. These included the state’s ability to define violence, the restructuring of
military roles, an anomic organizational environment, and psychological factors.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored two of the four catalysts o f the integrated
theoretical model: motivation and opportunity. More specifically I have attempted to
illustrate how these catalysts each contain multiple variables at work in a given case
of state crime, in this instance, the systematic use of torture and abuse. I have
suggested that at the international level, economic interests (e.g., OPEC to the Euro
and the use o f PMC’s), international relations (e.g., Cuba, political support,
complimentary legal system), and the international foci and practices (e.g., renewed
interest in terrorism and the practice o f covert military activities) had an impact on the
subsequent use of torture.
At the structural-cultural level several other variables were at play. For
example, imperial design (e.g., neocon agenda), September 11, 2001, the state’s
ability to define violence deemed in its interest as legitimate, goal attainment (e.g.,
quick regime change in Iraq and actionable intelligence) and the media, all had a role
to varying degrees with the use of torture. At the organizational level, goal attainment
(actionable intelligence), the strategic choice of Abu Ghraib, an anomic and resistant
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culture, and the effects o f isomorphism between institutions were also variables at
work. At the interactional level, ideology (e.g., the process of dehumanization of the
enemy and claim to virtue), rationalization, power, goal attainment, entertainment and
competition played a function in the institutionalization o f torture and abuse within
the walls o f Abu Ghraib.
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CHAPTER VII
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS II
The previous chapter examined the catalysts of motivation and opportunity
concerning the torture at Abu Ghraib. This chapter analyzes the catalysts of
constraints and controls that were in play in this case.

Constraints and Controls

The theoretical model outlined in Chapter II suggests that
phenomenologically, a constraint differs from a control. A constraint is an inhibitor or
barrier that occurs at the onset or during an illegal action. This constraint can act as a
complete blockage to the act, or it can act as a restraint, thereby causing the actor(s)
to find alternative means to goal attainment. These constraints are present at all four
levels of analysis (see Appendix B) and, though often intermingled or having a
dialectic nature, they nonetheless represent different restraints at each level. Controls,
on the other hand, are operationalized as a complete blockage to an act or a criminal
sanction that is ideally inevitable after the fact. This means that conceived criminal
action will not occur, and if it does, there should be legal repercussions. Controls also
exist at all four levels of analysis, though certain levels may contain more controls
than others or have a stronger impact.
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International Level Constraints

One of the most significant constraints at the international level is negative
international reaction to a state’s behavior. This was indeed the case concerning the
use of the loosely defined term enemy combatant, the creation o f detention camps at
Guantanamo, the war on Iraq and the subsequent cases of abuse and torture at Abu
Ghraib. From the outset the Administration’s decision to use the term enemy
combatant created a public and political international outcry. This negative reaction
strengthened as the Administration began discussing and planning the invasion and
occupation of Iraq. There was resistance to these plans by political leaders, NGO’s,
and many in the public. The general international support for the U.S. following the
September 11, 2001 attacks plummeted after President Bush gave his 2002 State of
the Union Address in which he referred to the “axis o f evil.” This comment acted as a
red flag that the unilateral tendencies o f the Administration were resurfacing, thus
estranging the vast majority of Europeans, both political leaders and the general
citizenry (Heinrich Bull Foundation 2003).
The general trend of lack of trust in the Bush Administration was reflected in a
March 2003 Heinrich Bull Foundation opinion poll that showed that Bush was viewed
as more of a security threat than terrorism. Once the war on Iraq was being marketed
negative attitudes increased. Beginning in September 2002, NGO’s and international
peace groups mobilized against the U.S./U.K. plan for the invasion and occupation of
Iraq, forming the largest anti-war movement in history (Amnesty International 2005).
A global antiwar protest involving over 10 million people took place on February 15,
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2003 in an effort to constrain the Bush Administration’s unilateral war on Iraq. These
protests were “the single largest public demonstration in history” (Jensen 2004: xvii).
Antiwar protests continued after the invasion. The Associated Press (March 19, 2005)
reported that “tens o f thousands” of activists turned out across Europe to protest and
mark the Iraq war’s second anniversary, with London drawing the largest crowd of
between 45,000 and 100,000. Furthermore, once the Abu Ghraib abuses and torture
became public in late April 2004, widespread negative international reactions
occurred again. In June 2004, a visit to Turkey by President Bush was preceded by a
series of protests and bomb blasts. In Istanbul and Ankara tens o f thousands of
Turkish and international protesters demonstrated against the Iraq war.
As large as it was, the antiwar movement ultimately failed to prevent the
invasion or end the occupation in the short term. In part, it failed because it did not
make the war politically costly enough for the U.S. The neocons believed the benefit
o f regime change, expansion of military bases, and additional control and power in the
Middle East would outweigh any temporary political consequences. Additionally, the
Administration, Rumsfeld in particular, believed these goals could be achieved in a
relatively short period o f time, undercutting the antiwar movement. Administration
officials believed that the war on Iraq would ultimately be justified as illegal but
legitimate similarly to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.
Due to the political pressures placed on the Bush Administration, the
immediate invasion of Iraq was suspended for several months. For example, in
response to these pressures the Administration made a half-hearted attempt to receive
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UN support for the use o f military force. President Bush addressed the UN on
September 12, 2002 and asked for multilateral action against Iraq. Later, a U.S.
sponsored war-sanctioning resolution failed to gain support in the UN Security
Council in March 2003. The war on Iraq faced strong political opposition from
France, Germany, Russia, and China, as well as the great majority o f UN member
states. Mr. de Villepin of France, acting Chairman of the UN Security Council, stated,
“We will not associate ourselves with military intervention that is not supported by
the international community. . . . Military intervention would be the worst possible
solution” (Peel, Graham, Harding, and Dempsey 2003: 1). The Administration’s
attempt to overcome the stiff opposition on the Security Council used “both carrot
and stick, by reconsidering economic and military assistance deals as well as prospects
for oil and trade in post-war” (Global Policy Forum 2005: 1). Nonetheless, the
Security Council did not authorize military force against Iraq. Political reactions did
indeed act as a temporary restraint. Ultimately, however, the opposition did not
control the Administration’s agenda to go to war on Iraq.
Once the invasion of Iraq had begun, the opposition grew stronger in an
attempt to have the U.S. and Britain end its occupation. For example, President
Vladimir Putin, in some o f the harshest words by a world leader said the war was
“unjustified and must end quickly” (Reuters, March 20, 2003: 1). Meanwhile, the
governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and several other Muslim countries filed
formal protests with Washington. Yet, these political pressures did not alter the
Administration’s position to remain in Iraq.
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Non-governmental (Human Rights Watch [HRW], and Amnesty International
[AI]) and inter-governmental organizations (International Committee of the Red
Cross [ICRC] and the United Nations [UN]) continuously attempted to restrain the
Administration from its unilateral and unlawful international positions. As with many
non-profit peace movements, HRW and AI were actively writing letters to the
Administration in an effort to constrain their decision-making with regard to an illegal
invasion o f a sovereign state (HRW 2002-2004; AI 2002, 2004). In June 2003,
Amnesty International called for an independent investigation into allegations of abuse
and torture in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. Other cases o f torture and abuses were
reported by NGO’s in an effort to get the Administration to reconsider its exploitation
of international laws on torture and foreign detentions.
Along with NGO’s, the ICRC, the sole intergovernmental oversight agency
for international humanitarian law, also attempted to act as a restraint. The ICRC
made several reports at different times and at different levels during 2003. The reports
included concerns beyond “only issues of water and food but also clearly of
treatment” (ICRC 2005: 1). The ICRC submitted an additional confidential report on
detention conditions and charges of abuse and torture in Iraq in February 2004 (dated
January 2004), to the Coalition Forces, namely Paul Bremer and Lt. General Sanchez.
The January 2004 report included observations and recommendations from visits
between March and November 2003. The report, published in the Wall Street Journal,
indicated abuse at U.S.-run prisons in Iraq went on for more than a year, though the
Red Cross complained privately to U.S. officials many times. In essence, the ICRC
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repeatedly made its concerns known to Coalition Forces and requested corrective
measures. The pressure extended by the ICRC report did cause some internal
discomforts, as U.S. officials feared that the alleged abuses and torture allegations
would become public knowledge.
On a number o f occasions the ICRC was assured that its findings were being
taken very seriously, and that measures would be taken; in later visits there
were indications that some of the material problems had been addressed;
however, more remained to be done. (ICRC 2004)
Actions by the ICRC would be expected to act as a restraint on future cases.
However, in light of allegations o f abuse and torture that continue to surface, the
ICRC has failed to control or restrain such acts. Actors often find alternative means to
achieve their goals beyond the scope o f these institutions. Such was the case with the
ICRC as their scrutiny led to more secrecy and a subculture o f resistance to outside
regulation. Nonetheless, the ICRC continues to monitor the 8,800 detainees held at
over 33 Iraq detention sites under the authority of the Multi-National Forces for Iraq
(MNFI), the Iraqi transitional government, and the Kurdish Regional Government
(ICRC 2005).
Beyond these organizations, international lawyers also spoke out calling on
the international arena to act together and restrain the Administration from its
unlawful actions (Sands 2005). This included the Citizen’s International Criminal
Tribunal for Afghanistan (ICTA). On March 13, 2004, The People v. George W. Bush
was settled after a two-year investigation. The tribunal found President Bush guilty of
war crimes “resultant to U.S. attacks against Afghanistan in 2001” (ICTA 2004). The
verdict of guilty included charges of war crimes for the torture and killings of
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prisoners o f war, for their detention, and deportation. The direction ordered by the
Presiding Judge Professor Osamu Niikura stated:
The Defendant is a convicted war criminal consequently unfit to hold public
office; citizens, soldiers and all civil personnel of the United States would be
constitutionally and otherwise, justified in withdrawing all co-operation from
the Defendant and his government; and in declining to obey illegal orders of
the Defendant and his administration; including military orders threatening
other nations or the people o f the United States on the basis o f the Nuremberg
Principle, that illegal orders of Superior must not be obeyed.
The ICTA failed to constrain the Administration’s policies o f unilateralism and
disregard for international law. As a non-empowered ad hoc Tribunal, composed of
independent lawyers and citizens, it did not have a large enough impact publicly or
politically to constrain future policies o f the Administration.
International media raised concerns over the U.S. treatment o f detainees. The
Windsor Star of Ontario (2002) and St. John’s Telegram of Newfoundland (2002) ran
a story on December 30, 2002 that stated, “U.S. officials who take part in torture,
authorize it, or even close their eyes to it, can be prosecuted by courts anywhere in
the world.” Additional coverage of the issue occurred in the Ottawa Citizen (May
2003: A17) titled “Fear of terrorism is no excuse to flout laws.” During October of
that same year, reports o f Iraqi detainee abuse and cruel and inhumane treatment at
Abu Ghraib also surfaced. An article by The Gazette, Montreal, (2003: A 18) stated
“Situation doesn’t meet rights standard . . . this is wrong.” Random reports continued
to appear within the international media months before the images were released by
the mainstream U.S. media. In March 2004, the ONASA News Agency (March 9,
2004: A l) ran a 473-word article decrying abuse and torture by U.S. forces and the
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Pakistan Press International Information Services Limited ran a similar story on
March 12, 2004.
However, even with political or public negative reactions, disapproval does
not necessarily change the situation. In the cases o f the invasion o f Iraq and using
torture as a means o f intelligence gathering, public and political reactions failed to
restrain the Administration’s policies. Instead, the negative reactions indirectly
reinforced the Administration’s illegal policies. As political pressure was being placed
on the Administration for its decisions, the need for a quick and successful regime
change and stability in Iraq was imperative. As a latent function, this pressure
reinforced an already hyper-mentality for actionable intelligence, which was a key
factor in the abuses that occurred.
There was also significant international public reaction that occurred when the
images of abuse and torture hit the airwaves. In part, this reaction was in the form of
peaceful political protests. For example, anti-American protests over reports of
torturing prisoners occurred throughout the Muslim world including the Gaza Strip
and West Bank to Indonesia. Protests were also reported in Egypt, Sudan, and
Pakistan. Australian doctors protested to express their “horror at gross dereliction of
the Hippocratic oath by US military doctors, who participated in the torture of Iraqi
prisoners in the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq” (Medical Association for the
Prevention of War, August 21, 2004: 1). These protests had some effect as the
Guardian (2004: 1) noted, “Worldwide revulsion at the scandal has forced the U.S.
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president into a public apology and threatened the position o f the U.S. defense
secretary, Donald Rumsfeld.”
There were also acts o f retribution and rage that took place in an effort to
constrain U.S. behavior. For example, a few days after the images broadcast,
Nicholas Berg was beheaded as retribution for the Abu Ghraib cases (Harbury 2005).
Rage also swept through the Islamic territories reinforcing the view that “the
Americans are an occupation force, not liberators, and we should fight to drive them
out” (Ahmad 2004: A8). Muslim and Islamic leaders also called out the U.S. and
demanded immediate action. The acts of retribution and the political outcry from
Muslim and Islamic leaders failed to constrain the practice of abuse and torture by the
U.S. Instead, the acts o f retribution were used to further justify the U.S. position that
it was dealing with extremists that needed to be controlled by any means necessary.
Additionally, the U.S. has held the public position that terrorist demands or threats
would not be addressed under any conditions. Likewise, the demands o f religious
political leaders did not hold enough economic or political power within the
international arena to constrain the Administration.

State/Cultural Level Constraints

At the state/cultural level, constraints are created by social movement groups
(e.g., Veterans for Common Sense, Moveon.org, and American Civil Liberties
Union), internal investigative reports (e.g., Senate and House Hearings; Taguba
Report), the use of the Freedom of Information Act, and media organizations.
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As Justice Robert Jackson (1946) stated, “The chief restraint upon those who
command the physical forces of the country . . . must be their responsibility to the
political judgments o f their contemporaries and to the moral judgments o f history.” It
is the political, moral, and legal judgments of the public that can serve as a restraint
on government officials and their political decision-making in a representative
democracy. Within the U.S., the public’s unrest could ultimately serve as a tool for
restraining objectionable foreign policies (e.g., the civil disobedience that ultimately
ended the war in Vietnam). Across the country, there were numerous public protests
of both the pre-war buildup and in response to the abuses and torture that occurred.
For example, Peace Action and MoveOn.org, both non-profit antiwar organizations,
staged numerous nationwide protest activities. Activists in dozens o f cities would
announce where and when public protests and demonstrations would occur and then
notified members via the Internet. This was in an effort to constrain the
Administration from going further with its neocon agenda and the invasion of Iraq. In
general, the organized movements failed. For example, public dissent and
organizations such as the Peace Movement and Moveon.org were cast as unpatriotic
and not supporting the troops. Additionally, the movement did not disrupt the general
status quo and pose a large enough political threat to the Bush Administration.
After the abuse and torture cases were brought to the public’s attention, many
of the protesters were indignant that their country was actively engaged in the use of
torture. Some groups, such as the Veterans for Common Sense (VCS), a veterans’
organization with 12,000 members, called for an independent commission to
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investigate the torture allegations. In a letter, signed by over 2,000 veterans, they
urged Congress and the Administration to commit to the creation o f an independent
commission to investigate on the detention and interrogation practices of U.S.
military and intelligence agencies. The U.S. health professional community has spoken
out forcefully to protest the unethical involvement o f physicians and psychiatrists in
the abuses and torture that occurred. The American Psychiatric Association, the
American Psychological Association, and the American College o f Physicians,
together representing more than 300,000 members, each have made public calls to
Congress to investigate the allegations and later joined efforts to support
Congressional legislation against cruel and inhumane treatment (Physicians for Human
Rights, July 15, 2005).
Several internal investigations undertook to examine the cases o f abuse and
torture. These included the Taguba Report (March 2004); the Mikolashek Report
(July 2004); the Schlesinger Report (August 2004); and the Fay-Jones Report
(August 2004). A key problem with these investigations, however, is that public
officials monitored the examination of their own behavior. As such, it should come as
no surprise that the reports promote the politically tolerable view that the abuses and
torture were, in effect, the result o f individual misbehavior and sadism. Granted, these
behaviors were said to occur due to the lack of authority and leadership. Nonetheless,
the acts remain an aberration of a few individuals out of the MP ranks. Visible in the
text o f these reports, especially the Fay-Jones Report, is the “subtle bureaucratic
response” dealing with the opposing interests within the state apparatus itself. Simply
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stated, the reports reflect the political war that erupted between agencies once the
Abu Ghraib images became known. On one side were the actors (including JAG,
DOJ, and the FBI) opposing expanded interrogation techniques and the disregard for
the Geneva Conventions, while on the other side were those in favor o f such
techniques and who tried to keep Abu Ghraib from becoming a political scandal (such
as senior officials in the DOD and the Executive Administration). Thus, the reports,
while recognizing a failure in the chain o f command and the latent effects of
isomorphism of techniques originally intended for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, maintain
that responsibility was in no way that of the Administration. As the Fay-Jones Report
stated, responsibility lay with the individuals in the 800th MP Brigade night shift at
Tier 1 in Abu Ghraib, or as Schlesinger stated “acts o f brutality and sadism” were the
result of a few that resembled “animal house on the night shift.”
Additionally, each investigation was limited to a specialized area. The Taguba
Report (an internal investigation led by Major General Antonio M. Taguba at the
request of General Sanchez) investigated the MPs and alleged cases o f abuse; the
Mikolashek Report investigated the detention procedures themselves; The Schlesinger
Report (appointed by Secretary Rumsfeld and led by former Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger) advised the DOD on the allegations; and the Fay-Jones Report (an
internal army report led by Major General George R. Fay and Lieutenant General
Anthony R. Jones) investigated the role of M i’s. This specialization limited the
investigations to the organizational components and that of individuals within
specialized branches. This ensured that a holistic investigation did not occur, while at
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the same time appeasing the conflicting interests within the Administration. Thus, the
investigations served as an exercise in damage control. They were an attempt to
maintain state legitimacy.
Beyond the internal military investigations, Senate and House Committees
held hearings in an attempt to assess what happened at Abu Ghraib and who was
responsible for torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In all, there
were five Senate Armed Service Committee Hearings, four House Armed Services
Committee Hearings, and three Public House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence Hearings. While some sincere efforts were made to obtain answers, a
number of factors limited the impact o f the hearings to act as a constraint against
future decisions that may enable or lead to torture and abuses. One of these factors
was the unwillingness of the Executive Branch, Pentagon, and CIA to disclose
information. As Senator Clinton (2004) stated during the Congressional investigation
of abuses and torture at Abu Ghraib,
If indeed, General Miller was sent from Guantanamo to Iraq for the purposes
of acquiring more actionable intelligence from detainees then it is fair to
conclude that the actions that are at point here in your report are in some way
connected to General Miller’s arrival and his specific orders, however they
were interpreted, by those MPs and the Mi's that were involved. . . .
Therefore, I for one don’t believe I yet have adequate information from Mr.
Cambone and the DOD as to exactly what General Miller’s orders were . . .
how he carried out those orders, and the connection between his arrival in the
fall of 03 and the intensity of the abuses that occurred afterward, (quoted in
Hersh 2004a: 64)
There was also the fear of political repercussions. For example, originally,
Senate Armed Forces Committee Chairman John Warner took a strong stand against
torture calling for and heading an investigation. Yet, he succumbed to White House
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pressure to postpone Senate hearings on the subject until after the November 2004
election (McGovern1 2005).
Thus, the Congressional Hearings did not produce any form of constraint.
Their efforts did have a limited impact on legislation such as the Congressional
Resolution and the McCain Bill condemning the use o f torture. However, to date,
cases of abuse and torture continue to surface. Additionally, the potential of these
actions to be constraints was further limited by President Bush’s claim that
Congressional Resolutions or Bills cannot constrain his executive power as
Commander in Chief or his decisions during a time o f war.
Furthermore, Congress abdicated its responsibilities of oversight by not
insisting on the disclosure of information that was kept from them in their attempts to
investigate the role o f the Administration in the cases of torture. Similarly,
Congressional Oversight Committees have also failed to insist that the investigation
by Brigadier General Formica into the detention activities of Special Forces (under
the SAP) be released. Instead they have allowed the Pentagon to claim the
investigation was ongoing and therefore, not able to be produced during
Congressional Hearings. Without Congressional pressure on the Pentagon to release
its report on the detention practices o f Special Forces, the investigation by Congress
was significantly reduced and they failed to constrain the Administration’s policies.

1 Ray McGovern served as a captain in the U.S. Army from 1962-64 before
serving 25 years as an analyst in the CIA.
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The Freedom o f Information Act (FOIA) is also a constraint. The FOIA is
based on the principle o f governmental transparency to the people. By its nature as a
mechanism of transparency or openness, it attempts to act as a deterrent to behavior
that is counter to public expectations and/or trust. The FOIA has compelled state
agencies to turn over millions o f documents relating to government operations and
performance. However, the original goal was not to control or constrain the actions
of the state, but to provide citizens with the knowledge they need to be active
democratic agents and to assist the process of historical research. As President
Clinton stated, “The act is a vital part of the participatory system o f government.”
The FOIA has been a useful tool for organizations (e.g., ACLU) to obtain
information regarding the cases of abuse and torture that have occurred since the
beginning of the war on terrorism. For example, suits filed by a coalition of human
rights and civil liberties groups (including the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional
Rights) requested the release of classified or blocked materials pertaining to the
abuses. This included the additional photos and video tapes kept from the public,
inter- and intra-departmental memos discussing interrogation techniques, and
investigations into allegations of torture. These suits generated thousands of pages of
documents, once classified, documenting torture and abuse and in some cases murder.
Furthermore, the government was ordered to release the remaining photos and three
of the four videotapes. Other released documents included death certificates
indicating the murder o f over two dozen detainees and FBI memos that implicated the
Administration (Bush and Wolfowitz) in promoting and condoning the use of cruel
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and inhumane punishment as well as what is classified as torture within international
law.
While the FOI has acted as an after-the-fact constraint to some degree, its
very structure also contains loopholes that the government has seized upon in an
attempt to block the constraint. Such actions include recent restrictions on obtaining
information through the FOIA. More specifically, an exemption was included in the
2002 Homeland Security Act for infrastructure organizations and corporations
(including the Energy Department).As Representative Henry Waxman (2005: 1)
states:
The Administration has expanded the authority to classify documents and
dramatically increased the number of documents classified. It has used the
USA Patriot Act and novel legal theories to justify secret investigations,
detentions, and trials. In addition, the Administration has engaged in litigation
to contest Congress’ right to information.
Included in the newly classified material were documents describing the prison
abuses at Abu Ghraib. Some documents released to the ACLU were so heavily
redacted they did not reveal any vital information.
Among the efforts to restrict state openness is Executive Order 13,292.86
issued by President Bush on March 25, 2003. This Order rescinds many o f President
Clinton’s innovations to the Reagan classification order and further amended
Executive Order 12958. In essence, it reintroduces a presumption o f harm to national
security for the release o f information (Pozen 2005: 650). Congress has also
narrowed access to Information via FOIA. This includes placing limits on who may
submit a FOIA request. The 2003 Intelligence Authorization Act precluded
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intelligence agencies from disclosing records in response to any request made by
foreign states. This in effect stops foreign states from requesting documents that
could be used to prosecute state actors. Consequently, the increase in classifications,
the restrictions imposed on the Freedom of Information Act, and the declining culture
of openness has significantly hampered the Act from being an effective constraint.
Closely related is the significant increase in the use o f the “mosaic theory.”
The mosaic theory has been used to describe the premise for intelligence gathering.
As Pozen (2005: 3) stated:
It is the view that disparate items of information, though individually of
limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when
combined with other items of information. Combining the items illuminates
their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting
mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of its parts.
As the Department of the Navy argues, “apparently harmless pieces of
information when assembled together could reveal a damaging picture” (32 C.F.R. §
701.31). In other words, separate pieces of information that may not be significant to
national security (a, b, and c), when pieced together may reveal a larger picture (x)
that could potentially reveal information that would risk the country’s security. Since
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the use of the mosaic theory by the DOD, CIA
and the Executive Branch has significantly increased resulting in an extraordinary
increase of government secrecy. The Administration has used the theory to classify
materials that previously would have been declassified, thus, preventing information
from being obtained through the FOIA. As a result, constraints, including Congress,
the media, NGOs, academics, and the public, were seriously hindered in their
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capability to monitor state activities, in this case the systematic use o f torture and
abuse by the military and other OGAs. Moreover, the use o f the theory contravenes
the purpose of FOIA as a source of public knowledge—in essence weakening its
ability to act as a constraint.
Ideally, within a democratic government, the media’s role is to be the public’s
watchdog: keeping an eye on the political apparatus and keeping it in check. In
essence, the media are to inform the citizenry and to make sure representative
government is indeed acting in the best interests o f its constituencies. A watchdog
media could function to constrain state acts that are contrary to the publics’ interest
by reporting information that allows people to see through state propaganda.
However, the mainstream media do not always function in this manner due to self
censorship.
While there is no formal censorship in the USA, there is what some call
“Market Censorship” (Chomsky 2004). Market censorship or self-censorship is a
function of a for profit news institution. The mainstream media do not want to run
stories that will offend their advertisers and owners. A process o f self-censoring did
indeed occur during the war on terrorism, invasion o f Iraq, and the subsequent cases
of abuse and torture. For example, the news media self-censored reports about Iraq
because of concern for public reaction to graphic images and details about death and
torture, according to a survey of 210 U.S. and international journalists. Many
reporters and editors chose less-graphic images and/or omitted explicit details, or
made them less noticeable, according to an anonymous survey conducted between
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September and October 2004 by Hall and Bear (2004). Hall and Bear also found that
of the journalists surveyed from March 2003 to September 2004, respondents from
European and Middle Eastern Outlets (26%) said they were not as confined as the
U.S. media in showing graphic content. In contrast, U.S. journalists were far more
concerned about publishing images o f dead contractors and military personnel. “Our
community is notoriously squeamish and vocal about it to boot,” said one respondent.
“So, we usually avoid dead bodies if we can” (Hall and Bear 2004: 1). Out of 73
journalists working in Iraq, 11 said they “thought that on one or more occasions
editing in the newsroom had distorted the final version of their story.” An embedded
journalist claimed that on some occasions the reports he sent were edited to make
them less negative and more in line with official views. Another said, “The real
damage of war on the civilian population was uniformly omitted.” Thus, it appears
that media self-censorship compromised accuracy and contributed to its general
failure as a constraint.
Nonetheless, there were instances when mainstream U.S. media attempted to
act as a watchdog by alerting the public to early cases of abuse and torture, albeit
briefly before vanishing without a trace or follow-up. For example, on December 26,
2002, the Washington Post wrote a piece on the CIA’s “brass knuckled quest for
information” subjecting Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects to “stress and duress”
techniques o f dubious legality, including sleep deprivation (BBC News 2005). In
November 2003, the Associated Press first raised the issue of abuses and torture in
Abu Ghraib, yet few media outlets noticed the news story.
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In January 2004, the U.S. Command issued a one-paragraph press release
discussing impeding investigations into abuses and torture that occurred in Abu
Ghraib. Yet, very limited coverage o f this press release occurred. For example, the
New York Times published a 367-word report on page 7 noting an inquiry into
allegations of abuse. Other outlets include the Philadelphia Inquirer with a 707-word
article (also on page 7) o f U.S. probing reports o f abuse of detainees; The Boston
Globe with 100 words about an investigation at the end of a lengthy article on Iraq;
and the Dallas Morning Star with only 20 words on 26A (Ricchiardi 2004).
Once the photographs hit the headlines, the topic dominated headlines for a
month. Even then, in general, the coverage of the horrors did not receive the same
level of coverage as abroad. This was not only due to market censorship, but also
because of direct pressure from the Pentagon (Hann 2004). For example, CBS had
come under severe pressure from the Pentagon not to broadcast the images, thus,
holding back for nearly two weeks. Other media outlets were also pressured from
showing the real costs of war. For example, ABC Nightline was going to run a story
on torture and the deaths of U.S. military personnel. However, a group controlling
eight o f the ABC affiliated stations pulled the show claiming it a “blatant anti-war
ploy” (Hann 2004: 1).
A statement from the Pentagon Working Group in their Revised Report on
Interrogation Methods of April 2003 implies that the potential o f the media and public
scrutiny as a constraint could be quite large. They state, “should information
regarding the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques than have been used
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traditionally by U.S. forces become public, it is likely to be exaggerated or distorted in
the U.S. and international media accounts, and may produce an adverse effect.”
(2003: 60). Nonetheless, in essence, the media, as an institution, did not constrain the
Administration by questioning the PR or assessing the claims made overall in the
global war on terrorism, and even more by failing to stay on top o f the limited leaked
cases o f abuse and torture that occasionally surfaced. The effect o f the media
acquiescing to the government’s demands of non-coverage or to corporate interests is
to create a situation whereby they cannot be an effective constraint when bound by
such contradictory interests. The Washington Post and the New York Times have
admitted to such shortcomings in their reporting, specifically that o f pre-war Iraq.
However, had it not been for the media releasing the story and images of Abu
Ghraib, the cases o f abuse and torture may very well have remained unknown.
Furthermore, the few articles questioning systematic practices o f the military, the
Administrations’ decision to hold thousands o f prisoners as enemy combatants, or the
overall foreign policy goal does represent the potential the media could have as a
catalyst of constraint had it been more effective as a watchdog o f political power and
corruption. When the media did act and release the images and subsequent stories of
abuse and torture, the Administration came under increased pressure to explain its
stance on international humanitarian rules and the Geneva Conventions.
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Organizational Level Constraints

Within an organizational setting, a culture o f conformity is normally
established with standards, norms, rules, and regulations. These regulations are both
internal and external. Internal regulations are associated with the larger mission or
goal o f the organization and its capacity to carry out daily standard operating
procedures. External regulations are meant to monitor the organizations activities and
to ensure rules and laws are being adhered to. This environment o f compliance acts to
constrain activities that are counterproductive to internal smooth operations and/or
against external regulations or laws. A failure of an organization to maintain a culture
of compliance can result in two phenomenon: (1) a culture o f anomie, and (2) a
subculture of resistance. Both o f these conditions existed within the walls of Abu
Ghraib. The organizational structure and subsequent environment within Abu Ghraib
was dysfunctional because of a general lack of regulation and lawlessness. Norms and
regulations that generally guide individual behaviors within the structure of a military
detention center were missing, leading to a culture o f anomie. Recall that the MP’s,
normally in charge o f prisoner oversight, were handed over to the M i’s and SOP
forces. This created unclear roles and responsibilities as well as accountability.
General Karpinski was also generally unaware of events and actors in Abu Ghraib.
This also demonstrates a weakness or failure of the formal chain of command and
unclear roles and responsibilities. Investigative Reports stated that soldiers were often
untrained in interrogation methods and were left without proper training on the rules
of prisoner treatment from the Geneva Conventions.
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There was also a subculture o f resistance within the organization preventing
potential constraints from effectively operating. Recall on January 13, 2004, the
Command at Abu Ghraib received a written notice from the ICRC claiming abuse and
torture had been witnessed by them during their spot visits. The response by
Commanders was to require ICRC inspectors to make appointments before visiting
the cellblock, thus trying to “curtail the international organization’s spot inspections
of the prison” (Danner 2004b: 1). Additionally, on May 7, 2004 a declassified e-mail
notes that, “we will continue to be asked about these practices as long as the
Committee visits. . . . I think we need to weight their relative worth” (DOD044801).
There was an agency of the state that operated with a culture of compliance:
the FBI. The ACLU released several documents obtained through the FOIA revealing
a culture of compliance within the FBI. For example, Doc 1836: 5/6/04 states:
In late 2002 and continuing into mid-2003, the Behavioral Analysis Unit
raised concerns over interrogation tactics being employed by the U.S. military.
As a result an E dated 5/30/03, was generated summarizing the FBI’s
continued objections to the use of SERE techniques to interrogate prisoners.
. . . It should be noted that FBI concerns and objections were documented and
presented to General Miller . . . MG Miller appeared in the New York Times
defending “coercive and aggressive” methods.
Not only did the FBI object to and report on the use o f expanded techniques,
such as those coming out of the SERE program in Ft. Bragg, but they also refused to
follow the previously discussed Executive Order by President Bush. E-mail
correspondence states, “We have instructed our personnel not to participate in
interrogations by military personnel which might include techniques by the Executive
Order but beyond the bounds of standard FBI practice” (ACLU FBI Doc 1836 2005).
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There was also a confidential report given to Army Generals by Colonel
Stuart Herrington in December 2003 warning that members o f the CIA and SAP
forces were abusing detainees. This report is an exception to the permissive culture
that was rampant within Iraq and specifically, Abu Ghraib. The report (commissioned
by Major Barbara Fast) claimed that members of a Special Operations Force had been
abusing detainees throughout Iraq and using detention facilities to hide their activities.
Recall the death of the Iraqi detainee in the shower after interrogation by these actors
who was later photographed packed in ice. So why was the FBI operating in a culture
of compliance? This can be partially answered by the FBI’s traditional standard
practices. The FBI has long held the belief that harsh interrogation techniques do not
produce reliable or valid information. Internal Memos, released by the ACLU, affirm
the view that FBI agents viewed torture as counterproductive, unreliable, immoral,
and legally indefensible. This led to a chasm between the interrogation techniques
followed by the FBI and the more aggressive tactics used by some military
interrogators. While the actions and reports submitted by the FBI failed to constrain
some cases of abuse, it did have a small impact. Several detainees were interviewed
and allowed to make allegations that would later be used to expose the abuses that
were occurring. Additionally, the constraint by the FBI did act to block potential
abuses at least while agents were present.
Internal constraints, such as clear lines o f communication, are a normative
component of an organization (Perrow 1986). Effective communication can act to
restrain deviant behavior through monitoring actions and openly discussing
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counterproductive activities. In other words, proper communication lines would allow
the bad news to travel up through the hierarchy o f an organization. The
communication system at Abu Ghraib, however, failed to be an active constraint. This
is illustrated by the many instances when abuses and torture were reported through a
broken chain of command leading to reports being ignored. For example, Specialist
Mathew Wisdom testified before an Article 32 Hearing in April 2004 that he told
superiors that he witnessed a case o f abuse involving England, Davis, Graner, and
Frederick, yet nothing materialized and abuses continued (Hersh 2004a).The reports
did reach certain levels higher in authority; however, the news did not travel to the
top o f the chain. In part, this was due to the overall dysfunctional structure and the
operating informal chain of command. The line of communication should have
produced a consistent set of expectations within the organizational environment.
However, the channels of communication were not open, thus failing to restrain
activities normally associated with illegalities.

Interactional Level Constraints

At the interactional level, the strongest constraints exist within the individual:
self-constraints. These include an individual’s morality or values stemming from their
socialization. While such constraints may restrain some, as was the case with the
torture at Abu Ghraib, they by no means consistently act as restraints for all
individuals after prolonged periods within an environment where they were heavily
socialized into expanded interrogation techniques (differential association) including
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torture. For example, in early October 2003, Staff Sergeant Fredrick took part in
abusing a detainee. When two other soldiers arrived, they demanded the prisoner be
clothed and then took him back to the general population. Sergeant Fredrick was
quoted as saying, “I want to thank you guys, because up until a week or two ago, I
was a good Christian” (Fay Jones Report 2004). He also states in a note to his family
“I questioned some o f the things that I saw . . . and the answer I got was this is how
the MI wants it done.” Sergeant Davis also told the Criminal Investigating
Department “he witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section being made to do various
things that I would question morally.” Nonetheless, Davis was one of the nine
prosecuted in the abuses and torture.
Davis’ story shows how internal constraints can eventually fail in certain
environments. Simply stated, the competition between “institutional power versus the
individual will to resist” is an ongoing process that some endure longer than others
(Zimbardo 2005: 19). Nonetheless, internal constraints played a role in restraining the
systematic and widespread use of torture and cruel and inhumane punishments that
occurred throughout the war on terrorism and at Abu Ghraib specifically. For
example, a Captain o f a MP Brigade unit in Baghdad was approached in the fall of
2003 by a MI Officer requesting that he have his MPs keep a group o f detainees
awake around the clock in preparation of interrogations. The Captain was quoted as
stating in an interview with Hersh (2004a: 34) “No, we will not do that.” When asked
by the MI Officer why he was refusing the Captain stated, “because when you ask an
eighteen-year-old kid to keep someone awake, and he doesn’t know how to do it,
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he’s going to get creative . .. the Army is made up o f people and w e’ve got to
depend on them to do the right thing.”
Within the walls of Abu Ghraib, internal moral restraints also existed. In the
Taguba Report (2004: 45), three soldiers were specifically mentioned for their refusal
to use torture and cruel and inhumane punishments for intelligence gathering means.
Master at arms William Kimbro (a Navy dog handler) refused to participate in using
his dog to terrorize detainees because “he knew his duties and refused to participate
in improper interrogations despite significant pressure from the MI personnel.”
Another such instance involved Lieutenant David Sutton who “stopped an abuse, then
reported the incident to the chain o f command.” SPC Joseph Darby, the most well
known name, also demonstrated internal constraint by not only refusing to participate
but also by being the whistleblower exposing the activities at Abu Ghraib. Sergeant
Joseph Darby, then Spec. Darby, secretly delivered a CD full o f photos o f abuse to
Army Criminal investigators. Some o f the photos were also released to CBS and the
New Yorker, which led to public awareness, the Taguba Report, several other
investigations and Congressional Hearings, and the eventual criminal punishments of
nine low ranking MPs.
Beyond the individuals noted in the Taguba Report, other soldiers refused to
participate in what they viewed as something reprehensible. For example, Specialist
Mathew Wisdom testified on April 9, 2004 during an Article 32 Hearing that he
refused to participate because he “did not want to be a part o f anything that looked
criminal” (quoted in Hersh 2004a: 12). Others testified to the same effect.
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Summary

Constraints were present at all levels of analysis (e.g., international and state
political pressure, NGO and INGOs, public movements, the media, and morality).
Some constraints had an impact, such as the FBI culture o f compliance, media
coverage once the images appeared, and individual moral restraints. Nonetheless, in
general, the constraints at all levels failed to restrain the Administration’s policies or
acts o f torture by U.S. personnel. The reasons for their failure varied in context.
Other constraints had an opposite affect causing additional cases o f torture to occur.
For example, political and public negative reactions to the U.S. invasion of Iraq
resulted in the Administration’s enhanced push for actionable intelligence by any
means to counter the growing insurgency.

Controls

Since the Administration or military personnel were not constrained, we need
to look at existing controls. Recall that controls are a perceived blockage due to
existing and/or after the fact controls such as laws, regulations, belief in sanctions or
punitive measures, and criminal sanctions that are ideally inevitable after the fact.

International Level Controls

At the international level, controls include international law and institutions of
social control such as the ICC, ICMT, United Nations, and the International Court of
Justice (WCJ). As noted above there is an extensive body of international
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humanitarian law addressing war crimes (specifically in this case, the classification of
detainees, torture, and cruel and inhumane treatment) that exist to control states’
behaviors during times of conflict. Consequently, international law provides for a
variety of punitive actions that can be taken against individuals (ICC) or states (ICJ
and UN) through various institutions of social control. The unique position of each
institution as a potential control o f cruel and inhumane punishment and torture will
also be discussed below.

International Law

As noted, there is an extensive body of international law (see Appendix C)
established to guide state and individual actions during times o f conflict or peace. The
capacity of international law as a control can be viewed as two-fold: as a deterrent
and as a guide for state behaviors. However, due to the problematic ways in which
international law can be enforced it does not hold the same deterrent power over
states as domestic laws may have over its citizens. Additionally, states that hold vast
economic, military, and political power within the international arena have long
ignored international law as a frame for their behaviors if it conflicted with their
foreign policy interests. For example, on July 24, 2002, the Administration attempted
to block a UN effort to establish a system of regular inspections o f prisons and
detention centers worldwide to check for abuses (Guardian, July 24, 2002: 1).
Though it failed to do so, the political pressure put on the UN Economic and Social
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Council illustrates how powerful states attempt to block such efforts to protect their
self-interests.
The failure o f international law to work as a control was also due to the lack
of deterrence these laws hold when not in the interest of the state. For example, when
the Administration ignored international humanitarian law for the treatment and
classification o f prisoners, it did so to pursue its interests to categorize detainees as
enemy combatants. The decision to classify prisoners as enemy combatants opened
the door to claims that, as such, they were not entitled to benefits normally granted by
the Geneva Conventions regarding the rules for prisoners. This led to discussions and
rationalizations to expand interrogation techniques that further violated the
Conventions and other Treaties the U.S. ratified. As the world’s leading superpower,
the U.S. is also in a unique position and has often attempted to circumvent
international law, and also to block advancements or monitoring efforts.
The failure o f international law as a deterrent was also evident in comments
made referring to the Geneva Conventions as “obsolete...and rendered quaint”
(Gonzales, January 25, 2002: 1). When law is viewed as irrelevant or illegitimate it no
longer holds a deterrent value. Likewise, international treaties are structured in such a
way that reservations may be attached to them by states, thus, further limiting the
original intent o f a treaty. For example, the U.S. ratified the torture treaty; however, it
included a reservation regarding the definition o f torture. The deterrence value is
further limited when institutions o f control are unable to enforce the existing laws.
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The International Criminal Court

The creation and empowerment of the International Criminal Court
significantly changes the landscape o f international criminality. The intention o f the
ICC is to provide an international system of justice that can address heinous crimes
against humanity when a state is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute any
individual accused o f the crimes specified in the Rome Statute (Mullins, Kauzlarich,
and Rothe 2002). A key distinction between the ICC and other institutions of social
control at the international level is that it addresses crimes o f individuals versus states.
The crimes that are subject for prosecution under the Rome Statute are defined in
Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8.
Article 5 of the Rome Statute fists the crimes within the jurisdiction o f the
ICC: crimes o f genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression (still to be defined by the Assembly of State Parties [ASP]). Crimes of
genocide refer to “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” (Article 6, Rome Statute).
Article 7 defines crimes against humanity as acts that are widespread or a
systematic attack against a civilian population. This includes acts of torture,
intentional causing o f great suffering to body or mental health, murder, and attacks
directed against a civilian population. Crimes against humanity are not as inclusive as
previously recognized Human Rights Law (HRL). The HRL applies in times o f peace
or war but is primarily conscious of protecting people against governmental violence
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against their recognized civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights (Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res.217A (IIIO, UN Doc A/810 at 71 [1948]).
War crimes are defined by breaches of the Geneva Conventions o f August
1949 (Article 8, Rome Statute). These include torture or inhumane treatment,
biological experiments, extensive destruction and appropriation o f property, and
willfully denying a prisoner o f war or other protected person the right to a fair and
regular trial. This category has the potential to be invoked by the ICC against U.S.
personnel and state actors.
While these acts are both customary and criminal offenses, the ability of the
ICC to penalize all who offend is limited. For example, the ICC is limited in its
investigative reach making it unable to subpoena any state or their records. While the
Court may request a warrant or subpoena, the Prosecutor and the Court lack an
empowered policing agency to ensure the enforcement of either request (Articles 5458). However, on December 22, 2004, a cooperation agreement between the Offices
of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)
was signed establishing a framework for cooperation between the two agencies. The
agreement enables the OTP and Interpol to exchange police information and criminal
analysis, and to cooperate in the search for fugitives and suspects. The agreement also
gives the OTP access to Interpol telecommunications network and databases (Rothe
and Mullins 2006).
The Rome Statute describes an ability to have jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes but realistically has limited jurisdiction. For example, its jurisdiction is
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inclusive only of a state party to the treaty or by agreement o f a state not a party to
the Statute. The criteria listed in Article 12 for the exercise o f jurisdiction requires a
state to become a party to the statute or accept the jurisdiction o f the Court if the
crime occurred on that State’s territory, its vessel, or aircraft, or if the State of which
a person accused is a national (Article 12, a-b). No person can be held liable by the
court unless the crime occurred within the jurisdiction o f the court. Thus, the
potential o f the Court to address the systematic cases of torture, murder, and cruel
and inhumane punishment committed by the U.S. is extremely limited. First,
compliance by a non-party state is highly unlikely and non-compliance can act as a
detriment to the ability o f the ICC to be an effective measure o f international justice.
Secondly, the alternative route to the ICC would be for the U.N. Security Council to
unanimously recommend the case to the prosecutor for investigation. Again, with
U.S. veto power, this scenario is not likely. Furthermore, the U.S. has consistently,
throughout the attempts to develop an ICC and the Rome Statue specifically,
attempted to ensure that the court would not impose its authority over its citizenry.

U.S. Opposition to the ICC

The U.S. failed to support the establishment of an ICC throughout the “cold
war era” as it pursued its own self-interests, economic gains, and strategic and
military expenditures. Issues of sovereignty, universality o f jurisdiction, a system of
complimentary, and pre-conditions of consensus have figured in the political and
ideological objections to the establishment of an ICC by the U.S. It appears that the
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U.S. wanted a court for the rest o f the world, but not for itself. U.S. officials insisted
the jurisdiction o f the court could not impinge on the US, its policies, or its own state
actors.
To ensure that U.S. military personnel, Foreign Ambassadors, and other U.S.
officials remained out o f the reach o f international jurisdiction, two key pieces of
domestic legislation were passed. As negotiations over the court were taking shape in
1996, the U.S. passed the War Crimes Act (18 USC § 2441). This legislation stated
that, as a sovereign nation, the U.S. would domestically prosecute its own citizens for
breaches of international war crimes to be included in the Rome Statute.
A year later, the U.S. decided that this was not a strong enough or an
exclusive enough set o f protections and passed The Expanded War Crimes Act, 18
USC & 2401 (SEC. 583). In essence, this legislation provides the necessary law
guaranteeing precedence for the domestic prosecution of any alleged U.S. war crimes,
ensuring that the Court would not have jurisdiction over any U.S. defendants.
Additionally, the legislation enforces previously signed international treaties while
ensuring U.S. primacy of jurisdiction.
The position of the U.S. towards the ICC is contentious at best. The U.S.
took the dubious position that humanity is best served by the U.S. remaining free
from the limitations imposed by the Rome Statute. U.S. Ambassador Scheffer argued
at the international level that the consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for
non-parties to the treaty, limit severely those lawful, but highly controversial and
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inherently risky, interventions that the advocates o f human rights and world peace so
desperately seek from the United States and other military powers.
The Bush Administration’s determination to undermine the ICC was
demonstrated by the political and legislative maneuvering that has taken place during
their term in office. In an effort to further restrict cooperation with the Court, in
2001, President Bush signed into law H.R. 2500 (Departments o f Commerce, Justice,
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act) that contains an
amendment which prohibits the use of appropriated funds for cooperation with,
assistance, or other support to the International Criminal Court or its Preparatory
Commission. This was a political move by the U.S. to restrict the use of military
finances that supported any action for the ICC.
The Bush Administration then submitted a letter to the UN on May 6 2002
that “formally declared U.S. intention not to ratify the Rome Statute, and renounced
any legal obligations arising from its signature of the treaty.” In August 2002,
President George W. Bush signed the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, making the
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act binding U.S. national law. The American
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASMPA) has been dubbed the “Hague Invasion
Act” (CICC 2002, Documents). The ASMPA restricts: (1) U.S. cooperation in any
comportment with the ICC, (2) Participation in UN Peacekeeping, and (3) giving
military assistance to most countries that ratify the Rome Statute. Section 2005 of the
ASMPA restricting the U.S. from UN Peacekeeping missions is broken into several

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

242

aspects providing the U.S. “legitimate legislation” for a coercive tool to de-legitimize
the efficacy o f the ICC.
The U.S. National Security Strategy Policy, released in September 2002, had
a direct reference to the ICC:
We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our
global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential
for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC),
whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.
This premise figures prominently in the multiple memos discussing expanded
interrogation techniques during 2002 and 2003. For example, Memo (15) dated
August 1, 2002 (p. 1) to Judge Gonzales states, “actions taken as part o f the
interrogation o f A1 Qaeda operatives cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC
although it would be impossible to control the actions of a rogue prosecutor or
judge.” The Memo continues with “we cannot guarantee, however, that the ICC
would decline to investigate and prosecute interrogations o f al Qaeda members . . . it
is possible that an ICC official might at least disagree with the President’s
interpretation o f GPW.”
The Bush Administration put substantial pressure on the UN to ensure
immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction by threatening to end all relief aid to Bosnia and
Herzegovina. If the UN did not agree to the U.S.’s demands for immunity the renewal
of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) would
have been put at risk. The result of the pressure put on the UN and the international
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community by the U.S. resulted in a controversial UN resolution. On July 12, 2002,
the Security Council voted on resolution 1422 granting peacekeepers from non-State
Parties a one-year immunity from prosecution by the ICC. A year later, Resolution
1422 was up for renewal at the UN. The proposed Resolution 1487 would offer the
U.S. the same privileges o f impunity granted in 1422. The U.S. concern over
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and laws of jus cogens and erga omnes are evident in the
U.S. Ambassador’s speech to the UN:
The resolution is consistent with the fundamental principle o f international
law, the need for a state to consent if it is to be bound, is respected by
exempting from ICC jurisdiction personnel and forces o f states that are not
parties to the Rome Statute. . . . I would suggest that even one instance of the
ICC attempting to exercise jurisdiction over those involved in a UN operation
would have a seriously damaging impact on future UN operations.. .The US
has been and will continue to be a strong supporter o f the tribunals established
under the aegis o f this Council. However, unlike the ICC, those tribunals are
accountable to the Security Council. (USUN Press Release # 85 (03) June 12,
2003)
The U.S. established bilateral agreement known as Article 98(2) is a response
by the U.S. to Article 98 o f the Rome Statute. The precautions taken by the
Preparatory Commission to recognize pre-dated international agreements between
states resulted in a perceived weakness within the text of the Rome Statute (Article
98). The Preparatory Commission took great pains to ensure requests for assistance
and/or surrender of individuals by the Court would not require a state to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements with respect to state
or diplomatic immunity pursuant to a State’s signature and ratification o f the Rome
Statute. This resulted in the misuse and misinterpretation o f Article 98 that the U.S.
seized to pursue U.S. interests by establishing the U.S. Bilateral 98(2). These bilateral
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agreements where an effort to de-legitimize the ICC and bind the Courts already
limited jurisdictional powers. The U.S. has drafted and circulated to over 100
countries a version of Article 98, 98(2), that would literally render the ICC ineffective
in attaining jurisdictional authority over U.S. nationals, military, peacekeepers abroad
as well as any national the U.S. allowed into its own territory. For example, in the
Working Group Report of April 2003, they state:
Other governments could take a position contrary to the U.S. position on this
point. For those state partied to the ICC that take the position that the ICC
grants universal jurisdiction to detain individuals suspected o f committing
prohibited acts, if these countries obtain control over U.S. personnel, they
may view it as within their jurisdiction to surrender such personnel to the ICC.
In an effort to preclude this possibility, the U.S. is currently negotiating
“Article 98” agreements with as many countries as possible to provide
protection, (p. 54)
This concern demonstrates the potential of the ICC, as slight as it may be, to
serve as an institution of social control.

International Court o f Justice

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ o f the United
Nations. The Court has two functions: (1) to settle legal disputes submitted by States
and, (2) to give advisory opinions on legal questions. The ICJ is a court for state
arbitration, not for addressing individual criminality. Similar to the ICC, ICJ
jurisdiction is only applicable if the States involved have accepted its jurisdiction. The
U.S. withdrew from the ICJ shortly after it was found responsible for several illegal
acts against Nicaragua (1984). Exceptions to the Court’s mandate for consensual
jurisdiction can occur by “virtue of a jurisdictional clause, i.e., typically, when they are
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parties to a treaty containing a provision whereby, in the event o f a disagreement over
its interpretation or application, one of them may refer the dispute to the Court” (ICJ
2005: 1).
It should be noted that the ICJ lacks the ability to enforce its rulings. If parties
do not comply with the Court’s decision, they can be taken before the Security
Council for enforcement action. However, if the judgment were against one o f the
permanent five members of the Security Council or its allies, any resolution on
enforcement would be vetoed. This occurred, for example, when Nicaragua brought
the issue o f the U.S.’s non-compliance before the Council. Furthermore, if the
Security Council refuses to enforce a judgment against any other state, there is no
alternative method of forcing the state to comply. Nonetheless, it is possible that
Afghanistan or Iraq could bring charges against the U.S. to the ICJ. Specific charges
could be related to violations of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time o f War and Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners o f War,
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. If this did
occur, the U.S. would probably reject the Court’s jurisdiction or not comply with its
ruling. In case of the latter, as a member o f the Security Council, no enforcement
would occur. It should also be noted that the ICJ is only able to require monetary
reimbursements or restitution; it is not a criminal court.
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International M ilitary Tribunals

International Military Tribunals (IMT) are ad hoc systems of justice. After
WWII, the first IMT’s, the International Military Tribunal o f Nuremberg and Tokyo,
were established to address the atrocities and illegalities that occurred during the war.
They were not used again until the 1980’s and 1990’s to establish Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, due to their A d hoc nature, the Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda proved to be more than challenging. In part, this was due to
the costs associated with IMT’s, the complexities of reaching consensus on the
procedures or desires for an IMT, and because o f the veto power o f the Security
Council that allows for a selectivity of cases that would be eligible for IMT
(Bassiouni, 1999). Since this time, the Security Council has become less willing to
continue the processes of ad hoc Tribunals.
Nonetheless, an IMT could be created to prosecute the Administration. The
principle o f individual criminal responsibility for ordering the commission of a crime is
expressly recognized in Article 49 of First Geneva Convention, Art. 50 of
Second Geneva Convention, Art. 129 of Third Geneva Convention, Art. 146 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as in the Statutes creating the Criminal
Tribunals on the ex-Yugoslavia (Art. 7.1) and Rwanda (Art. 6.1). (Derechos,
October 29, 1998:1)
Furthermore, the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda Statutes, respectively, provide that:
“The official position o f defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials
in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment” (Article 7, Paragraph 2). With the Pinochet
case, two precedents have been established and/or reinforced: (1) universal
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jurisdiction by IMT; and (2) Heads of State as responsible actors. For example, under
international law, superiors are responsible for acts committed by their subordinates.
Heads of State no longer enjoy personal immunity once they leave office. They
become liable for prosecution if extradited by another state to a location wherein
charges are filed (e.g., Spain for the Pinochet case). Furthermore, the rule provides
that
in case o f perpetration by a state official o f such international crimes as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture such acts, in addition
to being imputed to the state o f which the individual acts as an agent, also
involve the criminal liability o f the individual. In other words, for such crimes
there may coexist state responsibility and individual criminal liability.
(Cassesse 2002a: 6)
Ideally, the potential for an IMT against key Bush Administration Officials
(e.g., G. W. Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Gonzales, Bybee, etc.) is possible under IMT
rules and precedent. However, the likelihood of this occurring is not great.
Fear of IMT prosecutions was formally discussed within the State
Department. For example, the FBI has warned several former U.S. officials not to
travel to some countries, including some in Europe, “where there is a risk of

2

Recall Henry Kissinger sought for extradition for violations of international
law does not leave the U.S. without assurances of not being extradited. Moreover,
“Secretary o f State Colin Powell demanded that Belgium change its war crimes
legislation in order to halt a case against Powell, George Bush senior, Vice President
Dick Cheney and former US army commander Norman Schwarzkopf for committing
war crimes during the 1991 Gulf War. Washington fears a similar lawsuit is about to
be made against George W. Bush for human rights violations and civilian deaths in the
current war” (Michaels 2003: 1).
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extradition to other nations interested in prosecuting them.” And as Senator Helms
(June 2002: 2) recently noted:
[T]his year for the first time we have seen an international criminal tribunal
investigate allegations that NATO committed war crimes during the Kosovo
campaign. In addition, a month ago, in May, NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson submitted to a degrading written interrogation by a woman named
Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor o f the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal.
Given geopolitical realities, it is unlikely that any international tribunal will
ever judge whether the systematic cases of torture violated international treaties.
Moreover, historically, IM T’s have been victor’s courts. With the devastation of
Afghanistan and Iraq, their ability to be a “victor” is rather dubious.

The United Nations

The purposes o f the United Nations “are to maintain international peace and
security” (UN 2005: 1). The potential for the UN as an institution o f social control,
however, is rather limited. For example, only the Security Council under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter has the authority to enforce measures to “maintain or restore
international peace and security.” These enforcement mechanisms or social controls
range from economic sanctions to public symbolic shaming. This was case when Kofi
Annan (September 2004), Secretary General o f the UN, denounced the U.S. invasion
of Iraq calling it illegal. Other symbolic controls included Annan’s statement on
September 24, 2004 that cited the torture of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. forces as an
example o f how fundamental laws were being “shamelessly disregarded.”
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As previously noted, the UN could potentially order sanctions against the U.S.
until it changes its practice o f utilizing expanded interrogation techniques that are
viewed as torture under international law. Mandatory sanctions are used to apply
pressure on states to comply with Security Council objectives. Such objectives may
include interstate or intrastate peace when diplomatic means fail. The range of
sanctions include comprehensive economic and trade sanctions and/or more targeted
measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions.
Other targeted sanctions involve the freezing of assets (that the U.S. has used against
alleged terrorist groups) and blocking the “financial transactions o f political elites or
entities whose behavior triggered sanctions in the first place” (UN 2005: 2).
However, the structural limitations placed on the sanctions’ committee are great, as
the Security Council must approve them. As such, with the power of veto of the
Council, it is highly unlikely sanctions would be put on the U.S. for its role in the
torture and abuses that occurred in the war on terrorism or more specifically, Abu
Ghraib.

State/Cultural Level Controls

Controls at the state level include domestic law and legal sanctions. Pertinent
to this case study are the domestic laws governing torture and abuse and the potential
legal sanctions for their violation. However, as stated in Chapter I, law can serve to
control actions, but also due to the unique position o f a state vis-a-vis, its own
domestic law and the problematic ways in which it is enforced, law may not hold the
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same deterrent power over a political body as it does over citizen actors. Moreover,
the state, as a self- regulator and lawmaker, is in the position to create or nullify laws
governing it. Nonetheless, there are domestic laws governing state actions as well as
those of individual state actors as witnessed by the prosecution of nine MPs for their
involvement in the abuse and torture at Abu Ghraib.
The most powerful, though often disregarded, domestic law governing states
is contained within the Constitution: the supremacy clause that holds
This Constitution, and the laws o f the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law o f the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (U.S. Constitution, Article
VI, clause 2).
Under the Supremacy Clause, treaties form part of
the supreme law o f the land. . . . However, treaties which are non self
executing (i.e., drafted so as to require Congressional implementation, or
declared to be of such a nature by the Senate upon giving its advice and
consent to ratification) have no domestic legal effect. (Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law (3d ed. Vol. I, 2000)
Any conflicting federal statute supersedes self-executing treaties. International treaties
have no legal effect within the domestic territory, thus, requiring international
response via the ICC, WCJ, or IMT. Customary international law is not mentioned in
the Supremacy Clause, nonetheless with the Restatement 3 of the Foreign Relations
Law of the U.S., §111 comment (d), the view is that customary international law has
the domestic legal effect o f federal common law. There are also many domestic laws
that have been incorporated into U.S. law as part o f international obligations, thus
providing controls at the state level. For example, the War Crimes Act o f 1996 and
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the amended 1997 Act were created in response to U.S. obligations to prosecute
individuals for war crimes, including torture.
There are also several other domestic and military laws governing acts of
torture and abuse. These potentially provide legal sanctions for such behaviors.
However, they do not cover those in the Executive Branch, the Pentagon, or highranking officials in the DOD. Simply stated, existing domestic law is for military
personal. These laws include the Eighth Amendment o f the Constitution, U.S. Torture
Statute (18 U.S.C. & 2340) and the U.S. Code of Military Justice. Each o f these laws
has been thoroughly discussed in Chapter III. Infringement o f these laws has resulted
in the legal sanctions and prosecutions previously mentioned.
Another relevant law is The Alien Tort Statute, also known as the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA). Its origins date back to the first Judiciary Act o f 1789, which
created the U.S. court system. It provides that “the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law o f nations or a treaty of the United States” (National Law Journal 2004: 1). The
ATCA grants U.S. courts jurisdiction in any dispute where it is alleged that the “law
of nations,” or international laws, are broken. In June 2004, a Supreme Court ruling
upheld the core principles of the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). This was
contrary to what the Bush Administration had hoped for. The Administration argued
that the ATCA impeded the war on terror, and the U.S. Department o f Justice
claimed the act would interfere with the executive branch’s ability to conduct foreign
policy. Potentially, individuals abused and tortured at Abu Ghraib (and in the war on
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terrorism in general) would be entitled to bring a civil suit against the U.S. for alleged
abuses. This would include being able to sue corporations whose employees took part
in the systematic abuses and torture. Such is the case with CACI International and
Titan who are named as defendants in a suit filed in Federal District Court in
Washington, D.C. under the Alien Tort Claims Act, on behalf o f four Abu Ghraib
detainees. The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and the Philadelphia law firm
of Montgomery, McCracken, Walker and Rhoads filed a second lawsuit (a class
action suit) on June 9, 2004, in federal court in San Diego. This action also utilizes
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), along with the 8th, 5th, and 14th Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution.
There are other controls at the state level involving Congress. For example,
only Congress has the authority to declare war and to provide a check on Executive
decisions. While Congress abdicated this responsibility by providing the President a
blanket approval in the initial war on terrorism, the structure o f Congressional
controls and its legal obligations remain. In a memo from John Yoo and Patrick
Philibin to General Counsel Haynes, the potential affects o f Congress’ renunciation of
their responsibilities was pointed out, “a petitioner might even be able to question
constitutional authority of the President to use force . . . and the legality o f Congress’
statutory authorization in place of a declaration of war” (December 28, 2001, Section
III).
The idea of presidential power potentially overriding congressional
responsibilities appeared shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Several
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memos circulated between John Yoo and Robert Delahunty to William Haynes
proposing limitations of Congressional oversight when it comes to the president’s
authority to allow torture. For example, in a memo dated January 9, 2002, they state,
“Restricting the President’s plenary power over military operations including the
treatment o f prisoners would be constitutionally dubious.” In August 2002, when
talks of expanded interrogation techniques resurfaced, congressional check and
balance powers were further dismissed as irrelevant. As Bybee (2002: 26) stated,
“Any effort to apply criminal laws against torture in a manner that interferes with the
President’s direction of such core matters as the detention and interrogation o f enemy
combatants thus would be unconstitutional.” The final discussion of presidential
power occurred on March 2003 (1) in a DOD Memo that stated, “Any effort by
Congress to regulate the interrogation o f unlawful combatants would violate the
Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander in Chief authority in the President.”
As an after the fact control, on October 5, 2005 the Senate adopted a floor
amendment (S. Arndt. 1977) that would require the DOD personnel to use the Army
Field Manual Guidelines for interrogating detainees and prohibits the cruel and
inhumane and degrading treatment of persons under detention or control of the U.S.
Government. Senator McCain stated, “The Senate has an obligation to address the
authorizing legislation, just as it has an obligation to deal with the issue that
apparently led to the bill being pulled from the floor—America’s treatment o f its
detainees” (McCain, October 5, 2005). The amendment, attached to the Department
of Defense Appropriations bill attempts to regulate future interrogation techniques.
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President Bush originally said he would veto such a bill if passed through both
houses. However, due to the bipartisan support, the Administration did bend and
negotiated on some specific terminology.
The Bill did not prohibit the Field Manual from being revised in the future to
include more expansive techniques under its classified section (CRS Report for
Congress RS223L12). Consequently, on December 13, 2005, the Army approved a
new, classified set o f interrogation methods. “The techniques are included in a 10page classified addendum to a new Army field manual that was forwarded to Stephen
A. Cambone, the under secretary o f defense for intelligence policy, for final
approval.” (Schmidtt, December 14, 2005: 1). With the revised manual being
classified, it is highly unlikely the manual extends the wishes o f the Senate and many
within the Congress.
On December 30, 2005, President Bush signed the McCain Bill. However, he
attached a signing statement declaring that he will view the interrogation limits in the
context of his broader powers to protect national security. A signing statement is an
official document that a president can attach to a new law stating his interpretation of
the legislation. President Bush’s statement is an attempt to waive the restrictions
imposed by the legislation thus negating the intent of the law.
The Judicial Branch (Supreme Court) is an additional control for both the
Executive and Legislative Branches. The Executive Branch is controlled to some
degree by the judicial review process. This is contrary to the assertions of the memos
that circulated discussing the President’s authority to ignore international law that
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“interferes with the President’s war power” (January 9, 2002). This premise of
inherent executive power envisions a President in his role as the Commander-in-Chief
as unaccountable to Congress or the Judiciary. This view has been firmly rejected by
the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2004 (most notably, in the Hamdi and Rasul
decision). Nonetheless,'it failed to control Bush’s decision to classify detainees as
enemy combatants.

Organizational Level Controls

The most relevant variable of control at the organizational level is the code of
conduct that governs those working within the organization, in this case Abu Ghraib.
At Abu Ghraib, this would be the code governing the traditional role of military police
as support of the Joint Task Force. The specific roles include the administrative
processing o f detention operations. Simply stated, MPs are to facilitate combat
operations by providing the movement of prisoners from the battle area to holding
areas and/or detention sites where they then guard the prisoners and maintain order.
The specific code o f conduct for MP operations is fisted in the Code of Military
Justice, which dictates that MPs must treat prisoners humanely and other pertinent
rules governing the treatment and legality of MP behaviors. However, of the “38,000
trained military police in the Army, only about 970 have had specific training in
running prisons” according to Washington Post Staff Graham and Ricks (May 4,
2004: A l). Moreover, General Karpinski had never run a prison system, and
according to The Taguba Report (2004) “there is abundant evidence in the statements
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of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not
proficient” in basic skills needed to operate a prison. Nonetheless, as U.S. soldiers,
the Code of Military Justice binds them. Additionally, as has been discussed in several
other sections, the organizational role of the MP’s had been altered so that they were
aiding M i’s, OGA’s, and SAP forces. This led to an environment where the expected
code of conduct was less than effective. The evidence shows that there was both a
lack o f doctrine governing MP’s and an environment wherein operations were
improvised and ad hoc, making the code of conduct governing the traditional roles
ineffective as a control at the organizational level.
These failures had a direct impact on internal controls. Expected controls
within an organization he in the command and supervisory structure. As previously
discussed, the chain of command at Abu Ghraib was less than clear. This weakened
the internal controls. As Karpinski has stated, it was difficult, if not impossible to
know who was in charge, negating any internal control within the organization.
Furthermore, as CIA and SAP forces were allowed to conduct interrogations in Abu
Ghraib under different rules than M i’s and MP’s answered to, there was an additional
loss o f accountability, thus an additional lack o f internal controls.

Interactional Level Controls
Individual level controls essentially draw upon the legitimacy or perceived
legitimacy of the law and obedience to authority. This assumes there are laws
pertaining to the individual actors. This is indeed the case for the military personnel.
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While perceived legitimacy of authority is a part of personal morality, it is also
separate. Recall Mathew Wisdom’s testimony that he refused to participate because
he did not want to be a part of anything that “looked criminal.” Clearly, he accorded
legitimacy to the laws governing interrogation methods.
As discussed under interactional opportunity, actors at Abu Ghraib
experienced a separation from the consequences of their actions. Separation from
consequences can be understood in two ways. First, it can be used to understand the
disjuncture that occurs between a decision or act and the actual outcome of that
action. This would include the separation o f a CEO making a decision that harms
consumers from the affects of that decision. This also occurred at Abu Ghraib. For
example, General Miller was separated from the affects of his orders where he did not
directly witness or take part in the torture and cruel and inhumane treatment of Iraqi
detainees in Abu Ghraib.
Second, the term can be used to describe a lengthy time delay or lack of a
consequence of an actor’s actions. This can lead to a general lack o f perceived
legitimacy of law, as the actor is not held accountable. For example, Miller escaped
disciplinary actions by his position and that of his network of ties. Investigators,
Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt and Army Brigadier General John Furlow
recommended Miller be disciplined for his role in Command for abuses, however,
General Bantz Craddock rejected the conclusion on the grounds Miller did not violate
U.S. policy of law (Mazzetti 2005: 2).
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Recall that numerous reports from Afghan and American human rights groups
and the Pentagon documented allegations of torture inside U.S. detention sites in
Afghanistan. This was long before the Abu Ghraib scandal erupted; yet instead of
disciplining those involved, the Pentagon transferred key personnel from Afghanistan
to the Iraqi prison. More specifically, recall that the 519th MI Brigade under Captain
Wood, originally stationed at Bagram Afghanistan was transferred to Abu Ghraib.
During their service at Bagram, several soldiers were charged with torture and the
killing of detainees. Nonetheless, once transferred to Abu Ghraib, these soldiers were
allowed to continue conducting interrogations. This could have reduced the perceived
legitimacy of laws governing military personnel in the eyes o f these actors.
Additionally, “[h]ad the investigation and prosecution o f abusive interrogators in
Afghanistan proceeded in a timely manner,” Human Rights Watch executive director
Brad Adams noted in an open letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld fall of
2004, “it is possible th a t. . . many o f the abuses seen in Iraq could have been
avoided” (Adams 2004: 1).
The perceived legitimacy of the Geneva Conventions was rather weak in most
cases. For example, as Kenneth Roth (2004: 1), Executive Director o f Human Rights
Watch stated, “the brazenness with which these soldiers conducted themselves
snapping photographs and flashing thumbs-up signs as they abused prisoners,
suggests they felt they had nothing to hide from their superiors.” The Geneva
Conventions were also viewed as ‘non-relevant’ and as a “joke” (Frontline PBS,
October 18, 2005). Nonetheless, as discussed in previous chapters, there are well-
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established laws governing military behaviors at both the state and international levels.
With the punishment and prosecution o f nine MPs, these domestic military laws were
effective controls and illuminate the potential use o f them in prosecuting other
individuals that took part in abuse and torture.
Controls are also glaringly absent for the private contractors that were
involved in the known cases of abuse and torture in Abu Ghraib as well as those not
yet disclosed. Recall that two civilian employees, Steven Stefanowicz and John Israel,
were specifically mentioned in the Taguba Report as being “directly responsible for
the abuse at Abu Ghraib.” Nonetheless, both men and their corporations, CACI
International and Titan, have not been held accountable. In part, this is due to the
transnational loopholes o f international law that guides traditional state actors during
a conflict. As Singer (2005) stated:
Although private military firms and their employees are now integral parts of
many military operations, they tend to fall through the cracks o f current legal
codes, which sharply distinguish civilians from soldiers. Contractors are not
quite civilians, given that they often carry and use weapons, interrogate
prisoners, load bombs and fulfill other critical military roles. Yet they are not
quite soldiers, either.
Iraqi prosecutions of civilian contractors could have been an option as well.
However, procedures were taken by Paul Bremer to ensure immunity from Iraqi
prosecution for private contractors and agents working under the auspices of OGA or
SAP forces. In June 2003, Bremer, through the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) handed down Memorandum 17, granting foreign contractor’s immunity from
Iraqi law. The memo also put private contractors under the legal authority of their
domestic national laws. In June 2004, Paul Bremer signed a revised version of
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Memorandum 17, stipulating that the rule governing contractors immunity remain in
effect until forces are withdrawn from Iraq. The Order grants immunity from “local
criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction and from any form o f arrest or detention
other than by persons acting on behalf of their parent states” (Memorandum 17, 2004:
3). While legal controls are said to exist for these contractors within their domestic
laws, they are only bound when contracted by the DOD which most are not.
However, U.S. contractors are subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
(MEJA), which allows for the prosecution o f civilians employed by or accompanying
the military while overseas. President Bill Clinton signed the MEJA in October 2000.
However, MEJA specifically states that it pertains only to contractors employed by
the Department o f Defense.
Consequently, many of the civilian employees escape domestic accountability
because they were contracted under the Department of Interior (DOI), which
provides another loophole whereby civilian contractors are not covered by U.S. law.
This was the case with Titan and CACI, both operating under contracts from the
DOI. Nonetheless, if corporations are under contract to the Pentagon they are
required to follow a set of rules known as the Defense Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) that contains a section on “Contractor Standards o f Conduct”
covering proper behavior. DFARS was amended on June 6, 2005, to hold U.S.
contractors deployed overseas accountable under U.S. and international laws as well
as those of the host country. This had little effect, however, since immunity was
granted from Iraqi law and international law fails to govern international corporations.
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The exception to this is the recent Agreement by the Economic and Social
Council (2003), to which the U.S. is a signatory, which addresses the criminal liability
of transnational organizations. Furthermore, it specifically mentions that these
organizations (actors within the organization) fall under the purview of international
law and the ICC. The 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities o f Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights
Agreement sets precedence for the suggestion made in Rothe and Mullins (2006) that
transnational organizations should fall under the purview o f the ICC and be defined as
such in the Rome Statute. Thus, ideally, individuals such as Israel and Stefanowitz
could be held accountable at the international level via the ICC (highly unlikely) or an
international military tribunal.
The other variable of control at the interactional level is obedience to
authority. This includes two views. The first view is associated with obeying higher
orders such as those given, though not consistently, by the Administration to adhere
to the Geneva Conventions for all Iraqi detainees. However, the orders were
interjected with confusing and often ambiguous terminology as well as policy;
nonetheless, established military doctrine does exist and soldiers should have obeyed.
Secondly, the concept o f higher authority relates to international law. There is
international precedence, wherein amnesty or deniability based on this concept of
obeying orders or higher authority is not valid, regardless o f such arguments made by
Legal Counsel to the President and other DOD personnel. Thus, the presence o f legal
precedent to such claims could potentially act as a deterrent. Furthermore, as Cohn
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(2004) observed, the well-established doctrine o f “command responsibility,” in both
international law and U.S. military law
provides criminal liability for commanders whose underlings commit war
crimes. Even if the superior officer did not personally carry out the criminal
acts, he would be liable if he knew or should have known of the conduct, yet
failed to take reasonable measures to prevent or repress the criminal behavior.
In the case o f Iraqi prisoners in U.S. custody, there is significant evidence that
immediate superior officers were aware that prisoners were being tortured, and that
these practices were not limited to the Abu Ghraib prison (see Jehl and Schmitt
2004a; Wilkinson and Rubin 2004; Zemike 2004a, 2004b). And as the torture memos
and other internal state documents show, responsibility for these abuses does not stop
with superior officers in Iraq, but goes right to the top of the Pentagon and the White
House (Danner 2004a; Greenberg and Dratel 2005; Hersh, 2004a; Kramer,
Michalowski, and Rothe 2005). Moreover, as Levinson (2004: 139-140) states
individuals are not “unthinking automatons whose ethics are confined to the single
commandment o f obeying orders from a military or bureaucratic superior.”

Summary

Controls at all levels do indeed exist. However, their effectiveness as such was
limited for several reasons. I noted at the international level, the inherent
contradiction between state sovereignty and a universal international institution of
social control has impeded efforts since WWII to hold states accountable for their
illegal actions. Additionally, U.S. reluctance o f being controlled was and continues to
be a factor in the inability of international institutions of control to exert any form of
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deterrence. Likewise, as a state, it is in a unique position to establish laws that can
protect itself from accountability. Military doctrine and internal organizational
controls also failed for a variety of reasons including the dysfunctional chain of
command. At the interactional level, perceived legitimacy of law was accorded by a
few actors thus acting as a control. On the other hand, perceived legitimacy of law did
not occur for others.
Knowing how such acts o f torture and cruel and inhumane acts occurred (and
are occurring) we are left with the question o f what can be done in an attempt to stop
such actions in the future. In the following conclusion, I attempt to answer this larger
question by offering several policy suggestions that could potentially act to restrain or
control such actions in the future.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The goal o f this dissertation has been to identify, explore, and explain why
torture and cruel and inhumane treatment occurred at Abu Ghraib. Using a revised
version of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) integrated theoretical model I have shown
how the torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib were inextricably linked to the Bush
Administration’s foreign policies and disregard for international law. While there are
other motivations and influences that contribute to the overall production o f torture
as a social phenomenon, the theoretical model was able to incorporate and interpret
these events also.
In Chapter I, I raised some critical questions regarding the current
understanding o f state theories. Specifically discussed were the contending views of a
state’s role and the problematic tendency to omit the operationalization o f the state. I
then provided a working definition of a state in an attempt to rectify this key absence.
Included in this chapter is a review o f the contributions of state and state-corporate
crime scholars illustrating that critical criminologists have contextualized state
behaviors that violate international or domestic law as state crime for nearly two
decades.
Chapter II presented the theoretical frame that guides my analysis. Included in
this section is a review o f Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) integrated model that
264
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framed the theoretical approach I utilized. This chapter suggested several revisions to
the model. First, I argued for adding a fourth dimension, the international level, to
address the culture and legal structure o f international society. After all, state cultures
and practices are often contradictory with the emergent culture and legalities at the
international level. This was the case with the U.S. practices and foreign pohcy that
led to the torture at Abu Ghraib. Additionally, I suggested that Kauzlarich and
Kramer’s operationality o f control needed to be divided to account for differences
between constraints and controls. Likewise, several factors were removed from the
catalyst of opportunity and reconceptualized as constraints or controls.
Chapter III explored the nature of international law. This included a brief
history followed by a more extensive look at the international laws relevant to the
cases o f Abu Ghraib torture. Specific legal issues concerning war crimes, torture, the
status of detainees during times o f conflict, and federal laws and military codes
applicable to this case study were also considered.
In Chapter IV, I provided a descriptive account of historical events leading up
to the torture and abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib. This included charting the rise
of the neo-conservative agenda in U.S. politics and the war on terrorism: specifically,
the invasion of Afghanistan, the installation o f detention camps at Guantanamo, and
the onset of the war on Iraq. Chapter V described the events at Abu Ghraib that
occurred leading up to the torture and/or cruel and inhumane punishment. I then
provided a voice to victims of torture and abuse taken from testimony in investigative
reports and the subsequent civil law suits against key actors (e.g., Secretary of State
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Rumsfeld, General Karpinski and Sanchez, and Attorney General Gonzales) by the
American Civil Liberties Union. That chapter concluded with an explanation o f the
Administration’s responses to the abuse and torture that occurred at Abu Ghraib.
The theoretical analysis to explain why torture occurred at Abu Ghraib is
started in Chapter VI. Specifically, the analysis in this section is organized according
to the catalysts o f motivation and opportunity. The chapter is further divided between
general and specific motivations and opportunity. Simply stated, the general
motivations and opportunities are viewed as necessary but not sufficient without the
specific motivations and opportunities that occurred. Chapter VII continued the
theoretical analysis by focusing on the catalysts o f constraints and controls. These
concepts were further delineated by levels of analysis. Specifically, I explored
constraints and controls that were present at the international level, the statestructural level including the state political apparatus, the organizational level (Abu
Ghraib), and the interactional level (actors immediately involved in the torture and
abuse at Abu Ghraib).
Overall, the findings suggest that the torture and abuse was not the result of a
few deviant soldiers as claimed by the Administration. Instead, it was the result of
numerous key decisions and policies put in place by the Bush Administration. These
included the decision to classify prisoners as enemy combatants in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo, the desire for actionable intelligence, expanded interrogation
techniques, the enhanced practice o f using covert forces, organizational isomorphism,
a dysfunctional organizational environment at Abu Ghraib, and untrained,
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understaffed, and unsupervised low ranking military personnel. Taken together these
factors that led to the torture and abuse of hundreds o f detainees at Abu Ghraib
prison.
Given these findings, various control policies are presented in the following
section. State crime scholars have long recognized that policies specifically addressing
individuals are not sufficient as long as the organization or institutional culture
remains in place. Additionally, scholars have identified the problems associated with
states monitoring or sanctioning their own illegal behaviors. Therefore, the following
section suggests policies that take into account both individual and institutional
accountability. The policies include external control mechanisms as well as a call to
strengthen internal checks and balances. More specifically, I suggest that to constrain
the phenomenon o f torture and other violations o f international humanitarian laws the
International Criminal Court must be further empowered. Additionally, states and
transnational corporations, such as CACI and Titan, must be held accountable by the
Court along with the individuals representing them. Along with strengthening internal
checks and balances, I also suggest ending Congressional abdication and limiting
Executive power. Other suggestions include strengthening military training on
international humanitarian laws, and reevaluating the emergent military practices and
policies regarding interrogation and treatment o f prisoners.
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Policy Suggestions

International law is fundamental to the control o f crimes of the state. While
the criminological literature shows limited deterrent effects o f law in controlling street
crimes, some work has shown that among white collar offenders (or more socially
bonded offenders) there is a greater potential for law to control social actors and their
decision making processes. Those actors most likely to be involved in state crime
would seem to be those who are most susceptible to the deterrent effects of law.
Clearly, especially within the cases discussed in this dissertation, the U.S. has engaged
in criminal actions simply because they can. Current geo-political and international
legal structures offer no threat of consequences; international law can be violated
without threat o f prosecution simply because there is no empowered institution to do
so. When actors can act with impunity, some will chose to do so. Consequently, for
the most egregious o f crimes international law has historically done little to deter.
This observation forms the foundation of my suggestions focused on the ability of the
ICC to eliminate impunity and create a deterrent effect for international laws.
The question of whether or not the International Criminal Court will be able to
do what existing structures (UN, WCJ, and IMT) have been unable to do is still an
open question. Moreover, as the Court stands now, several limitations hinder its
potential to be an effective control. As currently structured and empowered, the ICC
cannot fulfill its potential or stated mission. Specifically, since nations must voluntarily
come under the control of the court, the most powerful and potentially criminal states
can avoid control simply by refusing participation. To remedy this situation the Court
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must: (1) attain universal jurisdiction, (2) expand the scope of individuals to include
state and transnational entities, (3) add the much needed definition o f crimes of
aggression, and (4) become fully empowered with its own enforcement agency. I see
these modifications as necessary for the Court to attain a full level o f legitimacy as a
full-time institution o f social control. Moreover, as the world and global capitalistic
interests become more intertwined, a fully empowered universal court is necessary to
deter and respond to the most heinous crimes against humanity as a whole.
One of the most significant potential policies which would ensure the Court
becomes a more legitimate and fully empowered institution o f social control would be
to grant it universal jurisdiction. This could be achieved in several ways. First, recall
that Article 123 of the Rome Statute allows for the Treaty to be altered in seven years
from the date it went into action. Changes could include adding crimes covered by the
Court (e.g. terrorism). The text o f the Treaty could also be modified removing the
condition of state acceptance, thus granting it universal jurisdiction. Secondly, the
Court could attain the status o f customary law. This could be accomplished by
precedence set by an international military tribunal or the World Court o f Justice
(e.g., the ICJ ruling granting universal jurisdiction in the Pinochet case). Last and
perhaps the least likely way for the Court to attain universal jurisdiction would be that
nearly all nation-states consented to the Court’s jurisdiction without reservations or
the opt-out clause previously discussed. However, as the criminological research on
state crime has shown, states with the most at risk economically, politically, and
ideologically, such as the U.S., are highly unlikely to allow themselves to be regulated
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by outside agencies (Rothe and Mullins 2006). This scenario also illuminates one of
the weaknesses with Article 13 (b) wherein only the Security Council can agree to
extend temporary jurisdiction to the Court beyond the conditions o f other Articles to
reach individuals not covered under the Court’s current jurisdiction. Just as state
compliance is unlikely by powerful nation-states, the same states sit on, or have allies
on, the Security Council, utilizing their veto power in accordance with their political,
economic, and ideological interests. For example, it is highly unlikely that the U.S.
government or President Bush would have a case brought against it for the Iraq
invasion and occupation as the U.S. has veto under Article 13 (b).
The potential o f the Rome Statute reaching the level o f customary law (erga
omnes) is a realistic possibility according to precedence set by international law and
the International Court of Justice. The International Court o f Justice states:
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a
conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of
international law, it might be that, even without the passage o f any
considerable amount of time, a very widespread and representative
participation in the convention might suffice o f itself, provided it included that
of states whose interests were especially affected. (ICJ: Continental Shelf
Case, 1969)
Therefore, the Rome Statute in the future may be perceived as general
customary law such as the Nuremberg Principles and reach a level o f universal
jurisdiction regardless of the wording or limitations o f jurisdiction. The phrasing of
the Treaty can then be altered under Article 123 of the Rome Statute. However, to
make this a political reality, some entity within international society must attain a level
of influence to rival that of the United States. As o f this writing, I believe that the
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European Union has such potential. The economic, political and military power
represented by this trans-national governmental body could balance the undue
influence the U.S. wields in world affairs.
The inclusion o f states as criminally responsible actors, currently omitted from
the ICC would eliminate state impunity. By including a state as criminally liable it
would follow that, as acting Head o f State, the individuals) at the top o f a political
apparatus could also be held responsible. Thus, leaders cannot avoid responsibility
through claims o f ignorance, non-participation, hegemonic propagandized counter
claims, or plausible deniability. States could not protect both their inner circle and
military leaders by limiting prosecutions to the lowest levels o f involvement (Schmitt
2005a). Such additional prosecutorial possibilities will place a level o f responsibility
upon state leaders that should undercut existing criminal tendencies. It will also
heighten the diligence governments practice in the oversight o f their sub-units.
For the ICC to generate much needed general and specific deterrence among
criminal states, it must be able to focus its prosecution on both the leaders of a given
state as well as the state itself. A polity as an organization will not necessarily be
deterred from criminal action if it can sacrifice individual agents to the court as it can
sacrifice individual soldiers and units on a battlefield similar to what occurred at Abu
Ghraib. Precedent was set at the Nuremberg Trials where both Germany and Hitler
were considered criminally liable. Furthermore, both Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998)
work and this dissertation emphasize that the locus of state criminality is the state, not
the individual. Structural and organizational conditions combine with individual

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

272

predilections and positions to generate these offenses; punishment o f individuals alone
will not be able to deter states themselves from offending. One can sanction numerous
bureaucrats, soldiers and spies without eliminating a state’s ability or motivation to
engage in criminal behaviors. The most powerful motivational elements arise within
the state itself, not within the state’s agents (Mullins et al. 2004).
Additionally, holding states legally liable would further ensure victim(s)
compensation and a sense o f justice for those victimized. It also would allow for
sanctions to be set against the state rather than utilizing the underpowered ICJ or
trying to get the Security Council to act. Obviously, one cannot incarcerate a state.
However, the ability to levy trade and other sanctions upon criminal states may act as
controls. Restriction of trade, imposition of tariffs, denial of loans from foreign
powers or the International Monetary Fund, or insistence upon collection of
outstanding debts are all tools which the ICC could use to exert social control. This
requires that there exist political and economic bodies capable o f and willing to
engage in such sanctioning.
The idea o f the criminal liability of organizations is not new either. Within the
scope of criminological research such claims have been made for several decades.
Moreover, during the Rome Statute Prepatory Committee meetings the concept of
organizations and states were added into one of the existing Drafts (Rothe and
Mullins 2006). The recent Agreement by the Economic and Social Council (2003), to
which the U.S. is a signatory, specifically addresses the criminal liability of
transnational organizations. Furthermore, it mentions that these organizations (actors
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within the organization) fall under the purview o f international law and the ICC. The
2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights Agreement sets precedence for my
policy suggestion that transnational organizations should fall under the purview of the
ICC and be defined as such in the Statute.
Article 18 o f this Agreement also sets up criminal liability for which the ICC
could potentially have jurisdiction. It states: in connection with determining damages,
in regard to criminal sanctions, and in all other respects, these Norms shall be applied
by national courts and/or international tribunals, pursuant to national and international
law (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2). My contention is that the Court should consider
cases involving transnational organizations that are violating the laws covered in
Rome Statute. Specifically in the case of Abu Ghraib, corporations such as CACI and
Titan would no longer operate in legal ambiguity.
Wars o f aggression are the most destructive and destabilizing o f all state
crimes. It is for this reason that the Nuremberg Charter defined wars of aggression as
“the supreme international crime.” Moreover, the act of aggression has long been
criminalized both customary law and the UN Charter. The specific prohibition of
aggressive war is found in Article 2(4) of the Charter which reads: “All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use o f force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or [behave] in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Yet, the fact remains
during the Rome Statute negotiations, at the insistence of the U.S. Ambassador, the
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definition of aggression previously passed by the General Assembly o f the United
Nations was not carried over to the treaty. Thus, the issue was left undefined and
failed to be settled prior to the final moments when the vote was taken to pass the
Rome Statute (see Article 5 (2) for specific details). At this point, the crime of
aggression cannot fall under the Court’s jurisdiction until the original seven-year span
is expired (from the signing of the Rome Statute) and additions can be made.
Specifically, a new provision must now be adopted in accordance with articles 121
and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall
exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.
The subject o f enhanced empowerment is indeed controversial, as it would
entail a further financial burden for the Court and supporting states as well as a
commitment to the training and hiring of a sub-agency within the Court’s purview.
However, I believe it is a necessary step to ensure compliance to extant international
i

law by states as well as to ensure that individuals are brought to the Court.
Furthermore this agency could act to retrieve documentation and evidence (just as
domestic policing agencies do), serve and/or arrest suspects, and ensure safe travel to
and from detention during court proceedings. The ICC must have the authority to
subpoena state records, non-accused witnesses and other currently “protected” sets of
information crucial to any prosecution. While INTERPOL currently exits, I believe
the enforcement agency of the Court should consist of independent agents, hired and
trained for the specific duty of court enforcement.
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Taken as a whole, the above suggestions are directed towards modifying
existing Articles established in the Rome Statute in order to generate an international
legal body that can produce significant reductions in state crime. Optimistically, I see
the potential within the ICC to become a major instrument in the control and
constraint of state crime and an institution providing much needed social justice on
the international level. Even if it has no other current effects on the types of crime I
have explored in this dissertation, minimally it provides the possibility for resolution,
justice and restitution for victims o f these acts o f torture and abuse. Moreover, it does
provide a formal historical record o f the act in hopes it may remain part o f the
collective conscious of humanity.
At the domestic level, or structural level, legislation needs to be enacted that
allows for the CIA, Special Forces, and the U.S. Government to be held accountable
through domestic civil suits seeking restitution for victims. Foreigners have recently
been banned from such victim’s rights. Under the doctrine of sovereignty, the state
may not be sued either. The Federal Tort Act also allows for broad waivers of
immunity for most federal officials. This legislation needs to be changed to take into
account domestic and foreign cases o f torture. It should include any U.S. official,
agents, or contractors who engage in torture practices whether within or out of the
U.S. Along these same lines, a victims’ advocacy group should be created to allow for
proper compensation and voice within the proceedings.
The Constitutional system o f checks and balances must be kept intact and
strengthened. Congress should not abdicate its authority as it did regarding Executive
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decisions to allow torture and the blanket powers extended to the Executive Branch
for war making. Constituents of Congressional members must insist the checks and
balances afforded by the Constitution are adhered to. Additionally, the Supreme
Court needs to adhere to precedent and limit Executive power, thus reinforcing the
significance of checks and balances.
The FOIA must not be reduced to a bureaucratic tool to disseminate partial
news bytes to the public. Instead, it must operate as a system o f transparency.
Restricting previously declassified material when in the Administration’s self-interest
must not be allowed. Additionally, the use of the mosaic theory by administrators to
pursue unwarranted state secrecy must not be allowed. Documents that are not
relevant to national security must be released to the public upon request. Likewise,
redactions must not be allowed that are not relevant to national security or the
security of individuals. Specific to this case, all government files and investigations
dealing with the cases of torture or murder during the war on terrorism needs to be
declassified without redections.
At the organizational level, there should be mandatory training for all military
personnel that extensively covers international humanitarian laws. This process of
socialization could potentially have an effect at the Interactional level. Moreover, a
system of rewards and protections should be implemented for individual military
personnel reporting cases of abuse to internal and external sources.
These suggestions are but a few to address the complexities involved in crimes
of the state. I have offered several broad policy suggestions that pertain more
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generally to cases o f state crime involving war crimes in hope that someday such
controls will effectively constrain or control acts such as torture.

Limitations

As with any research, this thesis has limitations. Qualitative methods are
considerably more valid than some forms of quantitative methods but lack reliability
due to the inherent danger of subjective and speculative interpretations that cannot be
completely controlled for. Most researchers attempt objective and value free
interpretations; however, the effects o f individual values and views are still present in
the researcher’s interpretations. Therefore, it must be understood that qualitative
research does create the inherent danger of subjective interpretation. By
acknowledging the inherent values and views a researcher brings with his/her
interpretations and by proclaiming the theoretical notions and frameworks to be
utilized in the process of interpretation safeguards can be established (Vaughn, 1982).
Other limitations o f this study include the claim that external validity, the inability to
generalize, is of significance. However, Yin (1984) has refuted that by presenting an
explanation o f the difference between analytic generalization and statistical
generalization: “In analytic generalization, previously developed theory is used as a
template against which to compare the empirical results o f the case study.” Yin also
suggests that generalization o f results, from single designs, is made to theory and not
to the specific population: in this case Abu Ghraib. Therefore, while specific
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generalizations may not be able to be made, general theoretical and analytical
generalizations remain valid.
With any case study, serious errors are possible when “official” reports and
declassified materials are utilized. However, the potential for errors can be controlled
through data triangulation. Nevertheless, these types of data still contain several
innate flaws (Berg 1998). Examples o f this include missing elements in documents or
missing portions of such documents. For this reason any research utilizing declassified
memos and documents as data is subject to receiving or obtaining only partial
information. This then limits what can be analyzed. The other side to this limitation is
that the researcher’s decision o f what to analyze frames what is sought in the data
collection.
Other limitations include the compartmentalization o f social agencies and
international organizations that contribute to the complex nature of assessing the
intent, impact, and social context of the political decisions that created or enabled the
events at Abu Ghraib to occur. Specifically, the multitude of actors, agencies, and
interdepartmental organizations, can contribute to an overwhelming and complex
context that will leave some areas o f analysis inaccessible or incomplete. Finally, the
recorded documentation within internal documents will seldom reflect the political
and conflicting activity that occurs “behind the political curtain,” shrouding the
political deliberations that may have influenced the policy makers decision (Bassiouni
1997). Specific commentaries and the subsequent military trials of those accused were
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unattainable for this research. Consequentially, a complete documentation of the
events at Abu Ghraib cannot be written at this time.

Future Research

Building upon this dissertation, future research could include a deeper
examination of the philosophical arguments for/against the use o f torture. This could
include a deeper historical analysis of the use o f torture by states to achieve specific
goals. Such an extension would strengthen findings o f this dissertation that torture is
often carried out by states and/or torturers claiming a higher virtue or greater good.
Along these same lines, a deeper analysis of the historical uses of torture would be
beneficial to a more holistic understanding o f the practice itself.
This work also presents a larger question of the phenomenon o f organizational
isomorphism. As this analysis has shown, torture had been a practice of the CIA for
decades. Additionally, specific techniques developed and used by the CIA over the
past five decades were subsequently used by lower ranking military personnel at Abu
Ghraib. As such, a study exploring these linkages could be beneficial for future policy
suggestions.
With any case of state crime, the factors involved in each case are complex
and often interwoven. As such, analysis of these phenomena can take multiple
directions. Additionally, exploring different venues to answer why they occurred can
help in developing theoretical patterns and correlations that can then be used in an
attempt to generalize to other forms of state crime.
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Institutional Environment: history, political, economy., and culture
Motivation
Culture o f competition, Economic pressure, Organizational Goals, and
Performance emphasis.
Opportunity Structure
Availability o f legal and/or illegal means, Obstacles and constraints, Blocked
goals/strain, and Access to resources.
Operationality of Control
International reactions, Political pressure, Legal sanctions, media scrutiny,
Public opinion, and Social movements.
Organizational: structure and process
Motivation
Corporate Culture, Operative goals, Subunit goals, and Managerial Pressure.
Opportunity Structure
Instrumental rationality, Internal constraints, Defective SOPs, Creation o f
illegal means, Role specialization, Task segregation, Computer,
Telecommunications and network technologies, and Normalization o f
deviance.
Operationality of Control
Culture o f compliance, Subculture o f resistance, Codes o f conduct, Reward
structure, Safety and Quality control procedures, and Communication
processes.
Interactional: Face to Face interaction
Motivation
Socialization, Social meaning, Individual foals, Competitive individualism, and
Material success emphasis.
Opportunity Structure
Definition o f situation, Perceptions o f availability and attractiveness o f illegal
means.
Operationality of Control
Personal morality, Rationalization and techniques o f neutralization, Separation
from consequences, Obedience to authority, Group think, and Diffusion of
responsibility
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998:149)
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Integrated M odel-Motivations and Opportunities
International Level

Motivation

Opportunity

Political Interests
Economic Interests

International Relations
Economic Supremacy
Military
Supremacy
Complimentary Legal System

Resources
Ideological Interests

State/Structural Level
Culture of Competition
Economic Pressure
Political Goals
Ideological Goals

Availability Illegal Means
Access to Resources
Classified
Materials
Media Censorship
State Propaganda
Role
Specialization

Organizational
Level
Corporate Culture
Organizational Goals
Operative Goals
Sub-unit Goals
Managerial Pressure
Reward Structure

Subculture of Resistance
Defective SOP
Illegal Means
Role
Specialization
Task Segregation
Instrumental Rationality
Normalization of Deviance

Interactional Level
Socialization
Social Meaning
Individual Goals
Individual Ideology
Competitiveness
Individualism
Material Success
Driven Goal Success

Rationalization
Techniques of Neutralization
Group Think
Separation Consequences
Diffusion of Responsibility
Definition Situation
Perceived Illegal Means
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Revised Integrated Model-Constraints and Controls
Constraints

Controls

International Reaction
Political Pressure
Public Opinion
NGO/Social Movement
Oversight Agencies

International Law
International Sanctions
Economic Institutions

International Reactions
Political Pressure
Media Scrutiny
Public Opinion
Social Movements
Obstacles
Blocked Goals

Legal Sanctions
Domestic Law

Culture of Compliance
Internal Constraints
Communication Process
Reward Structure
Safety and Quality Processes

Codes of Conduct
Internal Controls

Personal Morality

Obedience to Authority
Legitimacy of
Law__________

Religion
Socialization
Employment Security
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International Humanitarian Law

Hague Convention No. IV, 18 October 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs o f
War on Land, T.S. 539, including the regulations thereof.
Hague Convention No. IX, 18 October 1907, Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time o f War, 36 Stat. 2314
Geneva Convention, for the Amelioration o f the Condition o f the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration o f the Condition o f Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3363, 75 U.S.T.S.
85
Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War, August 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
Geneva Convention, Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War,
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
The 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, December 12, 1977, 16
I.L.M. 1391, DA Pam 27-1-1
Protocol for the Prohibition o f the Use in War o f Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other
Gases, and o f Bacteriological Methods o f Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65
Convention on the Prohibition o f the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
o f Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, January 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection o f Cultural Property in the Event o f
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 216
Convention on the Prohibition o f the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 10,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 583
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions o f the Use o f Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, October 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523
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Breakdown o f C ore C onventions a n d P rotocols:

Convention (I) for the Amelioration o f the Condition o f the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949—provides for the care o f the
wounded and sick combatants to eliminate torture, murder, and biological
experiments.
Convention (II) for the Amelioration o f the Condition o f Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members o f Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949— covers
the wounded, captured or sick combatants at sea.
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War. Geneva, 12 August
1949—this covers prisoners o f war to be treated humanely, adequate housing
provided, food, clothing, and medical care. Prohibits torture, medical experiments,
and acts o f violence, insults and public curiosity against those captured.
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War.
Geneva, 12 August 1949—This one includes civilians. Parties to the conflict must
distinguish between civilians and combatants and direct their operations only against
military targets. Civilians must be permitted to live as normally as possible and to be
protected against murder, pillage, torture, reprisals, indiscriminate harm,
indiscriminate destruction o f property and being taken hostage. Their honor, family
rights, and religious convictions must be respected. Occupying forces shall ensure safe
passage o f food and adequate medical supplies and establish safety zones for the
wounded, sick, elderly, children, expectant mothers, and mothers o f young children.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection o f Victims o f International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 19 7 7 pro vides further details o f civilian protections in international conflicts (the US signed
but did not yet ratify this one, yet, this is considered to be codified via customary law
- erga omnes). It states, in order to ensure necessary protection o f the civilian
population and civilian objects and military objects and accordingly direct their
operations only against military objectives. It also includes indiscriminate attacks on
civilians (Article 41 o f Protocol I). Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions
o f 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection o f Victims o f Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
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Legal Documents Prohibiting Torture
International
The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land (IV),
1907.
The United Nations Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, 1948.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Person in Time o f War,
1949.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War, 1949.
The Declaration on the Protection o f All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture,
UNGA 1975.
The American Convention on Human Rights, 1978.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 1987.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1996.
The Rome Statue o f the International Criminal Court. 1998.

U.S. Domestic
Eight Amendment o f the U.S. Constitution.
U.S. Torture Statute: 18 USC 2340.
U.S.C. o f Military Justice (Articles 93,118,124,128).
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Photographs o f Abu Ghraib Torture
All Photographs Reprinted for Fair Use, U.S.C. 17 Chapter I §107
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